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Whether the last common ancestor (LCA) of Homo and Pan (ca. 6–7 Ma) used stone tools is a foundational question in palaeoanthropology. However, it is often treated as known rather than as a hypothesis requiring substantiation. Lacking fossil evidence for the LCA, this assumption is based on data from extant primates and the available hominin fossil record. Phylogenetic approaches invoking parsimony argue that the presence of stone tool use in both Pan and Homo reflects homology rather than convergent evolution. While methodologically legitimate, we argue that this framework has been applied without sufficient attention to the specific criteria for this to be true. For homology to hold, stone tool use must have been continuously expressed across generations of both lineages from the LCA to the present. We evaluate this claim against three lines of evidence: behavioural data from extant primates, showing that stone tool use is heterogeneous within Pan; the hominin fossil and archaeological record, which leaves a substantial evidential gap between the LCA and the earliest known documented technologies; and comparative data from phylogenetically distant tool using animals, which show that similar behaviours can arise independently under comparable ecological conditions. Together, these lines of evidence favour a model of multiple, context-dependent origins of stone tool use over unbroken inheritance from a tool using LCA.
Philosophers often defend appeals to parsimony by invoking its central role in science. I argue that this move fails once we distinguish between two uses of parsimony: non-ideal and ideal. Non-ideal parsimony enjoys strong inductive support in science, since complex models are prone to overfit to predictively irrelevant noise. But philosophical data aren’t significantly noisy in the relevant sense: when our intuitions are unreliable, their unreliability typically reflects systematic bias rather than noise, which parsimony doesn’t mitigate. Philosophers therefore need ideal parsimony, which finds only weak support from science. Thus, the scientific analogy cannot vindicate the philosopher’s use of parsimony.
This chapter introduces empiricism: philosophies of science based on the notion that science is based on observations of facts, from which generalisations can be made. A short piece of fiction is first used to illustrate this notion. Building on this story, the methods of Francis Bacon are described as a prominent example of early empiricism. This is followed by a brief treatment of positivism and its influence on different branches of science and on society. Some possible limitations for empiricism are outlined, in particular the theory-dependence and fallibility of observations. It is argued that observing without theory is inefficient as a scientific method, since we then do not know which observations are relevant. The chapter concludes with a section acknowledging that despite its limitations, empiricism still has an important role to play in science, and the limitations are revisited in an attempt to explain this.
Industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology recognizes dozens of different constructs, including several individual differences, environmental variables, job attitudes, and work-related behaviors. It is, of course, necessary to retain a variety of constructs in order to adequately capture the complexities, subtleties, and diversity of work-related phenomena. But do the many constructs recognized by I-O psychologists all serve a useful purpose? Or has our field been too eager to welcome redundant, unnecessary constructs into the fold? And if I-O psychology has embraced too many unnecessary constructs, then what—if anything—should we do about it? In the current focal article, we first discuss when and why construct proliferation occurs. We then advance a nuanced perspective—one that asserts that construct proliferation is occasionally “good,” usually “bad,” largely inevitable, and often incentivized. We conclude by calling for a temporary moratorium on the introduction of new constructs into the field of I-O psychology, and we offer suggestions for how the field can address construct proliferation. We hope that the current article leads to a fruitful discussion of how to most effectively solve the construct proliferation dilemma.
The lexicalist hypothesis, which says that the component of grammar that produces words is distinct and strictly separate from the component that produces phrases, is both wrong and superfluous. It is wrong because (i) there are numerous instances where phrasal syntax feeds word formation; (ii) there are cases where phrasal syntax can access subword parts; and (iii) claims that word formation and phrasal syntax obey different principles are not correct. The lexicalist hypothesis is superfluous because where there are facts that it is supposed to account for, those facts have independent explanations. The model of grammar that we are led to is then the most parsimonious one: there is only one combinatorial component of grammar that puts together both words and phrases.
When evaluating competing hypotheses in archaeology, researchers frequently invoke the principle of parsimony, which states that simpler hypotheses should be preferred. However, the criteria for measuring simplicity and the rationale for labeling a hypothesis as most parsimonious often remain unclear. More broadly, the epistemic merit of parsimony and its relevance to archaeological reasoning are generally assumed but rarely clarified. This article explores how archaeologists use parsimony in ethnographic analogy and formal model selection. In the first context, it is usually uncertain how simplicity should be measured or why increased simplicity raises the plausibility of an ethnographic analogy. We contend that discussions of ethnographic analogy are better characterized under inference to the best explanation, where parsimony is only one heuristic among others. In the second context, simplicity is assessed by the relative complexity, rather than the quantity, of postulates in a model. This approach to parsimony, which does track plausibility under certain conditions, helps prevent false positives in archaeological interpretation. However, it also heightens the risk of rejecting alternative, complex causes. We argue that parsimony can aid in evaluating the relative likelihood of competing models and, more importantly, serve as a guide to clarify the complex histories of archaeological phenomena.
It is reasonable and scientifically appropriate to search for neural correlates of near-death experiences (including out-of-body experiences, OBEs) in the context of altered states of consciousness (ASCs). Our survey of the literature showed direct connections from NDEs via ASCs to brain mechanisms. Dualistic and paranormal approaches, subjective belief, and approaches via quantum physics appear either scientifically inadequate or premature to provide explanations for the NDE/OBE phenomena.
