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A history of “common sense” concerns as much the epistemological concept as the very architecture of human rational judgment. The historian of medieval philosophy Étienne Gilson (1884–1978) cast nineteenth-century Jesuit appeals to common sense as a costly defense against the Cartesian problem of certainty: when intellectual first principles are fused with sensus communis, metaphysical realism is at risk. The first aim of this paper is to revise Gilson’s historiography by showing that fusions of sense and reason began much earlier, already within the Latin tradition from the thirteenth century onward. I show that in their commentary practices, historical actors from Albert the Great (1200–1280) to Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) increasingly aligned conceptiones communes, assensus, consensus, and sensus communis, to the point that sensus communis could serve as a topos in philosophical argument. The second aim of the paper is to revisit Gilson’s concern about metaphysical realism. Here, I argue that common sense is essential in philosophical practice, but cannot supplant the first principles of reason. For when common sense becomes the sole foundation of human reasoning, reason loses the answerability to truth that it obtains from its contact with reality.
Thomas Paine is widely known for galvanizing public opinion in favor of the cause of American independence; his trenchant critique of Edmund Burke and spirited affirmation of the “rights of man”; and his contribution to the development of republicanism during constitutional debates in France. Yet there has been less scholarly attention to what is arguably Paine’s greatest revolution: namely, his vision of the United States as a “civic nation” whose membership is determined by consent to shared republican principles. A closer examination of Paine’s life and political writings reveals the strengths as well as the weaknesses of this civic ideal.
Often the practicing clinician is faced with making clinical decisions without clear guidelines from evidence-based medicine or clear practice standard algorithms. In this situation one must make decisions based on common sense. Common-sense decision-making in pharmacotherapy is based on one’s personal and clinical experience and experience passed on from one’s teachers. Experience alone does not lead to common sense. Common sense is arrived at by critically analyzing the experience first. The elements of critical analysis are discussed.
This paper examines reflective judgement as a crucial aspect of the power of judgement in Kant’s third Critique. Following Ginsborg’s normative-regulative interpretation, it demonstrates how aesthetics and teleology emerge from a single principle of reflection, which takes the form of contingent contingency, or possible lawfulness, in both. This reading establishes a parallel between common sense and the intuitive intellect, and allows one to preserve the normative dimension of Kant’s work while making Kant’s more speculative legacy continuous with it.
This chapter turns to the collapse of moral judgment Arendt saw in the early weeks of the Third Reich, and which she connects to the collapse of common sense and adherence to conspiracy theories in mass societies. The chapter draws on The Origins of Totalitarianism, coupled with contemporary “virtue epistemology” – the study of intellectual virtues and vices and their relation to knowledge. Arendt, I argue, is an exceptionally insightful virtue epistemologist. The chapter analyzes Arendt’s account of how European social conditions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the collapse of common sense in the face of a barrage of political lies. She warns that “if everyone always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but that no one believes anything at all anymore.” The result is a dangerous mix of gullibility and cynicism, what in the chapter I label culpable credulousness.
This conclusion pulls together the previous chapters. Arendt’s moral philosophy is, first and foremost, a moral psychology that turns on the concepts of thinking, judging, and common sense, and the catastrophic consequences of their absence. Its normative core lies in respect for human dignity, which she roots in the human conditions of plurality and natality. The chapter explains why Arendt’s early ambivalence about morality rests on mistakes. It then returns to four issues catalogued in Chapter 1: the problems of incongruity between person and act; the problem of principles and particulars; the problem of judgment; and the problem of moral realism. The chapter summarizes and expands on the solutions Arendt offers to these problems. It concludes by explaining the connections between Arendt’s moral thought and her ideas about international law. Holding perpetrators accountable for core crimes is one crucial way of acknowledging human dignity and of realizing the “idea of humanity.” Although Arendt is objectionably purist about the mission of international criminal justice, her contributions to its theory are impressive. They include a deep analysis of the crime of genocide, a critique of sovereign immunity, a recognition that states can be criminals, and an understanding of why some crimes are of international concern.
This chapter considers Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and William Morris’s New from Nowhere (1890) through the lens of the commons and what counts as “common sense.” Taking its cue from a question Morris poses about art’s role in radical social transformation, the chapter asks if the recent environmental turn in Victorian studies is interested in piecemeal or systemic change. Considering both modes of change, the chapter proposes a “poetry of the commons,” grounded in Carroll’s and Morris’s very different approaches to both the commons and common sense, as an alternative to the market economy and as more accurate approximation of how the commons traditionally worked. Accordingly, Alice and News can be seen as laying the foundations for something like “commons sense” and a practice and poetry of the commons adequate to the demands of the climate crisis.
