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Takeover authorities in Europe are primarily structured as takeover panels or as integral components of financial supervisory authorities. Compared with the supervisory structures, panel-based regimes are commonly perceived as providing a greater level of flexibility, predictability and speed. A closer analysis reveals that, while the panel structure tends to promote flexibility and predictability, no inherent and unalterable connection between these attributes and the institutional identity of the takeover authority can be identified.
The EU Takeover Directive’s primary mechanism intended to protect minority shareholders’ interests on a change of control is the mandatory bid rule. The rule leaves it to the Member States to determine the control threshold, to define what the equitable price is and to determine which parties are considered to be acting in concert. Member States may provide derogations from the mandatory bid rule, provided that the general principles of the Directive are respected. Member States have used their powers in different ways. This is not a bad thing as long as the Member States use this flexibility in a loyal way, taking due account of the overall purpose of the Directive and the purpose of the mandatory bid rule, and apply the rules in a way that makes sense in the context of local corporate governance models, the structure of the local stock markets, and local protections afforded by general corporate law. The appetite for amendments to the Directive is likely to be very limited. Provided that one accepts the premises for the existence of the mandatory bid rule in the first place, we do not see any pressing regulatory concerns that merit trying to improve this appetite.
The EU Takeover Directive was passed twenty years ago with the main aim of fostering a single European takeover market. However, subsequent economic, political, legal and corporate governance developments have hindered the Directive’s goal of enhancing the European market for corporate control. This chapter outlines the pro-market climate surrounding the Directive’s inception, traces the subsequent changes in market dynamics and governance, and examines the legislative measures that have contributed to the current state of the market for corporate control in Europe. Despite the continued existence of hostile bids, their importance and impact have shrunk under the current environment. This trend has reduced firm dynamism and resulted in benefits for a select few (notably, corporate insiders and national politicians).
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