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This chapter explores Aquinas’s account of God’s perfection, goodness, and the problem of evil. Aquinas argues that God is perfect because he lacks all potentiality and is wholly actual, with every creaturely perfection pre-existing eminently in him. God is good, not as a member of a genus, but as the Creator whose nature grounds and causes the goodness of creatures. Goodness, Aquinas maintains, is convertible with being, while evil is privation of good – either as suffering (malum poenae) or wrongdoing (malum culpae). He denies that God directly causes evil, holding instead that evils suffered arise incidentally from the flourishing of other beings, while evils done derive from human free will. The chapter contrasts Aquinas’s approach with modern debates – such as Mackie’s logical argument from evil, Rowe’s evidential argument, and Plantinga’s free will defence—showing how Aquinas resists theodicy by emphasising God’s transcendence and the derivative character of creaturely goodness and freedom.
In Leviathan, the foundation and stability of commonwealth arises from agreement about what is good and how the good is to be obtained. Hobbes argues that we all agree that peace and the means to peace are good, and such agreement, which Hobbes associates closely with reason, is a necessary condition on the covenant to form the commonwealth. However, there is also significant diversity. The chapter offers an account of this diversity, which poses a threat to the stability and success of commonwealths. Overcoming the threat depends upon the plasticity of our passions. Hobbes suggests that the passions that characterize us, even if they are diverse, are not plastic: most of us are dominated by fear; a few of us by other passions; and we cannot change who we are in this respect enough for such changes to matter to social theory. Reason also is fixed: a few, great social scientists perhaps can acquire the ability to reason better than they do, but whole populations cannot. We are notably plastic, however, in the objects of our passions. It is this plasticity that prudent sovereigns can exploit in order to bring about thriving commonwealths.
God of absolute goodness and compassion wants to be known via the commandments and prayer as the only God for the human hand heart. In creedal faith, Christ’s presence is realized by the Spirit.
Aquinas argues that, abstracting from divine revelation, God's existence can be argued for successfully, and that God is the source of the existence of all that is not divine for as long as it exists. His philosophical thought about God has been seminal for later thinkers, but can be hard to grasp as it is scattered across a broad range of his writings. This book provides a comprehensive and accessible single-volume account of Aquinas's philosophy of God which also evaluates it in the light both of various criticisms that have been made of it, and of philosophical thought more generally. It situates Aquinas's thinking about God in relation to major philosophers of the past and a number of important philosophers writing today, which will enable readers to understand Aquinas's philosophy of God in the context of centuries of philosophical thought.
This article argues for a possible route by which Thomism might affirm the goodness of physical deformity as an aid to abstraction. Recent scholarship has shown how Aquinas can speak positively of bodily diversity as part of God’s providential order, without treating physical defect as a loss of dignity. I extend this line by asking whether Aquinas can also give physical deformity an intrinsic epistemic role. For Augustine, the cosmos is an intelligible whole ordered by eternal Forms in the Word, mediated by rationes seminales, so that even physical defects remain diminished likenesses of their exemplars and can serve the good of the whole. Aquinas rejects this strong Platonic imaging: he retains divine ideas as extrinsic measures determined by God’s will, treats cosmic unity as an ordo communis under providence, and identifies goodness with the actualisation of natural potency. I therefore locate physical deformity as a mixed case of David Oderberg’s notion of ‘goodness by approximation’. The paper states conditions under which a mixed case can clarify a ratio and sharpen the universal: intelligible species are entia rationis grounded in substantial similarity, and atypical cases can remove misleading accompaniments so that what belongs per se becomes more evident.
Following Allen Wood, Leibniz’s theodicy can be seen as both totalitarian – it claims that divine wisdom informs every single part of creation – and wholesale – it proves this only in general terms. This chapter explores the criteria Leibniz considers to be criteria of goodness and how he argues, in wholesale fashion, for their instantiation. Leibniz’s criteria can be divided into two categories: metaphysical, which concern properties and features of being as such, and anthropocentric, which bear on the morality and happiness of human beings. What unites them is an overarching conception of goodness as rational intelligibility: a maximally good world provides a maximal number of actual opportunities for rational creatures to appreciate its goodness and thereby perfect themselves. Closer attention to Leibniz’s handling of criteria, however, reveals a danger that anthropocentric ultimately dissolve into metaphysical criteria, the practical into the theoretical. As a result, Leibniz’s project is threatened with dialectical contradiction: the existential concerns that govern his theodicy’s underlying motivation cannot be articulated in the theoretical terms of its execution.
