This chapter introduces the main methodology used in the book. It includes a discussion of nonideal theory, the analysis of political contexts via examination of the historical contexts in which they are used, and looks specifically at discourses around slavery and abolition as a source for insights about the idea of freedom.

Charles W. Mills’s persistent criticisms of Rawls’s ideal theory aptly motivated a turn to non-ideal theory, but also have deep, unexplored implications for Rawls’s ideal theory. Since ideal theory will remain useful as a supplement to non-ideal theory, these are worth pursuing. The criticisms put forward by Mills reveal two serious flaws in Rawls’s ideal theory: First, Rawls’s well-known focus on the “basic structure of society” as the primary subject of social justice puts way too much stock in the legal regulation of society, correspondingly ignoring other powerful types of social norms. Second, and relatedly, Rawls’s conception of social power is too highly moralized (too Hohfeldian) to enable him to come to grips with oppressive social power. These flaws need to be corrected and the limitations they entail must be overcome for a Rawlsian ideal society to be sufficiently resistant to breeding new forms of bigoted oppression.

Chapter 6 concludes the book by reconstructing both the pitfalls and the horizons of contemporary utopianism. Based on a comparative reading of my three constellations, my final point is that utopianism remains structurally pervaded by the following three fault lines: indeterminacy, wishful thinking and defeatism. Since these fault lines derive from enduring features of utopianism, the best manner of coping with them would be to openly avow their pervasiveness and prepare for the eventual traps that any form of social dreaming might fall into. If we conceive of utopianism as the education of our desire for being and living otherwise, we should, the chapter insists, also remain constantly alert to the multiple respects in which these pedagogical efforts may go awry. Critical self-reflexivity is therefore pivotal to the orientative function that all utopias in the Anthropocene seek to perform. The book ends with a discussion of how such a self-reflective attitude could be cultivated so as to accommodate the failures that social dreaming succumbs to. The anti-hero of Robert Musil's The Man without Qualities can assist us in gaining valuable insights into this issue.

This chapter is devoted to some of the philosophical issues that arise in the context of action, taking issue with the thesis that the turn to practices will lead to a better ‘theory’ of international relations or of social action. I first examine different choice-approaches and show why they are false friends; that is, they rely on misleading analogies. Here rational choice (goal means rationality), technique (techne), or the production of an object, systems (whole/ part distinctions), and teleologies or ideal theories concerned with the clarification of normative principles are found wanting. Common to all these different approaches is the notion that action can be subjected to a theoretical gaze, be it the view from nowhere or of being able to determine where we are from the point of the ‘end of history’. After some preliminary criticism I show 12 important differences that characterize action and that are overlooked when we think that such views are helpful for understanding praxis.

This chapter explores what apocalyptic thought shares with ideal theory, with a focus on our grounds for believing any proposed account of the ideal society. As John Rawls understands it, ideal theory is based on plausible reasons that others should accept, whereas religious belief is unsuitable to collectively guide society. Some, though, have questioned Rawls’s confidence in ideal theory, and this chapter draws on social science research to place these criticisms on firmer ground. It outlines an argument for why future uncertainty makes it impossible to offer a plausible defense of ideal theory. As a result, ideal theory, like religious belief, ultimately must rest on faith. Though ideal theory must abandon aspirations of outlining an ideal to collectively guide society, there is still a potential role for it as a source of utopian hope.

The close of the book offers a brief overview of its arguments and revisits the parable that opens the study. It also considers a parable from the apocalyptic tradition, the Sheep and the Goats in Matthew 25:31–46, and offers an interpretation to highlight its potential wisdom for ideal theory. On this interpretation, the parable serves as a subtle reminder of the virtue found in pairing utopian hope with epistemic humility.

The book opens with a parable to introduce three central figures in the chapters to come – Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Engels – and their approaches to apocalyptic thought. It then defines key concepts and gives an overview of the three main arguments advanced in Apocalypse without God. The first argument is methodological: the study of secular apocalyptic thought would place itself on firmer ground by focusing on cases where secular thinkers explicitly reference religious apocalyptic texts, figures, and concepts. The second argument is interpretive: apocalyptic thought’s political appeal partly lies in offering resources to navigate persistent challenges that arise in ideal theory, which tries to imagine the best and most just society. And the third argument is normative: ideal theory and apocalyptic thought both rest on faith and are best suited to be sources of utopian hope, but not guides for collective action by a society.

Why would secular thinkers find in Christian apocalyptic beliefs – often dismissed as bizarre – appealing tools for interpreting politics? This chapter aims to unpack that puzzle. A helpful approach for understanding apocalyptic thought’s appeal is the lens of ideal theory, which tries to imagine the best and most just society. Ideal theory faces a daunting task: outlining a goal that is both utopian and feasible. To be worth striving for, the ideal must be utopian and possess sufficient moral appeal to justify the transition costs needed to achieve it. Yet the ideal also must be feasible, since it is difficult to justify dedicating limited resources to pursue the impossible. These competing goals result in a catch-22: a more utopian ideal is a less feasible moral goal, which diminishes reasons to strive for it, but a more modest and feasible ideal is a less appealing moral goal, which also diminishes reasons to strive for it. What I call cataclysmic apocalyptic thought proposes a way out of this dilemma. It embraces a utopian goal and declares it feasible by pointing to crisis as the vehicle to wipe away corruption and bring the seemingly impossible within reach.

This chapter provides an overview of global poverty and the debate on transnational socioeconomic justice. It begins by examining the current state of global poverty and the argument that it is in decline; it finds reason to be cautious about optimistic narratives on the decline of poverty. It then looks at global inequality and the uneven distribution of wealth between the human population. It then returns to look at poverty as an existential experience and how it is corrosive to a minimally acceptable human life.

It then considers the debate on transnational socio-economic justice between cosmopolitans and their critics. It provides a general distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory.It settles on a minimalist position as its point of departure for the injustice of global poverty. It argues that all sides have neglected the problem of intransigent non-compliance. There is little likelihood that compliance with even minimal duties of justice will occur in the near future. This raises the question of what the victims of injustice should do when there is no remedy on offer.