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This chapter traces the Oslo peace process’s shift from informal backchannels to formal diplomacy. Under Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) pressure, Shimon Peres sent Uri Savir to Oslo, initiating Track I negotiations. This transition introduced protocol and state representation, replacing improvisation. Joel Singer, a Washington-based lawyer, joined the Israeli team, adding legal depth. Secrecy became vital, as leaks could derail progress. Within this tense atmosphere, negotiators drafted the Declaration of Principles (DoP), outlining a phased move from Israeli occupation to limited Palestinian self-rule. The DoP envisioned a cautious path from violence to coexistence and from political manoeuvring to reconciliation. Despite its significance, the agreement left major issues unresolved: it did not halt settlement expansion or address Jerusalem, the Al Aqsa Mosque, Palestinian refugees or statehood. The Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction was narrowly defined, excluding Israeli settlements, military zones and Jerusalem. The two-state solution remained absent; only autonomy was offered. On 20 August 1993, Savir and Ahmed Qurie initialled the DoP in Oslo. Peres informed the Americans, and on 13 September, the Accords were signed on the White House lawn, with President Bill Clinton presiding over a moment of cautious optimism.
The chapter delves into the iconic imagery and contested legacy of Moshe Dayan as the “minister of victory” during the Six-Day War. It examines the strategic decisions and military maneuvers orchestrated by Dayan, shedding light on his pivotal role in shaping the objective and management of the war. The emphasizing his focus on neutralizing the Egyptian military threat and avoiding unnecessary entanglements with other Arab armies. Dayan’s adaptability and opportunistic approach to seizing fleeting opportunities are highlighted, underscoring his influence on major decisions while attempting to minimize intervention in routine management. Furthermore, the chapter delves into Dayan’s considerations of international sensitivities, particularly regarding the Holy Basin and the potential involvement of the Soviet Union. The controversy surrounding the war’s objectives and priorities, as well as the tensions between the political and military echelons, is also examined. Additionally, the chapter delves into Dayan’s interactions with political figures and military leaders, revealing the complexities and challenges he faced in navigating the rapidly evolving dynamics of the war.
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