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The interpretation of Hegelian theodicy that has emerged over previous chapters finally allows us to understand Hegel’s accusation that Leibnizian theodicy is undermined by its ‘abstract’ and ‘indeterminate’ categories. As Hegel’s fuller discussion of Leibniz’s theodicy shows, the root of the problem is that his theodicy is afflicted by two kinds of ‘arbitrariness’: first, Leibniz’s application of axiological criteria to worldly instances eludes rational comprehension; second, Leibniz simply presupposes those criteria, with the result that the mutual implication of good and evil remains an unexplained given. Hegel’s own theodical enterprise, however, is not without its internal tensions. Following through on the logic of Hegel’s theodicy as geared towards effecting reconciliation means seeing it as effecting a break with the juridical model found in Kant and Leibniz: the goal of justification must be renounced not as unrealisable, but as misconceived. Nevertheless, Hegel’s own presentations of the goal of his philosophy frequently betrays a justificatory ambition that marks a fundamental continuity with his predecessors, seemingly invoking a teleological logic, whereby history can be measured by an absolute end or standard. The ultimate assessment of Hegelian theodicy turns, in large part, on whether this should be understood as rhetoric or rationale.
This chapter identifies key features of Leibnizian theodicy in order to bring out its historical peculiarity and significance. To this end, it distinguishes between the surface form of Leibniz’s project, which exhibits typical traits of traditional explanatory theodicy, and its underlying motivational structure. The latter can be seen as arising from a confluence of three currents: the articulation of a perceived threat to the adequacy of creation, an extreme variety of theological and metaethical intellectualism, and a rationalist understanding of goodness. Elaborating this gap between surface form and motivational structure shows Leibniz to have a transitional status: while viewing God as an absolute explanatory and metaphysical principle, Leibniz begins to liberate criteria of goodness, rendering them principles of reason to which even the divine will is subject and by which his creation can be judged. Exploring the resulting tension helps us appreciate the novelty involved in his reconfiguring theodicy as a juridical enterprise, that of putting God on trial.
Following Allen Wood, Leibniz’s theodicy can be seen as both totalitarian – it claims that divine wisdom informs every single part of creation – and wholesale – it proves this only in general terms. This chapter explores the criteria Leibniz considers to be criteria of goodness and how he argues, in wholesale fashion, for their instantiation. Leibniz’s criteria can be divided into two categories: metaphysical, which concern properties and features of being as such, and anthropocentric, which bear on the morality and happiness of human beings. What unites them is an overarching conception of goodness as rational intelligibility: a maximally good world provides a maximal number of actual opportunities for rational creatures to appreciate its goodness and thereby perfect themselves. Closer attention to Leibniz’s handling of criteria, however, reveals a danger that anthropocentric ultimately dissolve into metaphysical criteria, the practical into the theoretical. As a result, Leibniz’s project is threatened with dialectical contradiction: the existential concerns that govern his theodicy’s underlying motivation cannot be articulated in the theoretical terms of its execution.
This chapter begins by setting out various axes along which to categorise different kinds of theodicy. In particular, it is useful to distinguish between the kind of puzzle to which a theodicy responds and the kind of solution it proposes; between theodicies with theoretical and theodicies with existential motivations; and between theodicies that offer defences of religious doctrines and theodicies that endeavour to explain how those doctrines should be understood. With this framework in place, the chapter outlines certain central traits of the theodicy tradition prior to Leibniz, in order to bring out the historical peculiarity and radicality of Leibniz’s own enterprise. A brief look at the example of Augustine allows us to make two further crucial distinctions: between the project of explaining how God can be causally implicated in evil and that of addressing the apparent inadequacy of creation; and between theodicies that begin with fixed axiological criteria and those that think the nature of goodness must be gradually revealed.
This chapter turns to the execution of Kantian theodicy. Concentrating on the external obstacles to realising the highest good, it surveys the various theological commitments Kant regards as concomitants of hoping for their removal. Of especial importance is Kant’s socio-historical theodicy, which exploits a notion of purposiveness to explain how human social dynamics facilitate an imminent, historical progression towards the realisation of the good. Attention to the content of Kantian theodicy, however, shows how it not only reintroduces central elements of its Leibnizian predecessor, albeit within a radically altered epistemic framework, but involves a structural invocation of divine freedom that reveals fundamental continuities with Kant’s own pre-critical theodicy. This invocation in fact leads to a paradox at the heart of Kantian theodicy: echoing the dialectical contradiction between motivation and execution that afflicted Leibnizian theodicy, the finite, practical perspective that motivates Kantian theodicy proves impossible to maintain in light of the divine, infinite perspective integral to its execution. With this paradox in mind, we can ask whether Kant’s own critical, ‘authentic’ theodicy in fact survives the critique launched in On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy.
