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This chapter refutes the influential claims made by J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart that the study of military history by the army centred on learning factual information for its own sake. In fact, how the subject was taught at Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff College ran through several phases, the first of which was ushered in following the Crimean War. During the 1850s and 1860s the army adopted the methods of studying the subject used by European armies, so it was employed to communicate the ideas of continental theorists, including Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. As military history was taught to convey a standardised understanding of warfare, when the wholesale adoption of continental models became challenged from the 1890s it reflected the latest advances in British military thought. Psychological factors, new technology and political and maritime considerations all played a prominent role in how warfare was conceptualised from this time. Following the poor British showing during the Second Boer War, military history was again employed to further the professionalism of the officer corps as it was added to the exams sat by officers when seeking promotion.
This chapter argues that the developments in officer education examined in Chapter 2 provided a catalyst for the growth in military history published for officer education after 1856. When the army started to teach the subject, a financial incentive was created for both authors and publishers to produce textbooks. The reformation of the way the army taught military history after the Second Boer War expanded this market yet further as officers seeking promotion were forced to read widely around the campaigns under study. Equally, from the 1890s several military reformers anxious to increase the professionalism of the officer corps published military history for this purpose too. Although military history was mostly used to communicate the ideas of continental military theorists, in the decades prior to the outbreak of the First World War this began to change. A ‘British School’ of military thought emerged which employed the subject to introduce new ideas into how war was understood.
The Introduction sets out the main themes explored in the book and provides an overview of the limited existing literature on this topic. In so doing, it highlights that there has been hitherto no attempt to provide an explanation of military history’s initial emergence and development in Britain. To ensure that the concepts and categories which are used currently by historians are not applied without reflection to the nineteenth century, the Introduction begins with a discussion of how the scope of military history as a subject has changed over time. It identifies the period between 1815 and 1914 as the foundational stage in the development of military history. It describes the four main subgenres of the subject which appeared during this time: material for officer education and official, popular and scholarly military history. The Introduction discusses the book’s methodology, comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the source material and outlines the book’s structure.
This chapter introduces readers to the subject, and gives a rationale for Strategic Studies as a distinct academic discipline deserving of its own intellectual tradition. From here, the chapter discusses the central role of strategic theory in the discipline, and introduces readers to the most important works in the field. These works include the classics, such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, but reference is also made to important modern works, including Gray and Wylie.
Fighting in the Napoleonic Wars was in the continuity of the eighteenth century and even the two preceding ones. Major changes in weapons on a large scale would not occur before the years 1850. Generals and officers were still nurtured by the military writers of the eighteenth century, but among these writers some had envisioned what war could become if large-scale ‘operations’ were conducted and if armies grew in size. With the Revolution and the dictatorial power Napoleon inherited from it, France set the tone for waging war with more intensity, in the movement of armies as well as in tactics on the field of battle. Other powers simply had to follow, but interior conditions and social imperatives resulted in partly adaptations and half-measures.
Chapter 2 surveys and analyzes the greatest ideas and theorists in war theory and strategy – including the philosophies of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Jomini, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and Mao. This chapter makes war theory and its recurring themes more accessible by presenting diverse perspectives spanning all eras of military thought from classical through the twentieth century. Each theorist’s background and main ideas are presented, and their strengths and weaknesses are summarized. As history’s preeminent but also most misunderstood war theorist, special attention is given Clausewitz. Principal themes include war’s fluidity, unpredictability, violence, and reciprocity; concentration and momentum; adaptability, intelligence, and relative capacity; military genius; centers of gravity and decisive points; fog, friction, chance, and policy; guerrilla, asymmetric, and nuclear warfare; and war’s moral and physical dimensions.
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