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The July Crisis spanned just over five weeks, separating the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, on 28 June 1914 from Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August. In the vast scholarship on the July Crisis, commercial and financial issues have received relatively little attention. This absence reflects the character of the July crisis, in which the key actors were a small number of men, in the chancelleries, foreign ministries, and general staffs of Serbia and the great powers. The crisis affected markets from early July in Vienna, but panic across European markets set in on Monday, 20 July, three days before the delivery of the ultimatum. In contrast to crises in September 1911 and autumn 1912, collapsing financial markets and rising food prices did not restrain leaders. Indeed, perceptions of opponents’ financial and commercial vulnerabilities led leaders, particularly in Berlin and Vienna, to adopt more assertive diplomatic and military strategies. This chapter examines why the July crisis culminated in great power war in contrast to previous crises.
A great power war remained a possibility in Europe in the early twentieth century and preparing for it remained the state’s most important responsibility before 1914. This chapter examines how states developed plans to fight under conditions of economic interdependence. Preparations sought to mitigate the risks to economic stability and exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities. The lack of prior experience of a major European war in an interdependent global economy rendered planning extremely difficult. Some challenges went unforeseen; others required trade-offs that had to be balanced against the peace-time economy. These preparations imposed another interdependence dilemma on states – war preparations were costly, detracting from the economic basis of a state’s future power. Undertaking the preparations, inadequate and superficial as they proved, only served to underline the catastrophic consequences of war and spread knowledge about the high risks across bureaucracies and civil society. Planning for war, though dominated by military and naval leaders, included a wide range of civilian officials and experts from civil society.
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