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Chapter 4 examines the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union as a critical case study in how domestic political volatility creates opportunities for arms control agreements. Through extensive analysis of declassified documents, interviews, and archival materials, the chapter demonstrates how leadership changes in the USSR, particularly Gorbachev’s rise to power, increased US uncertainty about Soviet intentions. While the United States initially believed the USSR would certainly violate any agreement, Gorbachev’s emergence created doubt about this assessment without establishing clear expectations of Soviet cooperation. This uncertainty made the United States more willing to pursue an agreement with intrusive but not maximalist verification provisions. Similarly, the USSR observed domestic political pressures on the Reagan administration that suggested possible changes in US approaches. The chapter challenges alternative explanations based on Soviet decline, ideological change, or incremental trust-building. Instead, it shows how the INF Treaty emerged from a period of heightened uncertainty rather than increased trust. The treaty’s extensive verification provisions reflected both sides’ continued suspicions while enabling cooperation that seemed impossible just a few years earlier. The chapter provides strong evidence for uncertainty as the key causal mechanism linking domestic political volatility to arms control agreements.
Given the weakness of today’s UN as an instrument for tackling global challenges, we need to rely on treaties and diplomacy for urgent safety measures at the international level: a new pact on restricting bioweapons and synthetic biology, with inspections for verification; a treaty on AI and cyberwarfare; and a treaty to restrain the arms race for weapons in the oceans and outer space. After creating an Office for Emerging Biotechnology in the US, we should promote the creation of similar offices in as many other nations as possible, building a network of global regulatory capabilities. Finally, we can undertake a series of moderate reforms to beef up the effectiveness of the UN: enlarging the Security Council; restricting the use of the veto; and adding new Peacebuilding roles to the General Assembly.
Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons of Soviet/Russian and US nuclear weapons have been destroyed under successive bilateral treaties. Only one, New START, remains in force, and only until 2026. This chapter explains why and summarises the content and impact of the main treaties adopted between the two superpowers, beginning with the SALT I and ABM treaties in 1972.
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