This chapter distils the lessons of Camp David, arguing that the summit was premature and structurally flawed. Neither Israel nor the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) arrived with a clear, shared vision or the political will to make the painful concessions peace required. The gaps between their positions were vast, and shifting Israeli red lines further eroded trust. Internal miscommunication within the Israeli delegation – where some negotiators privately downplayed official positions – undermined Ehud Barak’s credibility and destabilised the process. Human relations among the negotiators were strained, and the Americans proved ineffective mediators: there was no binding agenda, guiding framework or systematic follow-up. The summit suffered from poor coordination, mutual suspicion and inadequate diplomacy. Ultimately, Camp David collapsed due to poor timing, lack of trust, conflicting expectations and insufficient leadership. Without mutual respect, clear communication and willingness to compromise, peace remained elusive.

This chapter analyses the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, examining their achievements, limitations and lasting consequences. In 1994, Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize for their peace efforts. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) created the Palestinian Authority (PA), granting it control over civilian affairs and internal security, while Israel retained external security. Key milestones followed: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (May 1994), Arafat’s return to Gaza (July) and Oslo II (September 1995), which divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C – an arrangement that heavily favoured Israel and fragmented Palestinian governance.

Implementation quickly faltered. Hamas and Islamic Jihad exploited PA weaknesses, while suicide bombings in Israeli cities shattered trust. Rabin’s assassination in 1995 devastated the process, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1996 election halted progress. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 Wye River Summit and the 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum revived talks briefly, but by not sufficiently addressing core issues – settlements and terrorism – the Oslo process remained fragile and ultimately failed to achieve lasting peace.

This chapter traces the path to Camp David through the Stockholm channel, highlighting the strained relationship between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, the flawed composition of both delegations, and the perceived American bias towards Israel. Barak, sceptical of the Oslo framework, viewed its asymmetry as illogical – Israel was expected to relinquish territory, while Palestinians offered only future promises. His unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 was a strategic pivot, signalling readiness to pursue peace with the Palestinians.

Yet Arafat, disillusioned by Bill Clinton’s failed mediation with Syria and Hezbollah’s success in Lebanon, grew wary. Barak’s fragile coalition and inability to manage internal divisions further weakened his position. Despite Palestinian warnings that they were unprepared, the US pushed for a summit. Trust eroded as Israel continued expanding settlements, controlling most of the West Bank, and failing to honour commitments on safe passage, prisoner release and infrastructure.

The Oslo process, once full of promise, was faltering. Barak failed to build the kind of rapport Yitzhak Rabin had with Arafat, and the Palestinians feared the summit would pressure them into unwanted concessions. Their suspicions were reinforced by ongoing Israeli actions and the perception that the US was not a neutral broker.

The period since the 1990s has proved, in an ironic way, the strength of Israel–US relations. In 1991, American president, George H. W. Bush, clashed with Israel, and since 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had strained Israel–US relations in an unprecedented manner. In both cases, the constants that determined the course of the Israel–US relationship, religion, shared values, and history, proved to be stronger than any individual, regardless of their position. The period covered in this chapter was characterized by a close friendship and strategic partnership between the two nations. During those years, the two countries signed several memoranda of understanding which solidified the American commitment to Israel’s security and ensured its qualitative military edge, as well as expanding the cooperation on economic and cultural matters. The military-industrial cooperation as well as security cooperation between the two countries deepened. The growing Israeli attachment to American culture and values was another manifestation of the deepening relations between the two countries. The Israeli economy changed from socialist to neoliberal under the influence of American economic thinking. Neoconservatism spread across Israel’s political and intellectual elites through institutions and people, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis adopted many of the characteristics of American culture and economy, bringing their country closer to the United States in form and content. The ties between Israel and the Christian Zionist Evangelicals deepened as well. With the Evangelicals returning to the forefront of American politics since the mid-1970s, they became a major force in the support of Israel, a tendency that was especially encouraged by the right wing in Israel. Evangelical support for Israel has only increased during the 1990s and 2000s.