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Commonly considered in Japan a “dark valley”, Japan’s war years are more appropriately viewed as a proactive attempt to transform world politics. While Japanese policies produced death and destruction on an unprecedented scale, they reflected a conscious and enthusiastic attempt to create a new world. From the Manchurian Incident (1931) to the Fundamental Principles of National Policy (1936) to the Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), the National Mobilization Law (1938), the New Order in East Asia (1938), the proclamation of a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (1940), and to the Tripartite Pact (1940), Japanese statesmen dramatically transformed Japanese domestic political and foreign policy aims in a way that made total war all but inevitable and total destruction a near certainty.
An architect of the Black civil rights movement and its foremost theorist, W. E. B. Du Bois looked expectantly to Japan. Apart from having escaped China’s fate -humiliated, nibbled, reduced – it was the sole colored country able to check white global dominance. He wrote elatedly after the Russo-Japanese war: “For the first time in a thousand years a great white nation has measured arms with a colored nation and has been found wanting … The awakening of the yellow races is certain … the awakening of the brown and black races will follow in time.” In 1936, Du Bois visited Japan and its continental provinces, which experience sealed his trust in Asian-African cooperation. Soon after Du Bois’s foray, Helen Keller went to Japan. Keller hoped, in what she thought would be a multi-month tour, to further the cause of people afflicted by disabilities, particularly blindness. Her 1937 excursion was additionally an exercise (albeit futile) in informal diplomacy, to avert the Japanese-US slide into a war trap. Neither did attempts in 1940-1941 by Bishop Walsh and Father Drought preserve the Pacific peace. These self-appointed emissaries had sought to lessen Japanese-US estrangement.
Pearl Harbor demonstrates that war can occur when coercion (e.g., economic sanctions) works too well. To investigate this dynamic, we also engage another important, but controversial, question in this case – namely, whether the United States (US) president Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) deliberately sought war with Japan as a way to enter the war in Europe. Contrary to some scholars, our analysis concludes that FDR was aware of the total oil embargo that Acheson implemented and that FDR wanted war. Indeed, the US made only one serious attempt to avoid war – the modus vivendi proposal. FDR supported the proposal because he thought it would give the US more time to prepare. Tojo may have entertained the proposal, but he never received it because Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill vetoed it. The latter needed the US to intervene in the war to increase their chances of winning. This is yet another example of alliances promoting war – in this instance, by vetoing a peace proposal. Finally, we consider why Japan was willing to attack the US, even though it knew the US was more powerful.
Chapter 1 deals with two main topics. One is to assess the reasons for the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Japanese economic motivations for war as an investment in building a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are given particular weight. Second, the chapter analyzes Japan’s economic plans for Southeast Asia at the outset of occupation, how these changed as the war turned against Japan, and the implications for Southeast Asia of Japanese military reversals and heavy merchant shipping losses. Emphasis is placed on Japanese economic weakness compared to American and it is concluded that Japan had no prospect of winning a Pacific War and only limited chances of securing a favourable negotiated peace.
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