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The feminist enterprise in law focuses on power imbalances related to gender and on unacknowledged, unrepresentative assumptions about what is reasonable and normal. On the hunch that the legally postulated “reasonable man” may not represent every reasonable person, feminist jurisprudence seeks out false (whether naïve or disingenuous) assertions of objectivity and neutrality in law and questions their premises. It rejects the retro-epistemology of evidentiary thinking, that is, the belief that there is an objective reality capable of discovery through neutral principles, logic, and clear thinking. Instead, feminist jurisprudence focuses on how language, emotion, and politics all can subtly influence law.
This chapter opens the possibility of a qualitative evidentiary approach, but one that is not based on rigid and categorical exclusionary rules of evidence. It proceeds to do so first by noting as a helpful analogy the qualified applicability of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence in the context of nonjury trials. Here the argument is asserted that the absence of a jury no longer requires the trial judge to serve as a “gatekeeper” charged with protecting jurors from evidence that may be relevant and material but that may have prejudicial effects that outweigh the substantive and probative value of such evidence. In this context, it is suggested that exclusionary rules still serve the valuable role of helping the judge (single person trier of facts) evaluate the quality of evidence. Hence a comprise position is reached between a rigid framework and a Free Proof approach.
In the landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court of the United States articulated the admissibility standard for expert evidence. In jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard, trial court judges must make difficult decisions regarding the admissibility of proffered expert evidence. Although all federal courts and nearly all state courts use the Daubert standard, we know little about how judges fulfill their gatekeeping role when making admissibility decisions. This chapter reviews the empirical and theoretical considerations regarding how judges in Daubert jurisdictions determine which proffered expert evidence should be admitted. After reviewing the standards governing the admissibility of expert testimony, which includes a discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert, and related cases, the chapter provides a discussion of each Daubert criterion, including the available evidence relating to judges’ understanding of those criteria. It then discusses the heuristics and biases that affect judicial decision-making. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implications for practice and research.
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