The notion of “AI empathy” has been criticized on the grounds that AI lacks the capacity to authentically share in the experience of the empathy recipient, or to be selective in its choice to empathize. In this chapter, we challenge the argument that human empathy is inherently or universally superior to AI empathy and suggest that a more fruitful way to frame this debate is in terms of the possible trade-offs between what human and AI sources of empathy can offer in particular situations. Emphasizing the empathy recipient’s perspective, we explore possible dimensions in which each empathizer source may excel, shaping the recipient’s possible preference for one source over the other. Drawing upon different ethical frameworks, we then discuss the possible normative consequences of whether one ought to accept or avoid AI empathy, given these trade-offs.

This commentary reads the three chapters in the section through Catherine Malabou’s discussion of the politics of anarchism. It argues that the each contribution describes a specific form of anarchic normativity, a related vision of the hierarchical, implications of these specific and specifically anarchic forms, and that each remains relatively fuzzy about the possible forms of regulatory agency. The conclusion focuses on the complicit engagements of scholars with anarchic normativities, their implications and the regulatory forms associated with them.

The chapter has two main goals. The first is to study what rules are grounded on. Regularities and related philosophical topics can be understood in many ways and at many levels, such as (simple) regularity, rule as law-like, rule-following, and rule-conforming. Sellars’s rule-governed behaviour is central. According to it, acts are done because of a rule, but not because of an awareness of a rule. This enables us to avoid regress in language-learning and getting bogged down in rule-following.The second main goal is to study why rules are binding – that is, on what their normativity is founded. It will be argued that the community must stipulate rules or at least acknowledge them implicitly in practice amid a sea of regularities. This acknowledgement, or normative attitude, forms a standard for correct and incorrect acts. This opens yet another topic to be examined: Can our judgments be right or wrong in some more substantial way that goes beyond communal assent? Is there something like ‘genuine normativity’ in a community-transcending sense? I shall answer this in the negative. The conclusion is that belonging to a community and the choice between them is central to normativity.

This chapter introduces the fundamental idea of The Life of Freedom in Kant and Hegel: the notion that we can only make sense of autonomy by returning to the concept of life. This return is needed to understand fully the genesis, the form, and the reality of human freedom. Such an account can be developed by means of a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies of freedom. As we can learn from Kant’s account, the notion of autonomy is threatened by the paradox of self-legislation and an opposition of freedom and nature that makes the reality of freedom unintelligible. As Kant already indicates and Hegel goes on to develop, we can overcome these problems by reconceiving of autonomy as a form of life. The chapter outlines the reading of Kant and Hegel supporting this view, situates the resulting systematic position in current debates on the sources of normativity and the nature of human freedom, and defines its relation to other approaches norm and nature (ethical naturalism, forms of life, and biopolitics).

The Introduction poses the book’s central question: Can Kant’s aesthetic theory support a meaningful practice of art criticism? The prevailing view says no, citing his rejection of aesthetic testimony and general principles as evidence that criticism is impossible. If testimony is ruled out, critics’ judgments lack authority; without principles, descriptive reasons seem arbitrary. The Introduction reframes these challenges and locates their solution in Kant’s neglected notion of judgments of perfection – attributive good judgments that, while nonaesthetic, can inform and support aesthetic evaluation without violating Kant’s two aesthetic tenets. Building on this insight, the book develops a hybrid model of Kantian art criticism that combines this underappreciated resource with selective elements from contemporary generalist theories, particularly Carroll’s concept of success value. The Introduction situates this project as both a response to gaps in Kant scholarship and an intervention in current debates on the role of reasons in criticism.

The Conclusion synthesizes the book’s two central phases: a revised interpretation of Kant’s theory of artistic beauty and a constructive proposal for Kantian art criticism. It recaps the main theoretical tools developed – especially the role of judgments of perfection – and their implications for contemporary debates about normativity, testimony, and the nature of criticism. The hybrid model advanced throughout the book offers a distinctive and timely alternative to both generalist and particularist frameworks. It upholds Kant’s critical legacy while equipping art criticism with renewed philosophical rigor and relevance.

