To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The death of the duke of Anjou in 1584 made Henry of Navarre the next in line to the throne, which to many Catholics meant being ruled by a heretic king. The Catholic League was formed as a series of urban cells in cities and towns ruled by strong Catholic majorities. The most radical of these Leaguer cells was in Paris, where a group called the Sixteen ruled the capital. The military arm of the League was led by the very popular Henry, duke of Guise, who forced King Henry III out of the city in May 1588. The king got his revenge when he had the duke of Guise and his brother assassinated at Blois during a meeting of the Estates-General in December 1588. The following year the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, died, and Henry III himself was assassinated in August by a militant Catholic. Although Navarre won some military victories over the League forces, now led by the duke of Mayenne, he could not win over the Catholic population until he had abjured Protestantism and converted to Catholicism, which he did in July 1593. He was then crowned as King Henry IV.
After the St Bartholomew’s massacres, various Protestants published political treatises advocating resistance to a king who was a tyrant. François Hotman, Theodore Beza, and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay all published monarchomach tracts declaring that French Protestants could resist King Henry III. Jean Bodin, a Catholic politician and jurist, wrote The Six Boks of the Commonwealth, advocating for a stronger monarchy. In the meantime, the religious wars continued, with renewed warfare followed by peace edicts that attempted to keep the peace. The death of Henry III’s younger brother and last Valois heir, Francis, duke of Anjou, in June 1584, meant that the heir presumptive to the throne was Henry, king of Navarre, a Protestant. This restarted Catholic opposition and a renewal of civil war.
This chapter offers some empirical support to a main claim in the book, namely that the capacity of the English state was higher than that of France, by examining the typical indicator of capacity, taxation. It focuses particularly on the fiscal burden of the nobility, to show that it was relatively heavy, especially if debt is also considered. Once compelled to contribute to taxation, the English nobility had greater incentives to participate in the institution where it was negotiated, as well as to accept its extension over the broader population. By contrast, the fate of the French Estates-General moved in tandem with the taxation of the nobility; when noble fiscal privileges were consolidated, the institution declined. The chapter also provides comparative data of both fiscal and military extraction, to support the claim of greater infrastructural capacity of the English crown.
A superior bargaining capacity, especially of urban and commercial groups, is considered to be the foundation of representative institutions. However, in large polities like France and Castile, the pre-eminence of urban groups in representative institutions was causally related to the ultimate decline of those institutions and the devolution of the two regimes into "absolutism." The chapter first shows how the French Estates-General lapsed due to the greater weakness of the French crown; "divide et impera" is the preferred strategy of weak kings. "Absolutism" is the outcome, not the goal. French kings could not secure representatives armed with full powers, as local assemblies retained the right of tax approval. It is not that the demands of representation were weaker in France; urban groups often articulated even more radical claims. Absent the nobility, however, they failed to retain bargaining powers. Similar conditions operated in Castile. However, I show that greater early strength of the Castilian crown allowed some institutional layering and functional fusion to occur, which explains why the Castilian Cortes was more long-lasting and continuous than its French counterpart, a puzzle not hitherto explained.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.