Religious freedom is protected in both international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), yet the interference with that freedom caused by the mishandling, concealment and improper disposal of human remains in armed conflict has remained largely under-examined in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). This article addresses that gap. It reconstructs the normative framework governing religious freedom in relation to the treatment of the dead under IHL and IHRL, analyzes emblematic IACtHR cases involving human remains in armed conflict settings and proposes a doctrinal path for strengthening protection in this field. The article does not contend that the IACtHR may autonomously apply IHL or declare State responsibility for violations of IHL as such; rather, it argues that, in cases arising from armed conflict, the Court may, and should, interpret American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)-based obligations in light of IHL in order to specify duties concerning the search, recovery, identification, respectful handling, return and burial of the dead. It further argues that Article 12 of the ACHR can capture the distinct religious and spiritual dimension of the harm when funeral rites are obstructed, denied or rendered impossible.

The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are widely viewed as integral to humanitarian assistance. Yet, despite shaping the work of many humanitarians, the international legal status of these principles is unclear. This article revisits recent scholarship that presents the bindingness of these humanitarian principles as “relative.” Through a close reading of the British Columbia Court of Appeal case of R v Rajaratnam, a decision that, to date, has received only limited scholarly attention, this article points to the role of national court decisions in the development of these humanitarian principles in international law. It explores how such decisions can help elaborate the legal meaning of the humanitarian principles and be integral to the crystallization of the humanitarian principles in customary international law. Far from merely theoretical, and with diverse humanitarian crises ongoing worldwide, this article’s inquiry into the Rajaratnam decision underlines the wide-ranging implications of national decisions on humanitarian practice in public international law.

This article proposes a “maximalist”, vulnerability-based perspective as the appropriate lens through which limitations of socio-economic rights and the relevant obligations of States during armed conflicts and under conditions of scarcity should be assessed. It argues that as vulnerability and deprivation increase, so too does the weight of the claim protected by the right. The concrete measures required of a State nevertheless remain calibrated to its resources, institutional capacity, degree of control and other means reasonably available to it, including the possibility of seeking international assistance. In this sense, the proposed approach is maximalist as to the State’s effort and the level of protection toward which State action must be directed, but not absolute as to the results that must be achieved. The article also addresses potential objections and, while acknowledging their significance, explains why they do not have to contradict the proposed approach.

This article interrogates the moral inflation latent in socialization programmes that court combatants’ compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) through moral character-building identity projects but neglect the unique logic of IHL as an emergency brake on total destruction and elide the liminal subjectivity of combatants on this precipice. The article begins by uncovering two divergent views on combatants’ subjectivity that underpin different approaches to influencing their conduct: one views combatants as functionaries and advocates hardwiring IHL into commands and policies to build shortcuts to combatants’ pre-reflective self-consciousness, while the other views combatants as reflective individuals and aims for their internalization of the ethical values underpinning IHL as a more durable way of promoting restraint. The article then examines the radical potential of combatants’ self-conscious exercise of their existential freedom in war, explores the limits of the use of “identity” inculcation to rein in this freedom, and demonstrates how IHL compliance could itself be an expression of combatants’ authenticity in an existential sense through acknowledging their inherently limited subjectivity as “enemies by accident” in war.

Since the onset of the third millennium, the battlefield reality has undergone profound changes, a trend that is expected to persist in the coming decades. State armed forces are increasingly investing in the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems and expanding their strategic capabilities in cyberspace and outer space. Concurrently, the prevalence of non-international armed conflicts – not only internal armed conflicts occurring within the territory of a single State, but also transnational armed conflicts crossing State borders – is steadily rising. In addition, recent armed conflicts have pushed belligerent actors to cooperate in various ways against a common enemy.

The principle of effectiveness, which is of paramount importance in international humanitarian law (IHL), compels this legal framework to adapt to these changing realities of the battlefield. This article argues that analogical reasoning plays a pivotal role in facilitating IHL evolution, while also cautioning against the limitations and risks of its widespread use.

The analysis is structured in two main sections. First, the article explains the dual function of analogies in contemporary IHL discourses, illustrated through five paradigmatic examples addressing some of the field’s most pressing issues. Second, it examines the limitations and risks of relying heavily on analogical reasoning in the ongoing development of IHL. The article concludes by underscoring the responsibility of IHL scholars and experts to remain vigilant against the misuse of analogies within this legal domain.

In 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross, together with a team of renowned experts, published online an updated Commentary on Geneva Convention IV (GC IV), a cornerstone of the international legal framework protecting civilians in armed conflict. Another article in this issue of the Review provides an introduction to GC IV and to the updated Commentary, summarizing the key protections set out in GC IV and their interpretation in the Commentary. This companion article provides a more substantive overview of the Commentary, exploring nine selected thematic areas in detail and highlighting key interpretive developments in each of them. More specifically, the article considers the Convention’s scope of application; its interpretation in light of diverse experiences and requirements in armed conflict; technological change; humanitarian activities; the distinct roles of Protecting Powers and the ICRC; internment; occupation; measures to be taken in peacetime; and mechanisms of enforcement and accountability.

