To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter takes a fresh look at the period 1993–2000, when the Oslo Peace Process dominated international and Norwegian understandings of the Middle East. Several dimensions of the Oslo Process have been analyzed by previous research. However, this chapter looks at the process from the vantage point of what came after (i.e., the Second Intifada), which marked a turning point in the radicalization of the global and the Norwegian left, in particular the trade unions, regarding the Middle East. The chapter looks at how the identity of Norwegian foreign policy elites and the labor movement was linked to the concept of Norway as a humanitarian great power. The Labor party and the trade unions owned the Oslo Process and took great pride in it. When it fell apart after Camp David in 2000 the reaction of the left was deep disappointment, and this is a crucial element in an analysis of the left’s turn towards a more radical denunciation of everything Israeli.
With the breakdown of the peace process as its backdrop, this chapter looks at the radicalization of The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) on questions of Israel and Palestine in the period 2000–2023. LO did not mention Israel or the Palestinians in its ordinary congresses in 1993 and 1997 or in the extraordinary Congress in 1994, that is, during the crucial period of the Oslo Peace Process. However, at the start of the new millennium, a significant shift occurred. By the congresses in 2005 and 2009, LO’s position had become more pronounced. The 2009 congress produced a particularly strong statement on Palestine, emphasizing the need for practical follow-up and reflecting a broader global trend of viewing Israel as a criminal state and Palestinians as passive victims. Trade union leaders accused Israel of genocide. LO’s increasingly radical stance on Israel, including calls for a comprehensive boycott and labeling Israel as an apartheid state, reflects the influence of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement. The chapter traces the anti-Zionism within Norway’s social democratic left after the turn of the millennium.
Chapter 2 examines Israel’s foreign policy amid the rise to power, in 1992, of the Labour party under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. It explains how Israel redirected its foreign policy from entrenchment to engagement, which rested on three pillars: scaling down the Israeli occupation, relinquishing territory in exchange for peace agreements with the Arab states, and putting a premium on diplomacy in Israel’s Middle Eastern foreign policy while keeping military force as a viable foreign policy tool. The chapter accounts for the decision-making process during key events such as the deportation of 415 Hamas members, Rabin’s failed peace proposal to Syria, via the ‘deposit’, and the decision to launch the Oslo peace process with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The chapter adds to the literature in two ways. First, by providing new information on Israeli foreign policy decision-making towards the peace processes with Syria and the PLO. Second, by tracing how and why Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres imposed engagement, as Israel’s preferred post-Cold War foreign policy stance, on the government and the security network.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.