To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The Nazis switched from a commercial to a partially disengaged strategy, as discussed in Chapter 8, and were joined by a Japanese empire whose own arc of policy ran along parallel lines. While London once more failed to pursue the commercial containment of Berlin before the war, the United States and Nazi Germany competed in prewar trade negotiations, concluding agreements with many countries that would soon join the Allies, be occupied by the Axis, or both. Those US pacts were the original down-payment on American hegemony, providing the template for the postwar trading system.
After the shallow stabilities of the mid 1920s, marked by Locarno and modest economic recovery, the Great Depression returned Europe to crisis. The Versailles order crumbled, from Stresemann’s western conciliation to national minority protections. Then, presaged by his predecessors’ burial of reparations and plans for rearmament, Hitler’s aggressively distinctive program unfolded: accelerated German restoration; economic autarky; racially defined Lebensraum in the east; heedless antisemitism. In response, Britain and France wavered. French policy oscillated among cynicism, fatalism, and confusion. Prioritizing imperial security, Britain decisively rearmed, aiming to counter Japan and Italy, while containing Hitler in western Europe. By 1937, under new Prime Minister Chamberlain, that approach solidified into “appeasement”: satisfying Hitler in eastern Europe would reduce Britain’s European obligations; free its ability to protect the Empire; create time to rearm. With the naivety of imperial arrogance, Chamberlain expected Hitler to be lastingly bought off. During the intensifying brinkmanship of 1937––1938, culminating in the Munich Conference, he followed that course to its end.
The Munich conference notoriously symbolizes appeasement and its failure. The issue under dispute concerns territory – specifically, the Sudetenland. This territorial dispute was initially internal to Czechoslovakia, a disagreement between the Sudetenland Germans and the central government of Czechoslovakia. Eventually, however, the nationalistic element to the dispute brought in the German government. The major powers avoided war because the French and British prime ministers – Daladier and Chamberlain, respectively – forced the Czechoslovakian president, Benes, to accept the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, based on the norm of nationalism (or self-determination). As this case shows, when actors widely agree on the norms through which territory can change hands, the probability of war declines. Nevertheless, this peace was short-lived. Indeed, the afterword to the chapter describes how Hitler invaded Prague shortly thereafter. The Danzig–Poland crises then followed. By that point, Britain and France had abandoned appeasement and shifted to balancing against Hitler; they allied with Poland and gave Hitler an ultimatum to try to stop his invasion. This conventional deterrence failed, and the Second World War began in Europe.
This chapter challenges the idea that there is a natural human condition of selfishness, as personified by the figure that has dominated economic theory for so long – ‘rational economic man’. It shows how the calculations and trade-offs that this sort of thinking promotes jar with our socially produced instincts and are entirely inappropriate morally. It presents evidence that refutes any such easy correspondence between this abstract Homo economicus and our actual motivations and behaviours.
It then looks back at our history to show that it has been moral narratives about who we are and want to be that have driven past transformational change. It uses the examples of the post-war welfare state and the revolution in local government in many of Britain’s major provincial cities during the period 1870–1900 (termed ‘gas and water socialism’ by its detractors) to illustrate this. In each case change was effected because the power elite was, firstly, persuaded of the moral case for action and, secondly, formulated the practical means to resource the major changes envisaged. It draws contemporary parallels with voices highlighting the dangers of escalating inequality and calling for a radical reset of corporate capitalism while questioning our favouring of growth over well-being.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.