How did health governance get internationalised, and with what effects? In the early nineteenth century, a range of transregional sanitary councils were responsible for mitigating the pandemic spread of diseases such as cholera. The International Sanitary Conferences, first convened in 1851, centralised this arrangement but also discriminated against non-European public health expertise. This article argues that this was a case neither of imperial power politics alone nor simply of functional problem-solving, but of the appropriation of pre-existing governance structures. The article singles out epistemic and institutional appropriation as crucial twin dynamics that shaped nineteenth-century health governance. Analysis of the 1866 and 1892 sanitary conferences shows how Europeans systematically disqualified non-European expertise: they constructed and prioritised cholera as an ‘Oriental’ threat to Europe, and repeatedly claimed the superiority of French and German over Ottoman, Persian, and Egyptian experts. Inversely, expert-based resistance to European policy proposals was nominally welcomed, but in practice sidelined whenever expert-based objections did not reproduce the dominant Eurocentric interpretation of public health. By showing how imperial and racial hierarchies actively obscured the transregional origins of health governance, the article innovates International Relations’ understanding of what internationalisation empirically looks like and contributes a novel account of appropriation as a key means by which hierarchical relations get built into international organisations.

From the World Bank’s ‘Climate-Smart Mining’ initiative or ‘Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement’ program to the IMF’s ‘Energy Transition Strategies’, international development institutions have plenty to say about the role of the supply chain in securing critical minerals for green energy technologies.1 This article forms part of a bigger project that examines how the form of the supply chain, in the context of the contemporary energy transition, entrenches the patterns of distribution and accumulation that we often associate with the fossil fuel economy. In this way, I argue that the supply chain contributes to suppressing alternative legal forms of decarbonization.2 Multiple international legal practices and modes of thought are involved in this suppression. In this article, I offer an account of how logistics, as a practice, discipline of supply chain management, and form of governance or jurisdiction contribute to foreclosing possibilities for alternative forms of decarbonization in ways that both implicate international law and point to possibilities for contestation.

The political representation and agency of young people in international politics is still poorly understood, notwithstanding sustained interest in the pluralisation and diversification of transnational civil society and the ‘opening up’ of IOs in international relations (IR) scholarship. In this article, we put forward a theoretical framework for the study of youth representation in IR that is at once responsive to the specificities of youth and, at the same time, contributes to theory-building on political representation of newly recognised constituencies in international institutions overall. Theoretically, we build on constructivist and performative theories of representation, and we use our empirical insights to extend and qualify these theories. Empirically, we provide the first in-depth study of youth representation in global health governance. Based on an interpretive analysis of policy documents and qualitative interviews with youth participants at three major global health events, our study explores prevalent portrayals of youth as a constituency and problematises the legitimising effects of these portrayals. Moreover, we expose how multiple barriers and intersecting inequalities constrain young people’s encounters with exclusive spaces of global health policy-making and we point to the reflective and ambiguous ways in which young people embrace, enact, and question ‘youth’ as a political category.

In the contemporary era, territorial conquest has been seen as illegitimate and has taken place in only limited ways. According to an influential narrative in scholarship and public debate, this “territorial integrity norm” is a product of the post-World War II international order and contrasts with the nineteenth century, when conquest was normalized and “might made right.” This essay argues, however, that nineteenth-century European international law imposed meaningful limitations on conquest, including “territorial inviolability.” These limitations were more effective in the colonized world than in Europe, primarily because national irredentism was not thought relevant outside Europe. Europeans’ denial of non-European sovereignty contrasted with their respect for European-established colonial boundaries, and they did not fight over colonial territory between 1815 and 1914. I demonstrate the strength of this “etiquette of thieves” by examining two events where territorial conflict between colonial powers was narrowly avoided: the Panjdeh (1885) and Fashoda (1898) incidents. Viewing territorial integrity as qualitatively changing, rather than absent at one time and present later, has important implications for discussions of how recent conquests, such as those of Russia in Ukraine, will affect the principle of territorial integrity. In particular, territorial integrity may be more likely to be altered in how it is applied than eroded altogether. A specific form of territorial integrity is an integral part of the post-World War II international order, but constraints on conquest as such need not be limited to that specific version of territorial integrity.

