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In Chapter 2, Thinking Styles in Psychology, we present a way to reflect upon and scrutinize psychological theories and practices. We use the framework of thinking styles (or thought styles), which was developed by the microbiologist and philosopher of science, Ludwik Fleck, in the 1930s. A thinking style is the preparedness to see, act, and think in a particular way that characterizes members of cohesive work groups, such as colleagues in a clinic or a research setting. In this view, thinking, acting, and seeing are thoroughly social phenomena that cannot be fully understood without taking context into account. Thus, thinking styles are by definition the property of some community of people: a thought collective. Becoming skilled in a field of knowledge includes becoming increasingly socialized into the ways of seeing, acting, and thinking that characterize the thinking style of one’s thought collective. In the chapters that follow, we use this framework as a tool when we describe and critically reflect on subfields, topics, and practices in the psychology discipline.
For Kuhn, textbook science is both a misleading rational reconstruction and an actual driver of normal science. Ludwik Fleck’s account of how textbooks stabilize scientific collectives illuminates the latter. Auguste Comte’s distinction between the theoretical method of instruction, which presents science ahistorically as a system of rational conclusions, and the historical method of instruction, which presents science as a series of effects, illuminate the former. Current STEM textbooks still employ the theoretical method, which obscures the role of historical accident when theory choice is underdetermined by rules. Kuhn and his mentor James B. Conant, in contrast, promote a case study approach. In our new learner-centered educational paradigm, we will need a new textbook science, one that leaves actual books behind.
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