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This article examines the first attempts of the transnational gay rights movement to frame its demands in the vocabulary of international human rights law (IHRL). Based on archival research and oral history interviews, the article narrates how the International Gay Association (IGA) advocated for recognition within broader IHRL civil society between the late 1970s and early 1990s. The article analyses the almost two-decades-long campaign to convince Amnesty International that gay rights were an IHRL issue. The lobby directed at Amnesty serves to demonstrate a threefold argument: (i) queer transnational activism’s history significantly overlaps with the history of IHRL; (ii) the resort to IHRL by queer activists was both purposeful and accidental. While it ultimately proved decisive in positioning LGBTI+ struggles within mainstream legal debates, it also relied on a contingent set of historical conditions and strategic choices; (iii) queer demands were not ‘naturally’ linked to IHRL, and it took a lengthy process of advocacy for the scope of IHRL to finally open itself to queer claims.
This article proposes a “maximalist”, vulnerability-based perspective as the appropriate lens through which limitations of socio-economic rights and the relevant obligations of States during armed conflicts and under conditions of scarcity should be assessed. It argues that as vulnerability and deprivation increase, so too does the weight of the claim protected by the right. The concrete measures required of a State nevertheless remain calibrated to its resources, institutional capacity, degree of control and other means reasonably available to it, including the possibility of seeking international assistance. In this sense, the proposed approach is maximalist as to the State’s effort and the level of protection toward which State action must be directed, but not absolute as to the results that must be achieved. The article also addresses potential objections and, while acknowledging their significance, explains why they do not have to contradict the proposed approach.
This volume makes a legal theoretical contribution to the emerging regime of indigenous environmental rights, drawing on the law, theory, sociological and anthropological approaches. Firstly, it introduces key developments in the field of international human rights law and international environmental law, dealing with contemporary trends but also foundational principles and rights. It then addresses one of the most influential strands, that of (transformative) legal pluralism and its decolonising effects on the law. And in a final part, it uncovers a known conceptual divide, distinguishing between anthropocentric and eco-centric approaches, thereby identifying key developments in the human rights field and rights of nature discourses. The book brings together experts in the field and also creates the space for scholarly dialogue, conceptually and beyond, which ultimately provides answers and directions in the field of indigenous environmental rights, to newcomers and specialised scholars alike.
This chapter examines international humanitarian law or the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict. Its development is briefly traced and its substance based upon the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 examined. These cover the principles concerning the wounded and sick on land and on sea, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the protection of civilians in times of war. The scope and meaning of occupation is examined, ranging from the start of such occupation, the rights and duties of the occupying power and its cessation. In this context, the principles of self-determination and non-annexation of territory are noted. The relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law is then examined, followed by an analysis of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. The status of non-international armed conflicts is considered, and then follows a survey of the pertinent principles governing cyber warfare. The chapter concludes with a look at the enforcement of international humanitarian law.
This chapter offers a historical and legal reinterpretation of the minority protection clauses of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, with a particular focus on their implications for the Kurds living in Turkey. While the treaty is often cited as excluding the Kurds from formal minority status, on the one hand, this chapter argues that Articles 38 and 39 of Lausanne nevertheless extended certain rights and protections to all inhabitants of Turkey, including the Kurds. Drawing on the treaty’s drafting history, diplomatic correspondence, and international jurisprudence this article demonstrates that Turkey’s subsequent denial of Kurdish rights therefore constitutes a breach of its treaty obligations. On the other hand, it further explores how Ankara, through military leverage, strategic ambiguity, and political assurances, succeeded in “de-internationalising” Kurdish claims, effectively shielding its domestic policies from external scrutiny. The article concludes by highlighting the shared responsibility of the Allied Powers and the League of Nations in allowing these violations to go unchallenged, and calls for renewed scholarly attention to Lausanne’s unfulfilled Kurdish question.
