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This chapter examines how conditional tenure as a contract feature shapes bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the distribution of trade compensation by the Department of Labor. The analysis centers on the implementation of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), a program consistently supported by the Democratic Party to help American workers displaced by international trade. The TAA program is administered by bureaucrats who must demonstrate three years of high-quality service before securing permanent appointments. Using daily TAA petition records from 1975 to 2020, the chapter shows that TAA petitions were less likely to be certified and more likely to face delays under Republican presidencies than under Democratic ones – but only when handled by investigators who had not yet attained tenure. These findings demonstrate that even career bureaucrats, though not directly appointed by the president, can be susceptible to partisan pressure when their job protections are limited.
This chapter introduces contract design as a mechanism through which presidents can influence bureaucratic behavior, distinguishing it from other established tools of bureaucratic control. It elaborates on the carrot-and-stick framework and explains how removal, renewal, and conditional tenure function within that structure. Drawing on this framework, the chapter derives three empirical expectations and outlines how they will be examined in subsequent chapters. Because Taming the Careerists centers on implementation of foreign policy in trade and immigration, the chapter also explains the rationale behind this case selection. Finally, it describes the data and methodological approaches used to evaluate the empirical expectations.
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