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In this book, Mats Wahlberg explores one of the perennial topics in Christian theology. Drawing on ideas from Thomas Aquinas, the Carmelite mystical tradition, and contemporary analytic philosophers, he suggests a new way of responding to the philosophical and theological problem of evil. Wahlberg analyzes the logical relationship between love, suffering, and sacrifice as conceived in the Bible and considered by Christian saints and mystics through the ages. Emphasizing the embodied nature of human love, he argues that love essentially includes a disposition to act self-sacrificially in a wide range of 'possible worlds'. This analysis provides the building blocks for a new theodicy, which portrays the sacrificial dimension of love as essential for the attainment of human fulfilment and deep intimacy with God. The book offers new insights into the relationship between self-love and love for others, the nature of sacrifice, and the legitimacy of theodicy in a world filled with horrendous evils.
The problem of evil is often thought to be the single most important objection to theism. The most popular reply to (the logical version of) this objection is the Free Will Defense (FWD), but this seems to presuppose incompatibilism, and thus be unavailable to divine determinists. In this chapter I explore this worry at length. First I consider the claim, made by Steven Cowan, that FWD may be utilized even by those who deny some of the propositions it includes. I then turn to two authors who claim that compatibilists – at least compatibilists of certain types – can accept each proposition utilized in FWD. I conclude that the first defense of this claim, offered by A. A, Howsepian, is implausible, but that the second, offered by Jason Turner, does show that a certain sort of compatibilist can accept FWD. Unfortunately, I will argue, there is reason to think that many divine determinists will be wary of accepting this sort of incompatibilism. I conclude with a quick look at other options and a brief investigation of the evidential problem of evil.
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