The EU–Mercosur agreement is one of the longest and most complex trade negotiations in modern economic diplomacy. Launched in 1999 and finally concluded in December 2024, it offers a unique lens through which to understand trade negotiations in an era of geopolitical uncertainty, domestic contestation, and multilateral fragmentation. Drawing on the authors’ direct experience in trade policy and negotiation, this article argues that the agreement was not delayed because technical solutions were unavailable, nor concluded because underlying conflicts disappeared. Rather, it moved forward when changing international conditions increased the political value of closure for both sides. Agricultural sensitivities, sustainability concerns, competitiveness debates, and Mercosur’s internal coordination challenges remained. What changed was the cost of failing to reach an agreement. The case suggests that trade agreements today are no longer merely instruments of market access; they also serve as tools of strategic positioning, regulatory reassurance, and geopolitical signaling. In this context, uncertainty can become not only a constraint, but also a catalyst for cooperation and agreement

Economic sanctions are a critical tool of international diplomacy. Existing scholarship shows that citizens in democratic sender states value sanctions that are effective in producing policy concessions. However, they also seek to limit the adverse humanitarian consequences of sanction imposition. How do citizens trade off these objectives against each other? We develop a theory of sanctions preferences where citizens (1) value policy concessions, (2) hold humanitarian motivations and (3) hold beliefs about how policy change occurs in autocracies. We argue that citizens are conditional humanitarians – humanitarian concerns dominate effectiveness considerations only if policy concessions are unlikely. Results from a pre-registered willingness-to-pay experiment examining the preferences of German citizens on sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine confirm the predictions of our theory.

Critical discussion of empire and imperialism has become a key theme in international relations. Much confusion, however, is generated by a lack of consensus on the meaning of imperialism. This paper offers one avenue for clarifying the terms of debate by reconstructing the conceptual history of imperialism from its inception in the late nineteenth century to post-war IR theory. In its initial formulation at the turn of the twentieth century, the theory of imperialism sought to analyse the interplay of capitalist development and geopolitical conflict in the formation and reproduction of international hierarchies. Immediately after World War I, however, an intellectual counter-revolution narrowed the concept into a synonym of colonialism, or the formal rule and administration of subject territory. As anti-colonial struggles won independence in the post-war period, imperialism was increasingly understood as a thing of the past. The paper argues that this conceptual narrowing remains an obstacle to contemporary theorizing, and that a rereading of the classical theories can strengthen contemporary IR frameworks. A key implication of this argument is that renewing the theory of imperialism in IR entails a reintegration of political economy and security studies.

This paper presents the first empirical analysis demonstrating how international security influences global data flows. Firms exchange data traffic to achieve fast, stable, and affordable access to digital infrastructure, driving digital interdependence. While international security shapes economic interdependence, the mechanisms linking the two – sanctions, tariffs, boycotts, and contracts – create little risk for Internet interconnection, which is commonly exempted from sanction and tariff regimes, not directly consumed by the public, and not enabled through traditional contracts. I theorize that international conflict generates cybersecurity externalities as state and non-state actors directly weaponize digital interdependence. Firms and their networks sit directly in the path of future conflicts. Leveraging network topographical measurements from computer engineering, I test whether conflict expectations increase states’ mutual reliance to move data. I find robust evidence that power politics shapes digital interdependence and use additional analyses to argue that externalities, rather than state preferences, drive this process.

Do populist governments bend their economic policies to the preferences of bondholders? Populist governments should be a “least likely” case for the market discipline hypothesis. Populist parties typically run on platforms that scapegoat wealthy elites as “enemies of the people” and hence should be more resistant to changing policy positions in the face of market pressure, given their reluctance to alienate their base. Employing most-different case studies of the Five Star Movement/Lega coalition in Italy and Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, we find that populists do bend to market pressure but that this “disciplining effect” does not stem primarily from foreign investors. Rather, it was the inaction of domestic investors in bond auctions that caused these governments to reverse course on headline economic policies. Because domestic investors served as both governments’ “buyers of last resort,” they needed to maintain their favor amidst foreign capital flight.

Many populist leaders politicise disputes with external financial ‘elites’, but most are forced by economic pressures to fundamentally change their ‘people-versus-elite’ problem representations and ‘concede defeat’. Notable exceptions are Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who sooner or later resisted strong push-back and defied the IMF or distressed-debt funds. These instances of prolonged populist defiance differ widely across commonly used structural and agential explanatory factors at international, domestic, and individual levels. To explain how Orbán, Kirchner, and Erdoğan managed to ‘beat the elite’, this paper clusters several root causes into a parsimonious framework of two intervening variables. The temporality of strong ‘elite’ push-back and the openness of advisory systems are theorised as shaping distinct cognitive mechanisms of representational continuity or change, through which ‘people-versus-elite’ input is either preserved until – or discarded before – feeding into decision outputs. As the two-by-two matrix of early/later external shocks and open/closed inner circles explains, Orbán did not move beyond marginal representational adjustments; Kirchner’s contingent representational fluidity benefited from opportune situational developments; and Erdoğan defied significant socio-economic cost with fundamental representational continuity. These insights highlight the potential of studying populism at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and international political economy.

Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci’s famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, we engage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises with a necessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by finance capital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulation around the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being marked by the ever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmospheric commons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentrated wealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological life through various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenous organising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternative internationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economy in practice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalism at the state, corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a ‘planetary political economy of the global majority’, which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological life according to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects.

Why do firms demand antidumping protectionism? Contemporary literature highlights a plethora of causal mechanisms within the data-generating process, including retaliatory motives, exchange rate appreciations, business cycles, and deindustrialization. I argue that countries that are economically integrated into global markets should be associated with less demand for antidumping trade remedies. In particular, countries with higher levels of trade and financial flows should receive fewer petitions for antidumping trade remedies from firms overall, ceteris paribus. I test this theoretical argument with a series of de facto globalization indicators collected from thirty-three countries between 1978 and 2022, finding support for these arguments.

This article assesses the initial contacts between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the World Bank during the early 1980s, following China’s admission to the institution in 1980. In the late 1970s, the PRC launched a new phase of economic reforms aimed at re-modelling its economic outlook. Collaboration with multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank was a key part of its “opening up” strategy. By drawing on newly available records from World Bank archives, the article reveals how the Bank’s approach to China's economic development was tailored to meet Beijing’s specific economic conditions and needs, and welcomed gradualism as the best path for China's reform strategy. At times of free market triumphalism and heavy structural adjustment towards developing countries, the China case, the article stresses, shows a World Bank behaving not quite in line with what many would expect. Therefore, the article provides not only an account of a bilateral relationship but offers a new perspective and reflection of the history of the international political economy of the early 1980s.

What happens to a public, domestic institution when its authority is delegated to a privately run, transnational institution? I argue that outsourcing traditionally national legal responsibilities to transnational bodies can lead to the stagnation of domestic institutional capacity. I examine this through a study of international commercial arbitration (ICA), a widely used system of cross-border commercial dispute resolution. I argue that ICA provides commercial actors an “exit option” from weak public institutions, reducing pressure on the state to invest in capacity-enhancing reform. I find that the enactment of strong protections for ICA leads to the gradual erosion of the capacity of domestic legal institutions, particularly in countries with already weak legal systems. I test the mechanism driving this dynamic using dispute data from the International Chamber of Commerce. I find that pro-arbitration laws increase the use of international arbitration by national firms, suggesting that firms use ICA as an escape from domestic institutions. This article contributes to debates on globalization and development as well as work on the second-order effects of global governance institutions.