The global diffusion of state power has led to a decline in global governance; that is, in the attempt to build authoritative rules and institutions that represent the common goals of the international community. The rise of China and other powers has increased the heterogeneity of the international system, and the erstwhile hegemon has turned against the international order. The major powers today have vastly different domestic characteristics and pursue strongly divergent interests. This has gridlocked and marginalized multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization and seen a worrying disregard for international law. In response, the institutional ecosystem of global governance is adapting by lowering its scope, weakening its commitments, and splintering into partly competing institutional orders. Adaptation and decline are not mutually exclusive: Today, we can witness the adaptation of global governance to its own decline. Theoretically, this points to the enduring relevance of hegemonic stability theory for global governance. The result is a reduced normative ambition for global governance, signaling a retreat from the grand internationalist vision of organized cooperation among all the members of the international community.

With formal international organizations (IOs) facing gridlock and informal IOs proliferating, cooperation in the twenty-first century looks different than it did in previous eras. Global governance institutions today also face additional challenges, including a fragmented information environment where publics are increasingly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. What do these trends portend for international politics? One way to answer this question is to return to a core ingredient of a well-functioning IO—information provision—and ask how such changes affect efficiency. Viewed through this lens, we see decline in some arenas and adaptation in others. Formal IOs are struggling to retain relevance as their weak policy responses and ambiguous rules create space for competing signals. The proliferation of informal institutions, on the other hand, may represent global governance evolution, as these technocratic bodies are often well-insulated from many political challenges. Yet even if global governance retains functionality, the legitimacy implications of such trends are troubling. IO legitimacy depends in part on process, and from this standpoint, the informational gains of informal governance must be weighed against losses of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, evaluating the normative implications of these trends requires making judgments about the preferred legitimizing principles for global governance.

Two states can have several bilateral agreements between them, some of which are legally binding and others are not. Is there a discernible pattern to how states structure the chronological sequence of binding and non-binding agreements governing a specific issue area? For example, do states prioritise a framework treaty to establish the foundation of their cooperation and let bureaucrats iron out details in non-binding instruments? Or do they first experiment with low-commitment agreements before eventually settling on a more permanent treaty? This paper explores these questions using the example of space governance, which is characterised by a high number of bilateral agreements. Examining space agreements between 287 state dyads, it argues that a combination of power asymmetry and trust levels influences the likelihood of certain types of sequences of binding and non-binding agreements. These findings are particularly relevant to the literature on informal governance, regime complexes, and space politics.

This article seeks to understand the evolving democratic legitimacy demands of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by reflecting on the challenges of catering to a globally affected public and enhanced participation opportunities given to some highly affected groups. It argues that the principle of democratic equality at a global scale fails to take account of inequities in affectedness and power within the demos and, instead, an approach that strives towards a principle of proportionality based on degrees of affectedness could enhance the UNFCCC’s democratic legitimacy. This builds on existing scholarship identifying a turn to an affectedness paradigm in international institutions more generally and the emerging influence of affected peoples organisations, characterised by the more direct forms of representation they facilitate and emphasis placed on the affectedness of their constituents to claim recognition and influence. The normative appeal of giving enhanced participatory opportunities to those most affected by climate governance is weighed against its challenges and risks. It is concluded that, despite conceptual and practical difficulties connected to the subjective nature of affectedness, a pragmatic approach that treats such a proportionality principle as a democratic ideal to be strived towards could have a legitimising effect on the UNFCCC.

Technology is of increasing importance for international cooperation, yet theory development in rationalist International Relations has not kept pace. I develop a theoretical framework for explaining cooperative outcomes in the international regulation of technology. I propose that uncertainty and the distribution of material capacities create a severe international collective action problem for novel technologies, which precludes robust cooperative outcomes and thus limits joint gains from the appropriation of technological benefits and from the mitigation of technological risks. While the severity of the collective action problem attenuates over time, in principle enabling greater ambition in cooperative outcomes, sociotechnical lock-in reduces the capacities and incentives of state actors to deviate from pre-existing rules. This leads to incremental change whereby rules harden over time but do not change significantly in terms of their regulatory substance. While early regulatory interventions are hampered by collective action problems, late interventions are constrained by lock-in. These temporal dynamics create a tendency towards systemic inefficiency in international technology regulation. I illustrate this argument using the cases of nuclear power and synthetic biology.