The Gettier problem suggests that the core challenge for theories of knowledge lies in eliminating knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. In response, two major approaches have emerged in contemporary epistemology: modalism and explanationism. However, both approaches have limitations and exhibit an interesting theoretical symmetry: while modalism effectively handles environmental luck, it struggles with certain cases of intervening luck; explanationism faces the reverse difficulty. This symmetrical limitation suggests that any theory of knowledge relying on a single dimension is likely to be inadequate. To address this, this paper presents a new, integrated approach – Modal Explanationism (ME). ME requires that a belief counts as knowledge just in case it is explained by the truth of the believed proposition in the actual world, and that this explanatory connection is preserved across a range of nearby possible worlds. It is argued that ME offers a more successful solution to the Gettier problem than either modalism or explanationism alone.

I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.