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The woman suffrage movement sought to capture Congressional Reconstruction for its own agenda. Having unsuccessfully opposed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments for creating what Elizabeth Cady Stanton called an “aristocracy of sex,” the woman suffragists now declared that women as well as black men were enfranchised under the Reconstruction amendments. This New Departure did not survive Supreme Court scrutiny. In fact, women who voted were tried under the Enforcement Acts passed to protect black men’s suffrage rights. As the federal government proved unable to protect black male suffrage, woman suffragists argued that Congressional Reconstruction had failed because it had been incomplete. Because Congressional Reconstruction had not enfranchised women, it had betrayed the natural rights tradition on which suffrage rights were based. The failure to include women had doomed universal manhood suffrage.
Congressional Reconstruction enfranchised black men in the former Confederate states. The Fifteenth Amendment made that enfranchisement national, but stopped short of granting suffrage as a positive right. While black men’s enfranchisement had been premised on their loyalty, military service, and ability to use the vote to protect themselves and the Union, anti-black violence made it increasingly impossible to exercise their political rights. The memory of black men’s military service waned and increasingly the federal government was expected to protect black voters. Voting proved not to be self-enforcing, but to need the power of the federal government to protect voters. With diminishing northern support and increasing desire for reconciliation, federal government interference became politically untenable. African Americans and Republicans proved unable to preserve black suffrage.
Congress sought to protect African Americans, not only through Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment but also through the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress’s authority to impose the penalty of reduced representation for any abridgment of the right to vote was intended to be an important supplement to Congress’s power to enact broad legislation to combat racial discrimination in voting. Congress also read its authority under the Reconstruction Amendments in tandem with provisions of the original Constitution – the Guarantee Clause, the Elections Clause and Article I, Section 5 – that emerged from Reconstruction redefined. These provisions gave Congress a role in defining the political community entitled to exercise this newly redefined right to vote, a right that was now federally protected and disconnected from its property-like status. Voting now served as the vehicle through which “We the People” could more easily join the community of “We the Voters” and express their political power.
Part III (Chapters 5 and 6) discusses Reconstruction, focusing on Congress’s post–Civil War power over voting and elections, which was often at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that authority. Reconstruction was defined, in large part, by the marriage between the Constitutions of Political Structure and Political Rights. This synergy was necessary because the exigencies of war required the creation of new political norms regarding the right to vote, republicanism, and federalism. This expansion of federal power ultimately set Congress on a collision course with the Court as Congress liberally interpreted its constitutional obligation to ensure republican government in the southern states.
This chapter surveys current doctrine concerning the scope of Congress’s regulatory, taxing, and spending powers. The Court’s historic pattern of decisions both presents a study in constitutional change and illumines factors that sometimes make change difficult. Prior to the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Court struggled uncertainly to cabin Congress’s powers under Article I. But the Court, seemingly in response to political pressures, substantially abandoned that effort in 1937, when it began to interpret the Commerce Clause as giving Congress vast powers to regulate the national economy and the Taxing and Spending Clause as allowing it to create largesse-dispensing programs that the Founding generation could not have imagined. At least since the 1980s, a strain of conservative scholarship has maintained that the modern, swollen national government finds no justification in the original Constitution and that the Court should enforce the original design. This chapter traces the Court’s limited success in implementing a course correction and identifies the considerations that have given pause to conservative justices. It also describes the Court’s more aggressive efforts to limit congressional power under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, all of which include express authorizations of Congress to “enforce” their substantive guarantees.
Petitioner Harold Rice seeks the right to vote in an election for trustees of the state Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”). Hawai’i law provides that only “Hawaiians,” a term defined in the statute as anyone who descends from an ancestor who was present in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778,2 may vote in this election. Petitioner Rice, who was born and raised and still resides in Hawai’i, descends from ranchers and missionaries who migrated to the islands in the mid-1800s. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (D. Haw. 1997).
Most histories of Reconstruction begin their narrative in December 1863 when President Abraham Lincoln announced his Ten Percent Plan, reserving most of the authority to restore the collapsing Confederacy in the executive branch. Frederick Douglass also thought that Reconstruction began in 1863, but in January rather than in December. That month, after the final Emancipation Proclamation was issued, the War Department at long last permitted states to recruit black soldiers, which Douglass believed was the first step toward black citizenship and voting rights. Although Republicans envisioned Reconstruction as a policy only for the Confederacy, Douglass understood that the entire nation required political reclamation. If William Lloyd Garrison and a good number of white abolitionists assumed their struggle concluded with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865, Douglass understood that the fight had just begun. He knew that the antithesis of slavery was not freedom, but equality.
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