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Chapter 7 continues the exploration of the implications of the transactions cost approach by looking at what the approach says about mergers and cartels – that is, combinations between competing firms. The chapter argues that, to the extent that mergers or cartels give rise to the potential for market power (i.e., the ability to engage in hold-up), they should be prevented under competition law. The chapter discusses why the punishment for forming a cartel is typically more severe than for merging. The chapter concludes with a discussion of traditional textbook oligopoly theory.
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