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Isaiah Berlin’s essay explores and criticises a conception of human freedom that identifies it with knowledge and, especially, with self-understanding. Even on this conception, freedom seems to require a power to change or reform one’s self – some power of self-determination through choice or decision, through will or volition. But this involvement of self-determination through the will then raises the issue of determinism. Are our choices or decisions antecedently determined? Knowledge and freedom may both be goods, but they are importantly distinct goods, and they may be in tension. Berlin’s reflections on freedom and knowledge are part of a wider project of understanding conceptions such as freedom in terms of their intellectual history and of exploring plurality within goodness and tensions between its various forms. The discussion will explore the relation between two very different forms of freedom – freedom as a form of power, a capacity to produce or prevent outcomes, and freedom as liberation, a desirable condition of fulfilment. It is freedom conceived as a power that seems threatened by determinism.
Chapter 6 focuses on Arnauld’s account of human freedom in its historical context. Arnauld’s early Jansenist view is compatibilist, but his view evolves and there is much debate about whether his later view remains compatibilist. I begin the chapter by considering several concepts relevant to Arnauld’s account and three possible positions: compatibilism, incompatibilitist-libertarianism, and compatibilist-libertarianism. I then discuss some important context, including the views of freedom and grace of Molina, Bañez, and Jansen. I proceed to look at some of Arnauld’s letters where he discusses his later view of human freedom and highlight three key themes in these letters as well as discussing some ambiguities in his use of various concepts and examples. I continue to consider several of his later texts, most notably De Libertate, and argue his later view is a version of incompatibilist-libertarianism. I close the chapter by arguing that the key cases and passages that have been the focus of much scholarship on Arnauld’s view are not intended to illuminate human freedom, but are instead meant to defend efficacious grace, and that Arnauld’s ambiguity in their presentation is intentional.
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