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This essay brings together the Jamesian will to believe with Coleridge’s famous description of the willing suspension of disbelief to offer a theory of fiction as a real-making practice. It begins by situating James’s writing on belief in relation to his thoughts on the “sense of reality” and then drawing out some distinctive features of his approach: For instance, instead of treating reality like an on/off switch (something is either real or it’s not), he treats it like a dial that can be turned up and down in volume. Belief is less about specific doctrines, for James, and more about the fundamental stance through which reality is perceived or rendered. The second part of the essay tests this Jamesian perspective against a novel that is itself about the relation between fiction and belief: J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello. It ends by specifying the particular place of literary fictions within the broader category of belief and asking if literary critics are best thought of as believers, knowers, or both.
A standard feature of our engagement with fictions is that we praise them as if they offer true insights on factual, psychological or evaluative matters, or criticize them as if they purport to do it but fail. But it is not so easy to make sense of this practice, since fictions traffick in made-up narratives concerning non-existing characters. This book offers the reader conceptual tools to reflect on such issues, providing an overarching, systematic account of philosophical issues concerning fictions and illustrating them with analysis of compelling examples. It asks whether fiction is defined – as John Searle and others have claimed – by mere pretense – the simulation of ordinary representational practices like assertions or requests - or whether it is defined by invitations or prescriptions to imagine. And it advances an original proposal on the nature of fictions, explaining why fictions can refer to the world and state facts about it.
Most legal and juridical proceedings depend upon fixed positions with regards to human rights claims, especially where violations of rights are concerned, those of victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and sometimes, although to a lesser extent, beneficiaries. However, the social and political realities in which rights are embedded usually prove much murkier. For example, those who carry out atrocities one minute, might find themselves the object of state violence the next; witnesses who receive reparations or are able to sell their stories might seem like less innocent beneficiaries of the events of which they’ve given accounts, and a much broader notion of culpability calls into question the function or efficaciousness of identifying individual perpetrators. This chapter argues that literature is especially well-suited for evincing and elaborating such ambiguities and contradictions that inhere in the history and politics of human rights.
Most legal and juridical proceedings depend upon fixed positions with regards to human rights claims, especially where violations of rights are concerned, those of victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and sometimes, although to a lesser extent, beneficiaries. However, the social and political realities in which rights are embedded usually prove much murkier. For example, those who carry out atrocities one minute, might find themselves the object of state violence the next; witnesses who receive reparations or are able to sell their stories might seem like less innocent beneficiaries of the events of which they’ve given accounts, and a much broader notion of culpability calls into question the function or efficaciousness of identifying individual perpetrators. This chapter argues that literature is especially well-suited for evincing and elaborating such ambiguities and contradictions that inhere in the history and politics of human rights.
Romanticism is a doomed tradition, yet a perpetually self-renewing one. The novel, Disgrace's central character, David Lurie, is an academic, a literary scholar, a Romanticist, in fact. Coetzee develops an interpretation of European Romanticism. His book is thus in great measure a satiric investigation of a wide range of Romantic ideologies, from Wordsworthian sincerity, on one end, to Byronic intellectual flamboyance on the other. If Romanticism is perpetually 'doomed' and perpetually 'self-renewing', those reciprocities draw on a common energy source: imaginative scepticism. Hemans poem locates not a sceptical deficiency but the exact form of Hemans's Romanticism. 'Byron' and 'The Sceptic' are magical mirrors giving Hemans access to that dreadful Christian situation within which Hemans's special Romanticism exfoliates: the Romanticism of maternal fear and anxiety. Romantic works flourish all about us in popular and highbrow art, music, and writing.
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