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In this chapter, a Millian justification of intellectual property rights is offered and defended. First, it is argued that a plausible form of utilitarianism endorses flourishing theory and indirect utilitarianism. The flourishing theorist argues that moral value includes pleasure and pain but also liberty, security, privacy, freedom of thought, and the like. The indirect utilitarian is willing to follow strategic rules even in cases where it looks like breaking a rule would get the best consequences. The notion of fallibility is essential to this account of moral obligations. Given that humans are fallible and that the rules we consider are typically tested over decades and in numerous contexts, it is generally the case that we are more certain of our rules than we are of our utility calculating abilities in any given instance. We could call these strategic rules rights, and this will include intellectual property rights.
In this chapter, and setting aside various foundational moral entanglements, an argument will be offered for the protection of intellectual property based on individual self-interest and prudence. While consequences play a fundamental role, the argument and analysis discussed are not utilitarian in nature. In large part, this argument parallels considerations that arise in a prisoner’s dilemma game. A sketch of the salient features of prisoner’s dilemma games is provided along with an examination of how content creation, exclusion, and access can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. In brief, allowing content to be unprotected in terms of free access will lead to a sub-optimal outcome where creation and innovation are suppressed. Finally, it will be argued that adopting the institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way we can avoid the sub-optimal results of playing an intellectual property prisoner’s dilemma.
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