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This chapter examines the interwar period between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, focusing specifically on the US containment strategy from 1991 to 1998. Analyzing crises such as the 1994 Kuwaiti Border Crisis, Operation Desert Strike, and Operation Desert Fox, the chapter illustrates how a coercer can use intentional coercion failure to mobilize international support for long-term containment. During this period, the United States demanded that Iraq comply with United Nations weapons inspections. However, the US increasingly preferred that coercion fail; rather than accepting Iraqi concessions that would eventually lead to the lifting of sanctions, American policymakers utilized Iraqi intransigence to justify the continued imposition of severe economic and military costs. This approach was driven by a fundamental lack of assurance – exacerbated by revelations of Iraq’s “cheat and retreat” tactics – that Saddam Hussein would ever genuinely abandon his weapons programs or regional ambitions. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that when a coercer does not trust a target to honor agreements, insincere coercion becomes a foreign policy tool to maintain the alliances necessary to keep an adversary perpetually weak.
This chapter examines containment in crisis during Clinton's second term, in which Iraq repeatedly obstructed UN inspectors, ultimately leading to their permanent exit from Iraq and US retaliatory airstrikes in Operation Desert Fox. The United States in this period became increasingly isolated on Iraq policy as France, Russia, and China refused to support military action and called for the lifting of sanctions. Containment's domestic critics exploited these crisis by building a political coalition to discredit containment and shift US policy toward regime change through the strategy of rollback. This coalition succeeded in passing the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, which symbolized the entrenchment of the regime change consensus in US politics, leaving defenders of containment isolated in the political sphere. Clinton, however, made little effort to enforce this law and continued to treat containment as the de facto policy.
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