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Chapter 4 challenges the financial risk management (FRM) approach to compliance as ethically inadequate. Sometimes law provides insufficient economic incentive to ensure that society’s normative aspirations are met. When this failure directly threatens human health, safety, or dignity, the need for a corrective framework becomes evident. Concerns for social justice require managers to go beyond the economic logic of the FRM paradigm, embrace a broader view of the firm’s civic duties, and cooperate with the ethical aspirations that inform the law. The argument is advanced with reference to the persistent industrial air pollution found in the now-infamously named Cancer Alley.
Chapter 3 offers competing models of regulatory compliance. The first emphasizes the civic duty to cooperate in the formation, implementation, and reform of public policy, including regulatory law. The second serves the logic of financial risk management (FRM), where profitability provides the sole lodestar. Comparing the two highlights the ethical challenges inherent in FRM. Exclusively financial orientations to risk management ignore the law’s moral underpinnings, encourage regulatory capture, and undercount the firm’s political obligations. An argument is advanced linking recent compliance scandals to this FRM orientation and an absence of the cooperative balance. The contrasting models developed in this chapter provide an analytical framework used in the remainder of this book.
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