This chapter begins the work of showing how the Phenomenology effects a transition from Kantian to Hegelian theodicy. It begins with Hegel’s exposition of self-consciousness, since this sets the terms for his subsequent analyses. Indeed, the famous ‘Self-Consciousness’ chapter thematises the very possibility of criteria of goodness by unfolding elementary structures of human autonomy. The chapter then turns to Hegel’s developmental account of Kant’s understanding of freedom as autonomy, which functions simultaneously as a critique: he presents Kant’s practical thought as the result of a progressive, rational development, while also diagnosing it as the product of a series of abstractions and reifications, whereby Kant conflates his insight into the nature of freedom with a certain methodologically individualistic metaphysics of the human being. The chapter focuses on the first of three key phases in the Phenomenology that engage with Kantian theodicy and its underlying view of the will, namely the somewhat satirical presentation of ‘Virtue’, which Hegel classifies as a shape of ‘Reason’. By charting the interrelated views of goodness and the will that produce and are produced by ‘Virtue’, we can uncover a developmental logical that leads to the Kantian idea of freedom as self-authorship.
Iris Murdoch challenged the intellectual climate of her day. She transcended the reductive, behavioristic view of consciousness, sought to transcend the theory of values that focuses on will and desire, and defended instead a transcendent understanding of goodness and the Good that can transform us, leading us to renounce our egocentric nature. Her positive view of individual freedom and value led her to oppose strict gender roles and structuralism. Murdoch proposed that, ideally, our lives may be a pilgrimage toward the Good. She believed that the experience of beauty and art can enhance the pursuit of the Good. And yet Murdoch shunned the quest to discover some meaningful, transcendent reality (God or an impersonal, purposive force) to understand ourselves and the cosmos. In her words, 'we are simply here.' The authors ask whether Murdoch's foregoing a search for a broader transcendent reality to understand why we are here is compelling.
Aquinas recognizes a number of wildly different kinds of individual happiness. What fundamentally unifies these various kinds of happiness so that they all count as varieties of happiness to begin with? This chapter gives a novel answer to this question and thereby identifies a new heart of happiness in Aquinas, which the author calls the Enjoying Good Activities Reading. On that reading, in every case, happiness is exclusively constituted by engaging in and enjoying a genuinely good activity. After giving a brief textual case in favor of reading Aquinas this way, the bulk of this chapter explains Aquinas’s understanding of enjoyment and his account of what it takes for an activity to be genuinely good. This makes clearer what this new reading amounts to and reveals something of its philosophical interest.
Chapter 7 examines the Fourth Way, which argues from the gradations of being, truth, goodness, and other perfections found in things, to a first cause utmost in being and perfection. After a translation and the premises are given, the chapter explains what assigning a gradation of these terms involves for Aquinas. There is discussion of a key implication of the Five Ways that God is “subsistent being itself,” that God’s essence is God’s existence. Next, there is a discussion of the premise that there is a maximum in every genus which is the cause of all other things in that genus. Thus, there is a maximum in being, truth, and goodness which causes these in all other things. This is God. A closing section discusses the doctrine of continuous creation in Aquinas, that God sustains all else in existence at every moment. There is a look at the contemporary debate over the need for a God to do this, which is termed divine conservation versus existential inertia.
In Chapter 10, I discuss the final three chapters of the Itinerarium (chapters 5, 6, and 7). The first two correspond to the third pair of the Seraph’s wings, those above his head, representing the vision of God we get looking “above” our minds to the transcendental properties “Being” (chapter 5) and “Goodness” (chapter 6). To make the contrasting points he wishes to make about the unity and Trinity of God, however, Bonaventure decides he must switch his imagery from the third pair of Seraph wings to the pair of wings on each of the two Cherubim that were said to surround the Ark of the Covenant in the Temple. After these two chapters, Bonaventure adds a short concluding chapter (chapter 7) that corresponds to the image of Christ crucified that St. Francis saw in center of the seraph’s wings. At this stage of the ascent, all intellectual effort must cease and those journeying who wish to ascend must simply rest in the mystery of God’s love.
The aim of this chapter is to establish that children are owed a sense of their own interiority. The chapter argues that although the literature on philosophy of childhood constitutes an advance on the deficit model of childhood insofar as it supports children’s rights and childhood goods, it risks reifying adult-child relations by continuing to essentialize childhood. While Gareth B. Matthews’ theory of development as socially and linguistically mediated begins to shift the focus toward the child’s own inner life, it falls short insofar as it fails to challenge the fact/value dichotomy. Drawing upon Iris Murdoch’s philosophy, the chapter concludes that a rejection of this dichotomy is in fact necessary for developing the notion of a morally inflected consciousness that is as available to children as it is adults.
