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This chapter analyzes upcycling practices from the perspective of trademark law, verifying their compatibility under the functional approach governing such exclusive right, whose impact on trade is not going to diminish in the context of a contemporary market increasingly dominated by communicative and reputational logics of brands. The analysis refers to the new paradigm of the circular economy, within which upcycling tends to be included, in order to question whether this change of political horizon in the European production model may affect the lawfulness of such practices, similarly to what can be argued in light of EU case law for recycling and refurbishing practices. In this sense, correctness in product elaboration and presentation to the market, mirroring the actual positive (if not even sustainable) contribution of the upcycler, should play a decisive role to exclude trademark infringement. The analysis will further reflect upon the applicative side of this issue, questioning whether this permissive interpretation does not end up in a return to well-established ‘old-fashioned’ principles that, properly tailoring exclusivity according to a model of fair competition, offer a valuable counterbalance to the excesses of protection that the trademark evolution has long been suffering from, like other IP rights.
This book explores how trademark laws can conflict with the right to freedom of expression and proposes a framework for evaluating free speech challenges to trademark registration and enforcement laws. It also explains why granting trademark rights in informational terms, political messages, widely used phrases, decorative product features, and other language and designs with substantial pre-existing communicative value can harm free expression and fair competition. Lisa P. Ramsey encourages governments to not register or protect broad trademark rights in these types of inherently valuable expression. She also recommends that trademark statutes explicitly allow certain informational, expressive, and decorative fair uses of another's trademark, and proposes other speech-protective and pro-competitive reforms of trademark law for consideration by legislatures, courts, and trademark offices in the United States, Europe, and other countries.
The Introduction provides an overview of trademark laws that implicate the right to freedom of expression. It also introduces the concept of inherently valuable expression in trademark law. Examples include descriptive trademarks; popular phrases and designs claimed as marks for T-shirts and other types of expressive merchandise; political and social messages; words, names, and symbols important to religious or indigenous communities; popular colors and shapes; and culturally significant creative works claimed as trademarks. The introduction also discusses the proposed free speech framework for trademark law. Government decision-makers should (1) identify the purpose of this specific trademark law and determine whether it is sufficiently important; (2) evaluate whether that particular trademark law directly and materially furthers its purpose; and (3) determine whether this trademark law endangers free speech, and ensure that it suppresses or chills protected expression no more than necessary in pursuit of that important purpose. The introduction concludes with an overview of trademark registration and enforcement laws that may potentially conflict with the free expression right.
Chapter 1 uses three examples of expression with substantial inherent value that should arguably not be registered as a trademark, or should only have a narrow scope of trademark protection regardless of whether it has acquired distinctiveness in an industry. The first example focuses on words that provide information about products. DC Comics and Marvel Characters have obtained trademark registrations for “Super Heroes” for comic books and other products that feature superhero characters, and “Super Hero” for masquerade costumes. The second example focuses on trademark rights claimed in popular terms or designs displayed on expressive merchandise. Lifeguard Licensing Corp. registered “Lifeguard” and a white Greek cross symbol (similar in shape to the red cross symbol) as a mark for T-shirts and other goods. The third example focuses on intrinsically decorative product features, such as three-dimensional shapes that represent things in nature. Globefill Inc. owns trademark registrations for a human-skull-shaped bottle for alcoholic beverages sold under the brand name “Crystal Head Vodka”, and a copyright registration and design patent for this sculpture.
The Conclusion provides an overview of the topics discussed throughout the book. First, it encourages governments to refuse to register expression with substantial inherent value or only provide a narrow scope of trademark protection to such marks. Then it reviews the free speech framework for trademark law, and the proposed reforms of trademark registration and enforcement laws discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, it discusses why these proposed reforms of trademark law are feasible. Many of the reforms proposed in this book are already included in current trademark laws or model trademark laws. Members of the International Trademark Association and other attorneys, academics, and commentators agree that the free expression right imposes some limits on trademark registration and enforcement laws. International obligations to protect trademarks in treaties and trade agreements do not prevent the United States, countries in Europe, and other members of the World Trade Organization from protecting the right to freedom of expression in trademark law. Governments also have obligations to protect this fundamental right in treaties and constitutions.
Chapter 3 provides details about the proposed free speech framework for trademark law. Legislators and courts should (1) identify the purpose of this specific trademark law – not the general purposes of trademark law, trademark theories, or a trademark’s functions – and determine whether it is sufficiently important (e.g., preventing misleading uses of trademarks, promoting fair competition, helping members of the public identify the source of goods or services, or discouraging the registration or use of hate speech); (2) evaluate whether that particular trademark law directly and materially furthers its purpose; and (3) determine whether this trademark law endangers free speech, and ensure that it suppresses or chills protected expression no more than necessary in pursuit of that important purpose. It is generally best to avoid constitutional analysis of trademark laws, so legislatures should consider making speech-protective and pro-competitive changes to problematic trademark statutes. In addition, courts and other government decision-makers should interpret provisions in trademark laws in a manner that protects expressive values and promotes the law’s important purpose(s).
Chapter 2 explains why the free expression right is relevant to laws regulating trademarks. Legislatures and courts agree that trademark laws can potentially conflict with this fundamental human right in constitutions, treaties, and statutes. Examples include the Recitals in the EU Trade Mark Regulation and Trade Mark Directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Constantin Film case, and the US Supreme Court cases Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti. This chapter also discusses the free speech theories relevant in the trademark context (such as the marketplace of ideas), why uses of trademarks are usually “expression” covered by the free expression right, and state action doctrine. With a focus on US free speech law, the chapter then discusses strict and intermediate constitutional scrutiny. It notes the analysis is different when laws regulate trademarks based on their viewpoint or content, and when the regulated speech is noncommercial or commercial, or fits into a category of expression that falls outside of the boundaries of the First Amendment. The chapter concludes with a discussion of William McGeveran’s four free speech goals for trademark law.
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