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Having wrested control over Reconstruction policy from President Andrew Johnson, Congressional Republicans wrote their own Reconstruction Act. In addition to considerable confusion over who was eligible to vote, white Southerners often refused to participate in the elections and constitutional convention process. Border South states were seeing the erosion of their proscriptive measures. Former Confederate states varied in the severity of the political disabilities they imposed on former Confederates. Like blacks and women, former Confederates claimed they needed the vote to protect themselves and the Union from a centralizing and oppressive federal government. At the same time, Congress was relieving many former Confederates of their Fourteenth Amendment-imposed inability to hold office. Despite much white southern rhetoric about the horrors of bayonet rule under the Reconstruction and Enforcement Acts, white Southerners used violence and fraud to regain control of the former Confederate states.
Congressional Reconstruction enfranchised black men in the former Confederate states. The Fifteenth Amendment made that enfranchisement national, but stopped short of granting suffrage as a positive right. While black men’s enfranchisement had been premised on their loyalty, military service, and ability to use the vote to protect themselves and the Union, anti-black violence made it increasingly impossible to exercise their political rights. The memory of black men’s military service waned and increasingly the federal government was expected to protect black voters. Voting proved not to be self-enforcing, but to need the power of the federal government to protect voters. With diminishing northern support and increasing desire for reconciliation, federal government interference became politically untenable. African Americans and Republicans proved unable to preserve black suffrage.
Discusses the place of presidential clemency in the presidencies of Ulysses S. Grant and Rutherford B. Hayes, particularly insofar as clemency was used by both presidents in winding down post-Civil War Reconstruction.
Congress sought to protect African Americans, not only through Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment but also through the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress’s authority to impose the penalty of reduced representation for any abridgment of the right to vote was intended to be an important supplement to Congress’s power to enact broad legislation to combat racial discrimination in voting. Congress also read its authority under the Reconstruction Amendments in tandem with provisions of the original Constitution – the Guarantee Clause, the Elections Clause and Article I, Section 5 – that emerged from Reconstruction redefined. These provisions gave Congress a role in defining the political community entitled to exercise this newly redefined right to vote, a right that was now federally protected and disconnected from its property-like status. Voting now served as the vehicle through which “We the People” could more easily join the community of “We the Voters” and express their political power.
After the clarification of the historical record offered by the book, the Epilogue explores the implications of this history for modern disputes between the Supreme Court and Congress. Given that the history offered in these pages stops around 1910, and as such is necessarily incomplete, the Epilogue seeks to draw a somewhat limited comparison between the Voting Rights Act of 1965 – in particular, the preclearance regime of Sections 4(b) and 5 – and past congressional voting rights efforts during Reconstruction and its aftermath. Notably, the Voting Rights Act was built on the framework created by Reconstruction era Republicans, but the Act also reflects lessons learned from a nineteenth century Supreme Court hostile to broad federal power.
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