Humans continually make judgments that some things have more value than others. Plausibly, it is largely through our value judgments that God intends to guide us in setting priorities and goals. This Element surveys leading accounts of what value judgments are exactly. It then explores the particular values we are apparently sensitive to when making two judgments endemic to human life: about what makes a life good, and about who deserves a good life. Connections are made between differing analyses of human value judgments and views about God's character and the goals God is prompting us to pursue.
Aquinas's virtue-based ethics is grounded in his metaphysics, and in particular in one part of his doctrine of the transcendentals, namely, the relation of being and goodness. This metaphysics supplies for his normative ethics the sort of metaethical foundation that some contemporary virtue-centered ethics have been criticized for lacking, and it grounds an ethical naturalism of considerable philosophical sophistication. In addition, this grounding has a theological implication even more fundamental than its applications to ethics. That is because Aquinas takes God to be essentially and uniquely being itself. Consequently, on Aquinas's view, God is also essentially goodness itself. Aquinas's metaphysical grounding for his ethics is thus meant to be understood in connection with his more fundamental views regarding God's nature, and in particular his views of God's simplicity. This metaphysical grounding confers significant philosophical and theological advantages on his ethics.
In this chapter, we look at Mesoamerican views on human activity and life. How did precolonial Mesoamerican philosophers think about proper or right action, in the case of the individual and the wider community? This includes issues such as the role of the state, the ruler, and the individual’s duties toward each. The chapter focuses on key ethical concepts and views in Mesoamerican traditions, such as those concerning humility, sacrifice, and the situational and temporary nature of goodness.
With special reference to Diotima’s teaching in Plato’s Symposium, this chapter discusses the central importance to Hermetic spirituality of beauty and reverence (eusebeia), Hermetic psychological theory, and the centrality of imagination to the Hermetic concept of “becoming aiōn” and gaining cosmic consciousness.
The constituent elements of the book: Hermetic spirituality, the historical imagination, alterations of consciousness, the relation between language and experiential knowledge, and radical agnosticism in the study of religion. Narrative historiography and historical-comparative methods.
Christopher Rowe argues that Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics develops a naturalised account of Socrates’s divine sign: even people lacking in practical wisdom, Aristotle proposes, can act appropriately, and achieve a kind of happiness, because of something divine in them. But this ‘something divine’ is not (as it is for Socrates) a private inner voice, rather a kind of well-naturedness. For Aristotle, goodness is natural. The goodness of human nature explains how it is possible to do the appropriate things even without reasoning, and even do so reliably. This offers Aristotle an answer to a puzzle about our relation to the natural world. Humans, he holds, are good by nature, yet he also holds fully virtuous human beings to be relatively rare: two claims that are hard to reconcile, given Aristotle’s usual view that what occurs ‘by nature’ occurs ‘always or for the most part’. By allowing there to be a level of decency that is achievable through well-naturedness, even by those who lack full virtue, Aristotle can answer this puzzle. If this decency is achieved by many people, then there is, after all, a kind of good human development that occurs by nature and occurs regularly.
The Conclusion sketches two notions: a metaphysical one – that much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality; and an epistemic one – that we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what position we occupy in this continuum of goodness. Envy’s signaling value may be much more important than previously thought. If most of human goodness is relational, comparative, competitive, or positional, then it is not surprising that envy is a universal emotion. It safeguards our chance at happiness.
Two non-native phones can be discriminated well if each one is perceived as a different native phonological category. In that case, the perceiver’s prior attunement to a phonological distinction in the native language supports discrimination in the non-native language. Discrimination of non-native phones is more challenging when both are perceived as similar to the same native phonological category, but a perceived difference in phonetic goodness-of-fit to the native category can nevertheless support discrimination. There are four different sources of information that a perceiver might use to discriminate contrasting non-native phones: 1) sensitivity to a native phonological contrast; 2) sensitivity to the phonetic goodness-of-fit to a native phonological category; 3) language-independent phonetic distance, and; 4) perceptual salience of a non-linguistic auditory difference. Using the Perceptual Assimilation Model (Best, 1995) as an example, the aim of this paper is to outline how a theoretical model of cross-language speech perception might account for these sources of information. On the basis of that review an evaluation will be made of the methodological requirements for determining which sources of information listeners use for discrimination.