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Pelli and Beccaria in the 1760s produced the first comprehensive critiques of the death penalty. They did not come from nowhere. For centuries, philosophers, jurists, and religious leaders produced ideas and arguments that would feed into the abolitionist cause, in a way unpredicted by their authors, none of whom were abolitionists. The starting point (ironically, as it became the standard-bearer of retributivism) was the Lex Talionis of the Code of Hammurabi, which aimed at controlling private vengeance, while advancing the principle of crime–punishment proportionality. Plato introduced the idea that punishment must be forward- rather than backward-looking, and dismissed the latter as vengeance. Jesus’s words and actions problematized the practice of capital punishment. Thomas More was the first to argue against the death penalty for a specific crime, namely, theft, while natural jurists such as Pufendorf ruled out Grotius’s assertion that capital punishment was permissible according to the law of nature. Beccaria combined social contract theory and proto-utilitarian considerations, the latter coming into play through the agency of Enlightenment philosophers, English, Scottish, and French. The advance of abolitionism was and is far from inevitable, as illustrated by the obstacles faced in England (for a time) and North America (perhaps lasting).
The Lex Talionis (‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth …’ ) was introduced by Hammurabi of Babylon, as a measure to control private vengeance and concentrate punishment in the hands of legitimate authority. It also carried the message that punishment should be proportionate to the crime, a principle that was pressed by progressive thinkers in later ages, such as Montesquieu. As the law was formulated, an offence committed merited an equivalent punishment: one eye for an eye, not two. Over time the Lex became the standard-bearer of backward-looking retributivism, which carries the idea that offenders deserve to be punished simply because of the offence they have committed. As such, it was an obstacle in the way of any burgeoning abolitionist thought, in particular because it prescribed ‘a life for a life’. The abolitionist Giuseppe Pelli attacked the Lex head-on. In doing so he drew on the diverse critiques of the Lex of a succession of earlier (non-abolitionist) thinkers. The Lex Talionis has staying power. It embodies a basic human conviction that retaliation is due for injuries suffered. As such, it is outside the law; it will coexist with, and survive, any legal environment.
Giuseppe Pelli never completed his dissertation against the death penalty, the first of its kind. He belonged to a small group of Catholics critical of their Church from within, but essentially conservative in their thinking and attitudes. Pelli’s research was heavily weighted toward the natural philosophers from Grotius on, and he exploited their knowledge of the ancient sources. Montesquieu apart, Pelli showed little interest in the Transalpine Enlightenment. He found in Montaigne a kindred spirit, a writer of conspicuous humanity who expressed his views without inhibition. As a loyal Catholic, Pelli’s basic argument against capital punishment was that it is inconsistent with Christianity. God is everywhere in Pelli’s work. Natural law is decisively God’s law, which could never have countenanced capital punishment imposed by human agencies. Pelli held back from direct attack on the powers-that-be, judicial and ecclesiastical. His diagnosis is Augustinian: the root of the problem is sin, to which the whole of humanity is susceptible. Pelli’s work is the best that devout, conservative Christianity could offer at this stage in history.
In the course of advocating forward-looking punishment, Plato opened up a specific line of attack on retributivism. He characterized backward-looking punishment as irrational, bestial, and motivated by revenge. This gave rise to a debate over the moral status of revenge and the closely associated emotion of anger, which drew in and divided philosophers from Aristotle to Camus and beyond. Of our two pioneer abolitionists, it was Pelli rather than Beccaria who attacked retributivism directly, following a line taken by the Stoic Seneca on vengeance and anger in succession to Plato. Pelli and later opponents of retributivism have been unable to deliver it a knock-out blow, for the reason that, like its standard-bearer the Lex Talionis, retributivism is grounded in the gut feeling, part rational, part emotional, that we are responsible for the evil that we do, that crime merits equivalent or proportionate punishment: that there is in effect a ‘good’ vengeance. This was, and is, reflected in public opinion and in the attitude and practice of judicial and political establishments, whatever some philosophers might argue.
The Feyerabend lectures on natural right is Kant’s first clear statement of a view on punishment that balances retributivist and deterrence concerns. Kant’s earlier views, shown by other course lectures on ethics, were largely focused on deterrence. As Kant developed his view of human autonomy, he shifted his reasoning about punishment to include concern for the honor and dignity of the victim as well as the criminal, including right of criminals to be treated no worse than they treated others.
This chapter notes how ancient societies used capital punishment, highlighting methods of execution and various legal codes (e.g., Draco's Code and the Code of Hammurabi) authorizing executions. The chapter discusses the "divine right of kings," corporal punishments used in prior centuries, and the lex talionis doctrine. It also highlights how punishment practices were tied to religious and societial beliefs, including interpretation of religious texts. The chapter traces the change in the law from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment, taking note of how judicial torture--a practice associated with contintental European civil law systems--was outlawed in certain locales in the eighteenth century even as harsh systems of punishment (e.g., the English "Bloody Code") persisted. The chapter also describes the Enlightenment thinkers--John Bellers, George Fox, William Penn, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Frederick II, Cesare Beccaria, and William Blackstone--who critiqued torture and capital punishment or called for the death penalty's abolition or curtailment. The chapter describes the death penalty's abolition in Tuscany (1786) and Austria (1787) and how the Enlightenment shaped the law.
Chapter 8 examines divine responses to violence, and in particular, to bloodshed and the outcry of the victim. The restoration, or ‘redemption’, of blood by a divine גאל הדם (‘restorer of blood’) is one of the primary ways that biblical texts portray Yhwh’s response to bloodshed. Through a study of select texts, including several from 1–2 Samuel, the following claims are made. First, Yhwh acted as restorer of blood and legal adjudicator for those wrongly accused. He played the role of Mesopotamian kings who addressed cases for claimants and accused. If the human system failed, the poor had legal recourse. Second, because of the frequent emphasis on the cries of the afflicted and poor in ancient Israelite literature, some poetic and narrative traditions came to valorize the renunciation of one’s legal rights to (human) vengeance. Devotion and loyalty to Yhwh were characterized in terms of committing one’s case to Yhwh, not only when the legal system failed, but in recognition of Yhwh’s unique prerogative to intervene.
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