The mental health and psychosocial needs of victims of armed conflict remain inadequately addressed in international law, despite growing recognition of their significance. More than one in five people living in post-conflict settings will develop a mental health condition, yet demand for mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) frequently outstrips supply. This article examines the intersection between human rights law and victim assistance regimes in disarmament treaties, exploring how the latter could strengthen international legal and policy responses to post-conflict mental health needs. Though it has conceptual and implementation gaps, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides a doctrinal foundation for mental health care; building on this foundation, victim assistance models include features such as explicit prioritization of MHPSS, practical implementation frameworks, and clearer international assistance obligations. These features could inform the development and implementation of the right to health, offering particularity that, if extended beyond specific weapons victims, has the potential to benefit wider post-conflict populations.
This article examines three key cases decided by the CERD Committee to show how the semantic conundrum of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) becomes an obstacle in extending protection against racial discrimination to various racialized groups. It is argued that the wording of Article 1 of ICERD creates a tripartite classification of semantics, in which meaning generated through different protected grounds obscures the conception of racial discrimination. This places constraints on the Committee’s ability to decide in favour of racialized non-citizens. The article proceeds to examine the jurisprudence of direct, indirect, and positive discrimination in the context of Article 1. It contends that while the semantic conundrum of ICERD confines racial discrimination to limited grounds, using the forms of discrimination can yield positive results. This is shown by re-examining the three cases, this time using the lens of forms of discrimination. It is argued that this approach can enable the Committee to transcend the semantic conundrum of ICERD and arrive at more nuanced conclusions.
Human rights litigation increasingly confronts claims that environmental degradation violates duties owed to future generations, yet existing doctrinal frameworks struggle to give these intergenerational obligations concrete effect. This article argues that the constructive trust offers a more coherent and workable private-law architecture for intergenerational equity than the public trust doctrine that dominates current scholarship and climate litigation strategies. The article traces the intellectual genealogy of intergenerational obligation in ideas of stewardship, usufruct and equity, and shows how these motifs have been channelled into trust-based vocabularies. Following this, it surveys international and domestic case law in which courts acknowledge temporal dimensions of environmental harm but hesitate to constitutionalise a general public trust, and highlights four structural defects that render public trust theory jurisdictionally fragile and remedially weak. The latter portion of the article develops an account of constructive trust reasoning grounded in unjust enrichment and unconscionable retention of benefits and shows how this framework can be used to attach proprietary consequences to profits generated by rights-violating environmental conduct, without requiring recognition of future generations as current rights-holders. The article concludes that constructive trust logic is transferable across legal systems, because it aligns with civil-law regimes of unjust enrichment, patrimonies by appropriation and constitutional environmental rights provisions. It further contends that an intergenerational constructive-trust approach can supply some of the ‘missing architecture’ of intergenerational justice within contemporary human rights law.
This paper explores how unrecognised separatist entities in Eurasia – de facto regimes such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics – engage with international law. It examines whether, and to what extent, these regimes comply with international law, analysing court decisions and legislation to move beyond simplistic views of non-recognition or assumed legality. The findings reveal that de facto regimes tend to mirror the international law approaches of the states they are most closely connected to – whether the territorial state (e.g. Ukraine) or an outside state exercising effective control over the entity (e.g. Russia or Armenia). This pattern is explained by the theory of “acculturation to statehood”: through sustained legal and institutional interaction, these regimes internalise and replicate the legal systems of their reference states. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the role of de facto regimes in the international legal order.
The book offers a critical and comprehensive examination of the concept of NIAC, including its normative foundations, threshold of activation, and corresponding personal, geographical, and temporal scope of applicability under International Humanitarian Law. It identifies and critically examines some of the most controversial aspects of modern NIACs, including notions of a 'global battlefield' and 'forever war' and provides practical guidance on identifying NIACs in real time. It is essential reading for international law academics, students and practitioners. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available open access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
With the global proliferation of armed conflicts, children are among the most vulnerable, facing serious violations of their human rights, most notably the right to education. Although both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) provide protection, schools continue to be attacked, educational infrastructure is destroyed, and millions of children lose access to learning. Against this backdrop, the present article examines the protection of children’s right to education under IHRL and IHL, and argues for a shift in how these existing norms are interpreted to better reflect the centrality of education to human dignity. Drawing on the established link between the right to education and human dignity under IHRL, the article proposes a novel interpretive lens that reframes the denial of education during armed conflict as a direct assault on the human dignity of the child, rather than merely a legal violation. Through this lens, education shifts from an ancillary social right to a core humanitarian concern grounded in the child’s dignity. The article argues that this human dignity-based understanding of education found in IHRL should inform the interpretation of IHL, as integrating this perspective would strengthen the normative coherence of IHL and offer stronger protection for children’s right to education in armed conflict. Recognizing schools as vital spaces for learning, stability and development, this approach emphasizes that access to education underpins children’s holistic growth, the realization of their rights and the safeguarding of their human dignity.
