One of the most striking developments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights Court over the past decade is the development a new doctrine of subsidiarity that has been presented as democracy-enhancing. This article explores this turn to subsidiarity in European human rights to assess the extent to which it is positively contributing to democracy. The article does so by first unpacking the notion of subsidiarity, arguing that it is a composite notion that has organisational, legal and democratic elements. Against this background, the article examines the place and space of subsidiarity in the European human rights system, finding that subsidiarity is overwhelmingly concerned with organisational matters. It does speak to democracy but only in a small subset of cases, which typically involve well-functioning democracies. This also means that the new democracy-enhancing doctrine does very little work in the context of democratically backsliding member states.

The steadily growing reliance on international dispute settlement as environmental protection means is not uncontroversial, raising three sets of issues regarding: (i) the nature of adjudicative fora (ontological issues); (ii) wider assumptions and frameworks (methodological issues); and (iii) processes for creating and implementing environmental obligations (processual issues). Accordingly, this review essay is threefold. Despite a trend towards greater reliance on international dispute settlement fora, Part I discusses whether their presumably inherent ‘anthropocentric’ orientation hinders their suitability and assesses the feasibility of solutions advocated in judicial discourses. Having observed inconsistencies between the law-ascertainment methods deployed by adjudicative fora and the general regimes on law-ascertainment, Part II contends, international law-based environmental protection risks becoming overly “judge-centric”, despite international law-making’s state-centric nature. Part III concludes considering various reversals of perspective, potentially countering the shortcomings of overly “judge-centric” environmental protection, in addition to factors such as enforceability, plausibly justifying greater reliance on arbitral fora.

This article explores the role of international law in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal (CFA). The CFA makes extensive use of international and comparative materials, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, it avoids issuing judgments that would clash with Beijing’s core interests and accepts its broad definition of “national security”. This arguably facilitates authoritarian interpretations of the ICCPR and undermines the authority of the Human Rights Committee. Yet, in March of 2025, the CFA granted an appeal and upheld the right to fair trial, emphasizing that the ICCPR continues to enjoy constitutional status in Hong Kong. Moreover, the CFA continues to advance the rights of vulnerable groups, including the LGBT community. The CFA’s contributions to comparative jurisprudence on international human rights law are decidedly mixed. But this is arguably inevitable, given its unusual status as an “apex court” operating in the shadow of Beijing.

Since 1996, international human rights law (IHRL) has attempted to address caste-based discrimination through the rubric of racial discrimination by reading caste into ‘descent’ under Article 1(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). However, this framing of discrimination remains inadequate. The Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights sought to identify caste-based discrimination by identifying practices of untouchability without analysing caste as a system of entitlement to knowledge, wealth, and land. Therefore, IHRL envisioned caste-based discrimination as primarily inflicting recognition harms on its victims. This meant that even material manifestations of caste-based discrimination were framed as consequences of untouchability. Furthermore, the creative legal move to read caste into ‘descent’ meant deracinating caste from its particular context in South Asia — where it remains imbricated with Brahmanical Hinduism1 — into a general form of ‘descent’ like any other ascriptive category. This process of abstraction erases the interdigitation of caste and Hinduism. These two moves mean IHRL remains ill-equipped to identify, let alone redress, caste-based discrimination.

International human rights specialists and libertarian philosophers have rarely pursued meaningful exchanges, but this paper probes some of their common ground. In recent years, leading international monitoring bodies have developed a principle described here as the ‘Libertarian Principle of Human Rights’ (LPHR). It runs as follows: Governments cannot legitimately recite public morals as a sufficient justification to limit individual human rights. That principle might seem obvious in many societies today, but throughout history, including the history of liberalism, any notion that certain individual interests must trump religious or customary beliefs has stood as the rare exception. The seemingly Western and secular suggestion of a libertarian principle inherent within human rights may seem at odds with the view that human rights ought to reflect diverse cultural traditions; however, LPHR underscores an anti-authoritarianism, which, it is argued, must form part of any serious conception of human rights. LPHR can be substantiated even for highly controversial rights, such as LGBTQ+ rights, suggesting that it applies a fortiori to more settled rights.