The main debates about nationalism during the past two decades have concentrated on the effects of changing means of communication and processes of de- and reterritorialization. The entangled web of relations which traversed national boundaries did not produce “the utopia of a post-national history,” but the “stabilization and territorialization of the nation-state,” in Sebastian Conrad’s view.1 Whereas the dynamics of nationalism have generally been located within nation-states, as “imagined communities,” “invented traditions,” or reactions to modernization, Conrad’s own case studies show that “the shifts and changes in the discourse of nationalism … appear not only as effects of internal trajectories, as the familiar picture would suggest, but just as much of the larger process we retrospectively call globalization.”
Some years ago, the intellectual historian Bronisław Baczko noted that a crucial feature of eighteenth-century thought was its all-pervasive desire for a “return to origins,” a fixation emerging through a quasi-obsessive quest for the beginning of all sorts of social, political, and religious institutions as well as moral principles.1 Indeed, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité (1754), Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Johann Gottfried Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772), and the Essai sur l’origine des connaissance humaines (1778), by the abbé de Condillac, are just a few works that testify, by their titles alone, to the eighteenth-century preoccupation with “origins.” But many more could be added. From the late seventeenth century onwards, innumerable scholars across Europe produced a plethora of tracts, pamphlets, articles, and books to investigate and dissect the origins of languages, knowledge, feelings, prejudice, and, importantly for us, nations.
In this chapter Chris Meckstroth explains how Immanuel Kant responded to the urgent political question of the 1780s and 1790s, how to understand the collective agency of the people or nation, with a novel conception of history. Kant thought we must believe progress is possible if we are to sustain a commitment to acting justly. To this end he re-worked arguments of Leibniz and Pope, who had tried to show that we live in the best of all possible worlds, thereby absolving God of responsibility for evil and saving the coherence of moral duty from scepticism. Kant, however, did not pitch his argument to the religious conscience of individuals. He aimed at political rulers whose authority derived from representing the general will of an entire people. His political thought focussed on principles a ruler must respect to count as that sort of representative. To these his philosophy of history added a concern for improvement over time, which he made plausible by drawing on a mechanism of unsocial sociability familiar in authors such as Pope. The result was a new, secular theodicy of progress favouring peace and republican politics, and designed to contain conflict in an age of democratic reform.
This chapter begins with a survey of the young Newton’s early exposure to experimental philosophy and then turns to the emergence of experimental pedagogy in the last years of the seventeenth century and its rapid expansion in the early decades of the century that followed. The proliferation of courses in experimental philosophy, both public and university-based, in Oxford, Cambridge, London, and St Andrews, is testimony to its success and legitimacy. So much so, we argue, that when his commitment to universal gravity came under attack by Continental detractors, Newton openly and very strategically aligned himself with experimental philosophy, in part because of the credibility that this approach to natural philosophy already possessed. This is not to claim that every Newtonian was partial to experimental philosophy, and in this chapter we examine the views of one opponent, the Oxford natural philosopher John Keill. We document the process by which Newton publicly declared himself to be an experimental philosopher in the second edition of the Principia of 1713, and then go on to examine his role in the eclipse of Baconian natural history.
Does Kant regard mathematical inference as a nonanalytic mode of inference relying essentially on pure intuition, or rather as advancing through strict conceptual analysis from synthetic premises? Commentators have found textual support for both readings, leading to incompatible accounts of the synthetic character of mathematical judgment. This paper develops a new argument establishing that Kant views mathematical inference as essentially dependent on extraconceptual resources. The paper also establishes that Kant employs “analysis” and its cognates in a number of senses in the critical period. In particular, he recognizes a notion of analysis directed to intuitions, thus distinct from conceptual analysis. This finding leads to a new reading of his famous description of mathematical inference as “proceeding in accordance with the Principle of Contradiction” (B14). Kant’s choice of the B14 formulation is explained as reflecting his desire to distance his own antilogicist theory of mathematical inference with its essential dependence on pure intuition from C. A. Crusius’s antiformalist theory of inference grounded in thinkability.
This chapter considers the question of how informed philosophical readers of Spinoza actually did understand him by examining one particular case, namely G. W. Leibniz. It first considers in some detail the historical and biographical context of Leibniz's reception of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP). Next, the chapter turns to a discussion of how Leibniz situated Spinoza and the TTP in the intellectual landscape of the time. It then examines how Leibniz interpreted Spinoza's position in relation to the sect called Socinianism, in relation to the rationalistic biblical exegesis developed by Lodewijk Meyer and, finally, in relation to Thomas Hobbes's theory of natural right. The objective of these analyses is only to see just how discerning a reader of Spinoza Leibniz was, that is, to determine the extent to which he recognized the originality of Spinoza's position.
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