In recent decades, States and military alliances have increasingly incorporated gender-sensitive perspectives into policy and doctrine. These developments, however, often fail to go beyond the strategic and policy levels. They lack gender mainstreaming on the operational and tactical decision-making levels, especially in the context of kinetic operations and targeting. Additionally, gender considerations are perceived not as being relevant for compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) but mainly as a means of advancing strategic goals. This article argues that incorporating a nuanced understanding of gender-specific impacts of armed conflict into the conduct of hostilities is vital for States’ compliance with IHL. Gender is not merely one of many lenses through which IHL can be interpreted; rather, it is shown that with today’s knowledge and capabilities, a gender-sensitive lens in military decision-making on all levels is indispensable for the meaningful implementation of IHL principles. This is illustrated through the three core principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Understanding the importance of gender considerations for the implementation of IHL can subsequently bridge the gap between high-level policies and the operational and tactical realities that are currently falling short of incorporating gender perspectives.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) seeks to restrain violence in war, yet its influence depends not primarily on codification or formal commitment, but on how legal judgment becomes embedded within military institutions. This article examines how IHL became operationally consequential in the United States military through a process of institutional translation. Drawing on new institutionalist perspectives, it traces how Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps officers secured sustained access to command decision-making by rendering humanitarian norms operationally intelligible and strategically relevant. Across four historical episodes—from the postwar creation of an independent JAG Corps, through Vietnam and Grenada, to the consolidation of Operational Law in the Gulf War and its subsequent strain in counterterrorism operations—the article shows how legal expertise became embedded within planning cycles, targeting processes, and rules of engagement. This institutionalization produced a structural paradox: IHL gained unprecedented influence by becoming useful to military strategy, yet that very usefulness reshaped the meaning of restraint within strategic decision-making. The article argues that law’s influence in war is conditional and institutionally mediated: the pathway that makes legal norms consequential also exposes their humanitarian content to strategic redirection.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly supporting targeting, intelligence analysis and operational planning across military domains, reshaping how commanders use force through human–machine teaming (HMT). HMT offers operational advantages, but risks such as automation bias, adversarial manipulation and degraded performance pose challenges for the ability of deployers to use AI systems in compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that adherence to IHL cannot be deferred until hostilities arise; system design, testing, governance and training must be structured in advance to establish the conditions under which AI-enabled human–machine teams can exercise appropriate human judgement consistent with IHL obligations. The paper proposes an HMT Assurance Card, a cross-disciplinary life-cycle instrument integrating IHL obligations, civilian harm pattern analysis and AI governance frameworks into measurable standards applicable across the AI system life cycle, defence institutions and coalition environments.

The increasing integration of outer space technologies into both civilian life and military operations poses significant challenges to the application of the principles of international humanitarian law. Although these technologies may strengthen military operations, the repurposing of civilian space assets for military ends increases their vulnerability to hostile actions, thereby creating risks that could ultimately impair the civilian infrastructure that is reliant upon them. The present article sets out to explore the growing reliance on space-based assets, such as satellites, for communication, navigation and surveillance purposes in modern conflicts, and explores the evolving role of outer space in armed conflict, emphasizing the humanitarian risks posed by its militarization and the absence of robust legal protections. The article puts forward that the international community’s primary focus should be the protection of civilians, achieved through the safeguarding of space-based assets and the prevention of outer space’s weaponization. Protecting these technologies from the effects of armed conflict is imperative for civilian safety as well as for maintaining global stability and ensuring that outer space remains a domain of peaceful cooperation.

This article examines whether – and, if so, how – existing international humanitarian law (IHL) protects civilians from cumulative mental harm, understood as harm to mental health caused by the cumulative effect of multiple isolated or interrelated actions undertaken during a military operation. It explores three legal avenues under IHL – (1) the general protection of civilians from the dangers of military operations, (2) the obligation to take constant care to spare civilians in the conduct of military operations, and (3) the prohibition against launching attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm – to determine the degree to which cumulative mental harm is already addressed by existing law. The article contends that parties to conflict are required to establish a framework for operationalizing these protections and outlines the organizing principles for such a framework.