The historical background to democracy, which good citizens must defend, started with the Greeks. Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius thought that political history was circular, which meant that good regimes, ruling on behalf of the people, held sway for a time but deteriorated into bad regimes – tyrannical – ruling for the rulers’ benefit. Their solution was to propose “mixed regimes,” containing monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements which, checked and balanced, would have to cooperate with each other by compromising different interests. Such a regime was the Roman Republic, which promoted both compromise and public virtue (“republicanism”) in the sense of devotion toward the state. During the Enlightenment, European political thinkers added the concepts of “sovereignty,” in order to impose public order, and “social contracts,” to make sovereigns at least somewhat answerable to subjects. Thus when the Founders convened to invent their government, they used “common sense,” prescribed by Paine, Jefferson, Madison, and others, to fashion a mixed government of special character. That government, which the Founders called “republican,” rested on a written “constitution,” which reined in “factions” via “checks and balances,” and which refrained from creating a “sovereign” who might, as in the French case almost immediately, plunge the nation into war.
Weber overlooked Citizens, but this essay concludes that, in truth, this role in any society is not an independent factor but a “dependent variable.” It depends on “common sense,” which means understandings which are shared by members of the same community but differ from one community to another – such as between what is demanded of good Americans and good Indonesians. Weber’s “ethic of responsibility” helps us to frame the subject, though, by urging us to measure every candidate’s “cause” against its potential consequences and then instructing citizens to support only good cause candidates. Trump has no cause, though, because he does not offer intelligible policies (he issues no position papers) but exploits his “charisma” to engage in politics as a program of exciting “show business” where the goal is achieve headlines every day and get the show renewed. In this sense, Trump is a modern “Pied Piper,” using the arts of advertising, public relations, and propaganda to “entertain” rather than to “educate,” to “amuse” rather than to promote a coherent national “vision.” What scholars must investigate now is why 77,000,0000 million American citizens, in the words of Neil Postman, found Trump “amusing” and voted for him. Can democracy survive if citizens are tempted to vote for fun and, say, ignore a politician’s disdain for global warming, international alliances, science, and top-notch higher education?
This Introduction notes that 77,000,000 American citizens voted for Donald Trump even though he was a convicted felon and autocratic narcissist. They therefore abandoned the “self-evident truth” principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness inscribed in the Declaration of Independence. That is, they failed to exercise citizenship as a vocation dedicated to good public behavior which supports voting in favor of candidates who will protect and maintain democratic values and institutions. Anticipating further analysis in later chapters, the Introduction ascribes this failure of responsible citizenship to, among other causes, the marketplace for ideas today which is overloaded with information and disinformation, leading to muddled thinking, a scarcity of common sense, and what Neil Postman called a media imperative of “amusing ourselves to death,” or entertainment rather than education.
The information system, now dominated by giant corporate platforms like Meta and Google, fractures our thinking by offering up, without qualitative distinction, every sort of fact and fantasy. The purveyors of such “sludge” offer a “confirmation” excuse by saying that they are merely confirming our preferences, some more reasonable than others. Actually, they have corrupted the marketplace of ideas promoted by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill who envisioned a post-Enlightenment forum that would moderately and respectfully assess propositions in order to try out “tentative truths,” thus seeking “knowledge” rather than “opinion.” But the current “marketplace for ideas,” conducted via “information system” instruments such as televisions and smart phones, is overloaded with so much information and disinformation that the shared understandings known to history as “common sense” cannot emerge from there, and citizenship is thus deprived of its major potential source of “wherewithal.” In such a time, community-wide “narratives” could take up the slack and point citizens in desirable directions. But such “Stories,” according to Neil Postman and Yuval Harari, do not emerge, because they are destroyed by relentless competition or undermined by academic debunking of historical Stories incorrectly framed before the rise of Science and Reason.
To defeat demagogues like Donald Trump, citizens must vote to defend democracy, otherwise it will not be there to defend them. Taking off from Max Weber's 'Vocation Lectures,' David Ricci's Defending Democracy therefore explores the idea of 'citizenship as a vocation,' which is a commitment to defending democracy by supporting leaders who will govern according to the Declaration of Independence's self-evident truths rather than animosity and polarizations. He examines the condition of democracy in states where it is endangered and where modern technology – television, internet, smart phones, social media, etc. – provides so much information and disinformation that we sometimes lack the common sense to reject candidates who have no business in politics. Arguing for the practice of good citizenship, Ricci observes that as citizens we have become the rulers of modern societies, in which case we have to fulfill our democratic responsibilities if society is to prosper.