Chapter 2 assesses what stereotypes are and explains what makes them both wrongful and harmful. The chapter begins by defining stereotypes, explaining their relationship to prejudice and implicit bias, and showing how they are maintained due to cognitive biases. I examine factors that go into making the judgments involved with stereotyping. Then I analyze what makes stereotypes wrongful, including their rigidity, their falsity, and the way they overgeneralize about a person’s experience so as to erase its nuance and complexity. I look at descriptive and normative components of stereotypes and show that negative stereotypes always make a normative judgment about the badness and inferiority of a person who fits the stereotype.

This chapter examines how “open science” is a practical problem for scientists, focusing on what is central to it: the extended access to research data. It considers how researchers evaluate the social and moral accountabilities of the open access to data and the tensions that result from them. In astronomy, most large scientific datasets are made by collaborations. This chapter considers two collaborations, including the MUWAGS team discussed in Chapter 6. As these teams’ members prepared datasets for public release, they became both inquirers into, and actors in, what many astronomers refer to as their discipline’s “culture of open data access.” Both teams can be described as groups of practical methodologists who used “inner dialogues” to explore the normative expectations and tensions of this domain ethnographically, seeking to inhabit proper statuses in it. The chapter argues that examining scientists’ understanding of statuses and their achievement offers resources for a refined critique of “open science” that is considerate of the context sensitivity of data production and use. Along the way, it examines some methods by which scientists, as members, are “doing ethnography.”

It is well past time to take scholarly disputes about words seriously, for where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Conceptual disagreement is a manifestation of disagreements about ideas. Yet no attempt has been made to measure the degree of conceptual disagreement that exists or to track those concepts identified as essentially contested. Accordingly, it is unclear how one might distinguish contested from uncontested concepts or test propositions about the causes of contestation. This chapter begins by introducing an approach to measuring conceptual contestation within social science. Next, the chapter explore factors that may help to explain variation in conceptual contestation. The characteristics of concepts – their value, abstraction, and normativity – explain most of the variability in conceptual contestation.

The Introduction opens with a (personal) precursor to the writing of the book. It discusses the methodological, normative, and theoretical basis of the book. It offers an overview of the argument and the chapters, and outlines sources employed in the research.

The concluding chapter summarizes the results and emphasizes the impact of the findings on future heritage language research and studies on bilingualism and language change in general: It stresses the necessity of including grammatical and pragmatic contact phenomena and discusses the importance of the interplay of extralinguistic factors and various types of linguistic developments: acquisition context, impact of schooling and literacy, contact with different registers and speakers. It explains individual processes in heritage language speakers, such as entrenchment processes, co-active activation of languages in the bilingual brain, as well as language awareness and metalinguistic knowledge. In addition, the role of normativity in diaspora communities, the challenge of relic varieties and the role of Standard German as language of schooling are discussed. Moreover, the chapter includes general observations on language maintenance in German heritage communities. It emphasizes the implications for future research: implications for the development of the German language in general, implications for the theory of language contact and implications for heritage language research.

This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s thinking about theodicy and explains the fundamental shifts in his attitude towards the project. It begins by examining his pre-critical sketch for a theodicy that remains firmly within the Leibnizian mould while repairing its structural inconsistencies and gaps. At the heart of his reparative measures is a different conception of divine freedom, one that Kant will retain throughout his critical period. The chapter ends with a consideration of his late essay On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy of 1791, in which he rejects the entire tradition of rationalist theodicy, whilst still maintaining the importance of an ‘authentic’ alternative. The basis of his rejection of previous theodicies is moral: the very pursuit of such a theodicy involves sacrificing individual freedom and rejecting an autonomous stance. Accordingly, the central sections of the chapter explain Kant’s critical concept of autonomy and how the theory of normativity it entails is fundamentally incompatible with a rationalist conception of value.