This article examines the historical evolution, legal foundations and contemporary practice of National Information Bureaux (NIBs), institutions that States are required to establish under the Geneva Conventions to collect, centralize and transmit information on enemy combatants hors de combat and certain categories of enemy civilians who have fallen into the State’s hands. It traces the origins of NIBs from early wartime initiatives in the nineteenth century to their codification in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly Article 122 of Geneva Convention III and Article 136 of Geneva Convention IV. NIBs are intended to facilitate the exchange of information on prisoners of war and interned protected persons, to respond to enquiries concerning their fate and whereabouts, and to assume certain other tasks related to these categories of persons. Drawing on historical sources and contemporary State practice, the article shows that the establishment and functioning of NIBs remain uneven. States most frequently establish NIBs in the context of international armed conflicts, in particular conflicts with neighbouring States or military interventions abroad. These bodies are usually embedded within governmental structures, and their activities often extend beyond the tasks envisaged in the Geneva Conventions, frequently prioritizing issues relating to the State’s own nationals. By contrast, there is no documented practice of establishing NIBs in non-international armed conflicts, although some States have created institutions performing partially comparable tasks. Peacetime practice is also limited, with a relatively small number of States establishing or preparing NIBs through standby institutional arrangements. Two models have emerged: the State-operated model, in which NIB functions are assigned to ministerial or other governmental bodies, and the auxiliary-humanitarian model, in which these tasks are entrusted to National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. The article concludes by identifying key challenges in the contemporary operation of NIBs and suggesting measures to strengthen their effectiveness.

The overarching principle of humanity in international humanitarian law (IHL), which entails the prohibition of unnecessary suffering, the right to humane treatment and respect for human dignity during armed conflicts, constitutes a key guiding principle for the conduct of hostilities. As military decision-making becomes increasingly determined by artificial intelligence (AI), and the growing use of AI-enabled systems in modern warfare raises ethical and legal concerns over the erosion of human oversight and increasing civilian harm, the principle of humanity offers a critical perspective for assessing whether these technologies preserve or undermine the human-centred foundations of IHL.

This article interrogates whether the use of AI decision support systems (AI-DSS) in armed conflict poses a threat to or reinforces the principle of humanity in IHL. It analyzes the principle of humanity within the framework of IHL, focusing on its legal relevance and broad scope of application in its purpose of protecting life and health and ensuring respect for the human person. From there, the article delves into the challenges and opportunities that the use of AI-DSS presents in the conduct of hostilities for the fulfilment of the principle of humanity in compliance with IHL. The article concludes that it is necessary to adopt a normative framework for the responsible use of AI under IHL and proposes a set of guiding principles and standards grounded in the principle of humanity to ensure that AI is developed and deployed in a more ethical and responsible manner during warfare.

Conflict-affected populations experience harms beyond those to life and limb, yet narratives about the effects of attacks remain dominated by war’s physical impacts. This article highlights the incidental mental harms of war, which are not necessarily the objective of an attack but which can nevertheless be devastating to those affected. It proposes a critical analysis of international humanitarian law’s principle of proportionality in attack through a decolonial lens. Among the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, proportionality has attracted attention for its protective potential against incidental mental harm, but its interpretation remains the subject of fierce debate. This article argues that mental harm should be considered in jus in bello proportionality assessments, but not in a manner that undermines the decolonizing global mental health agenda. A decolonial lens reveals that some legal interpretations encourage the consideration of incidental mental harm in decisions of attack, but only for a fraction of the mental harms experienced in conflict (such as post-traumatic stress disorder or a traumatic brain injury), thus omitting much of the lived reality of mental harm. These interpretations might succeed in deconstructing the hierarchy between physical and mental harms, only to replace it with one between types of mental harms – a hierarchy that privileges and prioritizes Western understandings of mental health. Rather, this article posits, the application of proportionality should centre localized and socio-culturally appropriate notions and experiences of mental harm.

The history of the notion of “war crimes” spans at least ten centuries. As far as the Western hemisphere is concerned, it starts some time in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, absorbs normative content during the following centuries, appears as a phrase in the eighteenth century, takes juridical shape and becomes an accepted notion in the nineteenth century, and starts being enforced as a category of criminalized violations of the laws of war with greater regularity in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Today, war crimes constitute one of the “core” categories of recognized international crimes. During that long process of normative development, a core set of rules and prohibitions crystallized to form a body of law first referred to as the laws and customs of war and later as international humanitarian law (IHL) when those laws and customs came to be accepted as truly international. Various means of enforcement – reprisals, hostage-taking, reparations – would be tried over time to give this body of law and its prohibitions a degree of coercive power and deterrence. Slowly, the idea that individual criminal responsibility should attach to the violation of some of the most important prohibitions of IHL came to be accepted as an alternative to what had proven to be ineffective means of enforcement. The notion of “war crimes” grew out of this process, and the list of conduct coming under that umbrella expanded significantly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the combined pressures of violent historical events and the prosecutorial and codificatory efforts that resulted from those events. The twentieth century witnessed the general acceptance of the notion of war crimes, their recognition as norms of customary international law, their frequent domestic and international enforcement, the refinement of their legal contours, their expansion into new territories including non-international armed conflicts, and the creation of institutions, jurisdictional principles and mechanisms geared towards the effective enforcement of those offences and prohibitions.