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This chapter investigates the President’s role in overseeing the administrative state, focusing on the contentious issue of for-cause removal restrictions for independent agencies. It argues that while the recognition of “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) is inconsistent with the Constitution’s tripartite power structure, Congress may still create agency independence through statutory discretion and bipartisan structures without violating the President’s executive power. The chapter proposes a formalist middle path: the President retains the constitutional power to remove principal officers but lacks a constitutional right to control their statutory duties directly, aligning with historical practices from the First Congress, several early presidential administrations, and statements from Daniel Webster and William Howard Taft. This distinction avoids both unchecked presidential control, which risks politicizing administration, and a “persuader-in-chief” model which lacks historical support and risks a parliamentary despotism.
This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s state-sovereignty cases, particularly those involving sovereign immunity and the anti-commandeering doctrine. It argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides a textual basis for limiting Congress’s power to abrogate these state attributes. It critiques the Supreme Court’s modern federalism cases, like Printz v. United States, for relying on nontextual grounds, asserting that sovereign immunity and anti-commandeering principles derive from the Constitution’s structure and history, which view these as significant sovereign attributes the power to abrogate which cannot be delegated by implication. The chapter examines National League of Cities and its reversal in Garcia, highlighting tensions in applying federal laws to state functions. It argues that forcing states to enforce federal law or submit to citizen suits risks recreating the Articles of Confederation’s enforcement problems, potentially requiring the use of force against noncompliant states – a power the Framers rejected. Drawing on historical practices and the law of nations, the chapter posits that such powers require explicit constitutional authorization, reinforcing federalism’s vertical separation of powers and preserving state autonomy within the Constitution’s original design.
This chapter analyzes the Necessary and Proper Clause, arguing it grants Congress incidental, not great and substantive, powers to effectuate its enumerated powers and those of the other government branches, reinforcing the Constitution’s limited government framework. It examines the 1791 debate over the national bank, where Madison, Jefferson, Randolph, Hamilton, and later Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) agreed the clause authorizes only lesser, implied powers necessary for executing express powers, not broad authority to regulate for the general welfare. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, which limited the confederated government to powers “expressly delegated," the clause empowers Congress to exercise implied powers while avoiding an exhaustive enumeration unsuitable for a constitution. The chapter refutes revisionist claims that the clause implements the Virginia Plan’s proposal for a general grant of legislative authority, finding such arguments speculative and inconsistent with historical evidence. It argues that the clause’s “sweeping” nature captures minor details, not major powers, ensuring Congress’s authority remains tethered to enumerated powers and preserving the balance of the compound republic.
This chapter surveys current doctrine concerning the scope of Congress’s regulatory, taxing, and spending powers. The Court’s historic pattern of decisions both presents a study in constitutional change and illumines factors that sometimes make change difficult. Prior to the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Court struggled uncertainly to cabin Congress’s powers under Article I. But the Court, seemingly in response to political pressures, substantially abandoned that effort in 1937, when it began to interpret the Commerce Clause as giving Congress vast powers to regulate the national economy and the Taxing and Spending Clause as allowing it to create largesse-dispensing programs that the Founding generation could not have imagined. At least since the 1980s, a strain of conservative scholarship has maintained that the modern, swollen national government finds no justification in the original Constitution and that the Court should enforce the original design. This chapter traces the Court’s limited success in implementing a course correction and identifies the considerations that have given pause to conservative justices. It also describes the Court’s more aggressive efforts to limit congressional power under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, all of which include express authorizations of Congress to “enforce” their substantive guarantees.
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