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This chapter offers a novel interpretation of mid-1970s (macro)economic policy as cumulative polyvalent performances. Revisiting the 1976 IMF crisis, the chapter argues that mid-1970s economic policy did not result from, for example, ideological conversion or unilateral (international) imposition. Instead, I trace how overlapping public-facing and behind-closed-doors framing contests drove government elites’ mid-1970s policy decisions. From the government’s perspective, the challenge was to strike a balance between satisfying financial markets, foreign governments, and the IMF, while holding government to power, maintaining government and party unity, and preserving the partnership with the trade unions. It was not the possibility of IMF conditionality being too demanding that concerned PM Callaghan the most but the chance that it could be too little to convince what he deemed the government’s financial market constituency. The goal was to craft a policy package that different audiences could interpret slightly differently. In the end, despite the drama made of the IMF deal at the time and the later mythology about it, the government was able to get it on relatively soft terms.
This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.
This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.
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