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This chapter addresses the second main challenge to Kant’s conception of autonomy: the sense that the opposition between nature and freedom renders the actuality of freedom unintelligible. Turning to the Inaugural Dissertation and the three critiques, the second chapter shows that tackling the problem requires us to first overcome a widespread misunderstanding of Kant’s notion of the intelligible world. The intelligible world is not a given world available to theoretical cognition but initially accessible only through practical cognition as a world that ought to be. The chapter develops a new interpretation of Kant’s use of the principle “ought implies can” to show how the moral self-consciousness of the ought provides the realm of freedom with a first degree of actuality that, however, remains insufficient on its own. For freedom to be truly realized, we have to realize our freedom in the natural world by endowing it with a different purposive form. The third Critique offers unrecognized resources to explain how such a realization may be possible. By means of its account of natural purposiveness and the feeling of life, it redescribes external and subjective nature in such a manner that we can see how freedom may take root in them. By means of its account of fine, Kant specifies the general form of processes through which we can transform given nature and produce a second nature expressive of ideas. The chapter closes by considering why Kant did not fully develop these resources and why freedom remains ultimately unreal in his own account, something especially obvious in his discussion of the highest good.
The idea of the individual as autonomous, capable of understanding through the use of reason what morality requires, and capable of doing the right thing because it is right, is one of the pillars of the Enlightenment, and Kant's ethics provides a robust account of the way in which the individual's capacity for moral insight, and freedom to make choices in accordance with such insight, are indispensable for any account of an authentic commitment to the objective good. Jacqueline Mariña situates Kant's ethical and metaethical arguments in the wider context of his claims in his critical works, convincingly rebutting recent claims that he did not succeed in showing that rational agents are necessarily bound by the moral law, and that he ended up with an empty moral dogmatism. Her book shows that the whole of Kant's critical works, both theoretical and practical, were much more coherent than many interpreters allow.
This chapter demonstrates that a correct understanding of Kant’s argument for the bindingness of the moral law in Groundwork III succeeds. Through his critique of the conditions of the possibility of the act of willing, Kant demonstrates that any act of the will involves our activity as intelligences. This includes action in accordance with hypothetical imperatives, which involves the capacity to understand what is required in order for us to influence the world and so act in it; it requires the capacity to act in accordance with laws. Kant characterizes his argument in Groundwork III as a deduction answering the question: With what right we are bound by the categorical imperative? It proceeds in three essential steps: an analysis of (1) negative freedom and the logical conditions of judgment in all practical principles; (2) moral valuation and the problem of the circle, and (3) positive freedom as implied in the act of reflection as the self understands itself as acting in accordance with the idea of laws. When we so act, we transfer ourselves into the world of intelligences and must assume the conditions of membership in such a world. These include being bound by the moral law.