One of the most revolutionary human rights treaties, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), was premised on the goal of achieving equality for sexes defined in a binary manner. In a far more recent history, as Sandra Duffy reconstructs in her chapter, gender identity and how to conceptualize and recognize the rights of transgender and other claimants have been high-profile points of controversy in international fora.
Le droit à l’alimentation, vecteur de la sécurité alimentaire, a longtemps fait l’objet de débats contradictoires, d’une part, sur son appartenance à la catégorie des droits humains et, d’autre part, sur sa justiciabilité. Toutefois, au regard de son importance dans la vie de l’être humain, la prise de conscience semble avoir évolué sur son sujet. Des textes juridiques tant à l’échelle nationale qu’ internationale l’incorporent de plus en plus. Joint à cela, des théories à l’image de la théorie des trois niveaux d’obligations de Henry Shue en matière de mise en œuvre des droits humains et de la théorie générale des droits en filigrane, peuvent être mises à contribution afin de prouver son existence et sa justiciabilité. Dès lors, on pourrait affirmer qu’en sa qualité de personne morale de droit public qui se présente comme une entité souveraine, l’État a une responsabilité pour lutter contre l’insécurité alimentaire et favoriser la jouissance du droit à l’alimentation par sa population. Toutefois, cette réalité ne peut permettre de marginaliser l’existence de difficultés au niveau d’une telle mise en œuvre. C’est le cas du manque de reconnaissance universelle de ce droit, de l’insuffisance des textes juridiques à valeur contraignante qui l’encadrent ou encore de la marginalisation de certaines branches du droit international qui sont pourtant contributives à sa réalisation et à celle de la sécurité alimentaire. C’est à l’image du droit international de l’agroalimentaire et du droit international des sols. À cela, s’ajoutent d’autres défis. Ceux-ci sont liés aux disparités existantes entre les États au regard de leurs situations économiques différentes, mais aussi aux fléaux de plus en plus prononcés comme les changements climatiques et les conflits armés. De la sorte, l’insécurité alimentaire reste une problématique internationale qui nécessite une action collective de l’ensemble de la communauté internationale (États, organisations internationales, organisations non gouvernementales) pour son éradication.
Chapter 4 unpacks the reasons why international human rights is currently incapable of adequately protecting the environmental rights of future generations. It begins by explaining that future generations are not legally recognised as people who possess human rights and governments are not obliged to protect them. Even if those rights were recognised, there are no clear pathways for enforcing them. As the chapter explains, international human rights violations can be litigated by ‘victims’, who are people directly affected by an actual or imminent violation. The law does not allow for legal claims on behalf of people who do not yet exist or for harms that have not yet occurred or are not imminent, even though they may be foreseeable. Without standing to bring a legal action, the rights of future generations cannot be litigated and enforced within international human rights bodies. Additional challenges exist in relation to proving a breach of the law and establishing a causal connection when the alleged harm has yet to occur. Finally, the chapter explains the difficult task of balancing competing human rights interests and obligations across generations. After outlining these numerous challenges, the following chapter will offer a possible way forward.