In this paper, we adopt an experimentalist approach to determining the content of international human rights for assessing national mandatory work programmes for recipients of social assistance (MWPs). This approach implies going back and forth between law and experience in order to determine the better way to secure human rights in an ever-changing environment. After having identified six criteria for evaluating MWPs in the soft case-law of international bodies, we confront this emerging international human rights framework with an empirical study on MWP practices in the Netherlands. This confrontation reveals that specific aspects of the capability for voice of working welfare recipients are absent in the human rights framework and that the framework is not gender-neutral. Including these aspects, we construct an experimentalist human-rights-based instrument that is suitable for evaluating national MWPs.

On April 19, 2016, in The Case Concerning the Resolution of the Question of the Possibility to Execute in Accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 July 2013 in the Case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia in Connection with the Request of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (Anchugov & Gladkov (Russ.)), the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Constitutional Court) held that decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are binding on Russian courts, in accordance with Article 15(4) of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Constitutional Court stressed the necessity of ensuring a reasonable balance between the obligation to implement ECtHR judgments and respect for the fundamental principles of the Russian Federation's constitutional system. The Constitutional Court found that because the ECtHR judgment in question implicitly conflicted with provisions of the Russian Constitution, Russian courts are not obliged to comply with the judgment regarding issues that remain in conflict; however, other means are available to the Russian legislature to give effect to the judgment. While the decision marks an important development in Russia's relationship with the European system of human rights, it is not inconsistent with the approach taken by a substantial number of European domestic courts in holding that treaty obligations to enforce decisions of international courts cannot justify violating domestic constitutional norms.

In light of a recent shift in dialogue to hard law standards in the domain of business and human rights, this article provides an in-depth examination of the viability of a business and human rights treaty. It seeks to advance a valid theoretical model for a treaty that directly addresses non-State actors, explores the allocation of responsibility among multiple duty-bearers, and contemplates the scope, content, and enforcement of the potential obligations. By supplementing this analysis with analogies drawn from existing treaty regimes, the article aims to contribute positively to the normative development of international law in the field.

The phenomenon of child labour is on the rise in Europe in the wake of the economic crisis. Specific action in tackling this practice faces a range of challenges including the often hidden nature of the work, cultural attitudes and gendered constructions of the role of children especially in domestic settings. This article explores the range of international standards and efforts made by numerous human rights tribunals aimed at combating the practice, with particular emphasis on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It concludes that the Court has drawn erratically on its standard methodologies (including the comparative technique) in interpreting Article 4 of the ECHR, thus providing limited guidance to European States in getting to grips with child labour.

The paper presents a theory of the moral structure of international human rights. It proceeds by drawing on recent scholarship on the philosophy of national constitutional rights, which has shown that there is now an emerging global consensus on certain structural features of constitutional rights; in previous work I have summarized this under the label ‘the global model of constitutional rights’. Starting from the theory of rights underlying the global model, the paper asks what modifications, if any, are required to turn that theory into a suitable theory of international human rights. In particular, it examines the widely held view that international human rights are more minimalist than national constitutional rights. Discussing recent work by Ronald Dworkin (on political/constitutional versus human rights) and Joseph Raz (on legitimate authority versus national sovereignty), the paper concludes that it is not possible to make rights more minimalist than they already are under the global model. It follows that the moral structures of national constitutional rights and international human rights are identical. The final section of the paper examines some implications of this result, addressing the issues of the workability of the proposed conception of international human rights in practice, its point and purpose, and discussing the obligations of states to participate in international mechanisms for the protection of human rights.

As far as the topic of ‘necessity and human rights’ is concerned, considerations informed by necessity mainly play a role as grounds for restricting or derogating from human rights on the basis of primary norms contained in international human rights treaties, rather than on the basis of the secondary necessity norm set out in Article 25 of the ILC Articles. The arguably exhaustive treatment of necessity-informed restrictions and derogations in those treaties largely precludes invocation of the general defence of necessity under the law of State Responsibility. Indeed, the drafters have already factored in necessity when drafting human rights treaties. In so doing, they have incorporated necessity into the law itself as a justification for limitations to human rights, thereby excluding reliance on a broader concept of necessity outside this framework. Beyond the human rights treaties, for that matter, States are very hesitant to invoke necessity as an excuse, as this would amount to admitting that their conduct was in fact unlawful (although excusable). Apart from that, ‘human rights’ may possibly qualify as an ‘essential interest’ excusing non-compliance with non-human rights related international law obligations, but it can be said that the notion of jus cogens may be a more potent tonic to set aside ‘incompatible’ lesser norms of international law.