The 2024 election of Donald Trump has been followed by executive decisions never before experienced in the history of American democracy. This new approach is grounded on a radical right (RR) program that had already been put in place in the Hungary of Viktor Orbán, who is presented as a model by Trump. Both leaders have defined a performative communication style, attracting a large segment of their respective citizenry. This style is based on the strategic use of common sense. However, we barely know how commonsensical executive RR leaders are during one of the most sacred events in a liberal democracy: the annual State of the Union or State of the Nation address. Based on a critical discourse analysis of the multiple speeches produced by Trump and Orbán in the frame of these events, the current research investigates the routinized and multifaceted usefulness of common sense to contest liberal democracy. The findings indicate that these leaders use the state address as a ritual of liberal democracy to impose a new RR order grounded in commonsensical policies, polities, and authorities.
Chapter 6 makes it clear that definitions, categories and expertise have not ended interpretive issues. Definitions are disembodied. All forms of violence and suffering, their definition and recognition remain relational in reality, born out of a labyrinthine complexity – in terms of how they are constructed, communicated, filtered and understood. Preconceptions of who is deserving of recognition, the requisites for social identification, moral commitment or collective empathy reveal this to be the case. Social science takes suffering to be (inescapably) intersubjectively, textually and sensorially understood – so judicial determinations must also go beyond the technical and doctrinal. The chapter’s discussion on temporality continues the theme of sensing. It examines temporal registers in the recognition of torture – exploring the questions: how does time feature and function in juridical understandings of torture? This discussion on time adds to the kaleidoscopic catalogue of sense-centric registers and reasoning operating in the anti-torture field – illustrating it to be a device of inclusion and exclusion.
There has been an understanding of a disconnected relation between humans and nature in modern liberalism. The disengaged relation is closely tied to dichotomous perceptions of realities with a widening gap between humans and nature, subject and object and culture and nature. This article considers the disconnected understanding as a sense-making crisis of modernity and qualifies this as a metacrisis. Instead of the disengaged views and the dichotomous relation between humans and nature, this article claims that the relations between the human self and nature is culturally, socially and politically mediated. To elaborate on these phenomena, this paper examines the writings of two thinkers with diverse concerns: Charles Taylor and Antonio Gramsci. For Taylor, the self is mediated with nature through social imaginaries, language and reconciliation in labour. For Gramsci, the self is mediated with the natural world via common sense, socio-historical elements and work. This article argues that cultural and socio-political elements that mediate human-nature relationships are essential in environmental education.
Divergent perspectives are typically rooted in contrasting worldviews which, in their own right, help to establish a certain social order and structure social relations in determined ways. Worldviews not only grant meaning to individual existence; they also help communities to pursue collective goals that advance their members’ mutual interests. In their turn, individuals establish communities and participate in collective actions in pursuit of their own interests. This chapter argues that human action is, in this manner, characteristically self-interested and oriented towards social relations at the service of collective projects. These collective projects are legitimated by common sense that grants meaning to social objects and events. Processes of social re-presentation serve to fashion objectifications that do not challenge a community’s underlying project. In this way, overcoming conflict requires unpacking contrasting action strategies in terms of projects supported by logical perspectives – that is, perspectives that make sense to the individuals involved. We propose an argumentation analysis protocol that serves to identify convergent claims. Whilst these do not reconcile contrasting projects, they provide the building blocks for mutually satisfactory solutions and reveal targets for social representation intervention.
In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition (Oxford 2021), I highlight the book’s main lines of argument and provide an overview of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: part I identifies the best kind of argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; part II presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and part III defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.
I raise two concerns about Bergmann’s philosophical methodology: the first is a parity problem for his intuition-based “autodidactic” approach; the second is a tension between that approach and the commonsense tradition in which he situates it. I then use his approach to reflect on the limits of rational argument and set it alongside an alternative that likewise emphasizes the personal nature of philosophical inquiry while remaining more neutral about the rational standing of competing intuitions.
Chapter 5 discusses the concept of credibility and what sources align with what is credible. Thorough discussion of five information sources is presented, including that pertaining to anecdotal evidence and personal experience; common beliefs and common sense; expert opinion (and opinions in general); research findings; and statistics. Discussion also involves how information from these sources can be interpreted and how all these sources can be flawed (and in what contexts).
Thomas Reid was a theist and a philosopher; yet the exact relationship between philosophy and theology in his works is unclear and disputed. The aim of this Element is to clarify this relationship along three lines by exploring the status, function, and detachability of theism with respect to Reid's philosophy. Regarding the first, the author argues that belief in the existence of God is, for Reid, a non-inferential first principle. Regarding the second, the author argues that theism plays at least six different roles in Reid's philosophy. And, regarding the third, the author argues that, despite this, theism is largely detachable from Reid's concept of human rationality and philosophy. What emerges is a picture of the relationship between philosophy and theology in which both inquiries are motivated by natural human curiosity, and both are founded on principles of common sense.