In concluding the book, Chapter 9 summarises the lessons that were learned through the three case studies and reiterates the reasons why international human rights law needs to be reformed to better protect the environmental rights of future generations. It highlights the perpetual challenge of balancing the interests of current and future generations, but argues these can be mitigated by articulating new standards and expectations for states which incorporate notions intergenerational responsibility and fairness. Reforms are needed to ensure at least a level playing field, where future generations’ rights can be recognised and given the same weight as those of present generations. Chapter 9 concludes by calling for a multifaceted reorganisation of many areas of law, politics, economics and social policy, and offers hope that reforms of international human rights law might play a leading role in that undertaking.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed rationale for expanding international human rights law to protect the environmental rights of future generations. It draws on various theories of intergenerational responsibility, including the work of Edith Brown Weiss and theories of intergenerational equity, planetary trusts and the capabilities approach. The chapter also considers various Indigenous worldviews, such as the Seventh Generation principle of First Nations peoples in North America and the beliefs of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, which embody a strong sense of intergenerational responsibility. The deep feeling of connection with ancestors and descendants that is held by many Indigenous peoples translates into notions of custodianship towards the land and obligation to people across time. These worldviews have much to offer as we think about the future direction of human rights law, and provide another justification for making the law more responsive to future environmental threats.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed overview of the current state of international law. It begins by explaining the extent to which environmental rights are protected in international law. This includes an examination of the recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which recognised the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. The chapter also looks at a number of specific human rights, such as the right to life and the right to an adequate standard of living, exploring the way these rights have been applied by courts and tribunals in environmental cases. The chapter also explains the role of intergenerational equity as a long-standing principle of international environmental law, albeit it one which often lacks legal force. Finally, the chapter provides some examples from domestic law where the environmental rights of future generations have been protected. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that, while there is now widespread recognition of the environmental dimensions of human rights and growing protections at the domestic level, international human rights law still provides only limited protection of environmental rights and no explicit protection of the rights of future generations.
Tragically, the abuse of children within organizational contexts continues to persist across time and geographies. Various institutions established for children’s care and protection have repeatedly been exposed as epicentres of abuse. The concept and practice of ‘child safeguarding’ has emerged as an approach to address the systemic failures within organizational settings that enable – or fail to prevent – child abuse. Child safeguarding has received minimal academic attention and there is a notable lack of focus on the legal dimensions of child safeguarding, especially from an international human rights law perspective. This article contends that child safeguarding should shift from being viewed primarily as a practice issue to being understood and approached as a matter of children’s rights law. The article connects the concept and practice of child safeguarding with international children’s rights law norms and standards, examines the role of the state vis-à-vis non-state actors, and brings together the various guidance of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child articulating the responsibilities of states in protecting children from violence perpetrated by non-state actors, including a case example of the Committee’s inquiry into Chile’s residential care centres. The article suggests a baseline of child safeguarding responsibilities for NGOs working with children and calls for greater attention to child safeguarding within international children’s rights discourse.
The outsourcing of traditionally military functions in Africa to private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps has been accompanied by violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. According to the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, state responsibility for these violations can be imputed to the states that employ PMCs to function as their agents, to exercise government authority or to act in the vacuum left by official authorities. States that do not intervene to prevent these abuses fail their obligations of due diligence through persistent non-action and should not be excused from demanding accountability by immunity agreements between the host and hiring states. We explore the possibility of the communitarian invocation of state responsibility by third-party states, on behalf of victims, in order to end impunity, drive accountability and secure effective redress for victims.
This article presents a critical postcolonial analysis of international human rights law’s engagement with human trafficking through the lens of seven UN treaty bodies. Drawing on content analysis of 1,197 documents (33 General Comments/Recommendations, 1,049 Concluding Observations, and 115 Individual Communications), the article reveals how international human rights law is implicated in the status subordination of subaltern people. The article identifies 54 documents containing evidence of colonial legacies, with 76% of relevant Concluding Observations addressing Global South states. It argues that treaty bodies reinscribe colonial patterns through problematic conflation of trafficking with slavery, promotion of repressive migration policies, inconsistent treatment of prostitution and sex tourism, perpetuation of ‘raid and rescue’ approaches, and essentialization of trafficking victims as ‘innocent’. It also exposes limited engagement with intersectionality in individual communications, potentially overlooking complex, multifaceted experiences of trafficking victims. The article concludes by proposing concrete strategies to decolonise anti-trafficking law and practice, including interrogating assumed neutrality in legal instruments, embracing a politics of recognition, integrating the concept of ‘burdened agency’, and meaningfully countenancing intersectionality in legal analyses. This analysis contributes to understanding how international human rights law can better serve its emancipatory potential while avoiding the perpetuation of status subordination.