This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.
This chapter argues that the main arguments which lead many philosophers to reject substance dualism can be parodied and transformed into arguments against substance dualism’s main competitor, the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to undermine substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: parsimony-based arguments; the argument from causal closure/exclusion; the argument from conservation laws; the argument from the correlation between mental states and brain states; arguments to the effect that souls require an implausible cutoff point, in either evolutionary history or in fetal development, before which there is no soul and after which there is a soul; and arguments to the effect that substance dualism leads to an implausible skepticism regarding our ability to reidentify people over time.
We present an overview of the role, benefits, and drawbacks of theory in scientific research, particularly in the social and behavioral sciences. We discuss what theory is and what it is not. We also focus on some key elements of theory such as its ability to explain phenomena at multiple parallel levels of analysis. Evolutionary theory is offered as an example that illustrates the importance of conceptual integration across different disciplines. We further describe the key characteristics of good theories, such as parsimony, depth, breadth, and coherence (both internal and external), and we encourage the use of “coherence stress-tests” to help refine theory. We then discuss 4 advantages and 10 disadvantages of using theory in social and behavioral science research. Finally, we suggest conceptual tools and provide a list of recommendations for theory-driven research. We hope this chapter will help in the complex pursuit of improving research practices in the social and behavioral sciences.
Most definitions of creativity foreground novelty or originality. But if we look at how nature solves tricky problems, we discover several interesting things. Successful problem solving tends to be parsimonious (simple, economic or elegant) such as the wax cakes built by bee colonies. The number of basic solutions to such tricky problems of how to design an eye, how to fly and how to make a functioning radar system, are relatively few and have been rediscovered again and again ( a pattern discovered by Richard Dawkins). The fact that nature tends to reuse basic anatomical designs (mammals, birds, reptiles) again and again (common descent, homology) is also a case of parsimony or getting it right. This can be seen as a case of co-evolution but of an intra-species kind. Popper’s and Baxandall’s concepts of how problem situations constrain problem solvers is yet another version of getting it right.
The chapter analyses Cato the Elder as the ‘inventor’ of a novel ethos of principled thrift and pride in peasant parsimony in response to the massive and unprecedented influx of war spoils and other riches into Rome in the first half of the second century BCE. It explores how Cato turned aspects of prudent and parsimonious husbandry as allegedly practiced by earlier generations of Roman peasants into a normative benchmark for all Romans, and in particular members of the senatorial elite and endowed his vision with authoritative and exemplary force by projecting it back into the past. The argument then shifts to resistance to this reconfiguration of material moderation as an ancestral ideal and concludes with a look at the self-promotion of Scipio Aemilianus, who aligns himself in some respects with the Catonian persona but distances himself from it in others, not least in his explicit if partial embrace of Greek culture – or rather those aspects of Greek culture that could be presented as compatible with Roman tradition.
The use of dimensional personality traits with explicit ties to general or normative personality has gone mainstream with instantiation in the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and the soon to be released 11th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11). Much of the theoretical and empirical work that supports the transition to dimensional trait-based models of personality disorder has used the prominent five-factor model of personality to do so, which suggests that five basic dimensions capture much of the important and reliable personality variance: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. This chapter reviews this literature and demonstrates how general and pathological five-factor models of personality are parsimonious, valid, and useful. The authors believe that the use of such models for the diagnosis of personality disorder represents a much needed and empirically supported movement to integrate normative and pathological personality.
According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.
In this essay I aim to understand how Adam Smith predicted the progress and prosperity of a commercial society and analyze the main attributes of his natural liberty system. I examine the meaning and implications of prosperity in Smith’s thought. Finally, I analyze the role of the division of labor and parsimony in the overall process of societal advancement.
Much of the recent debate has centred on an ongoing controversy over whether primates are capable of reasoning about basic aspects of the visual perspective and perceptual awareness of others. One issue that has played a prominent role in this controversy concerns the relative "simplicity" or "parsimony" of mindreading and non-mindreading explanations of behavior. This chapter discusses the role that such appeal to simplicity have played in this controversy as a case study for thinking about the proper place of simplicity considerations in inferring cognitive processes in non-human animals, and in science more generally. After providing some background to the controversy and describing the appeals to simplicity that have been made, it poses some problems for such appeals. The chapter outlines a general philosophical account of simplicity. It sheds light on the nature of evidence for primate mindreading, and on how future work might resolve this controversy.
The chapter discusses the principle of conservatism and traces how the general principle is related to the specific one. This tracing suggests that the principle of conservatism needs to be refined. Connecting the principle in cognitive science to more general questions about scientific inference also allows us to revisit the question of realism versus instrumentalism. The framework deployed in model selection theory is very general; it is not specific to the subject matter of science. The chapter outlines some non-Bayesian ideas that have been developed in model selection theory. The principle of conservatism, like C. Lloyd Morgan's canon, describes a preference concerning kinds of parameters. It says that a model that postulates only lower-level intentionality is preferable to one that postulates higher-level intentionality if both fit the data equally well. The model selection approach to parsimony helps explain why unification is a theoretical virtue.
Glugoides intestinalis, Microsporidium sp., Ordospora colligata, Gurleya vavrai, Larssonia obtusa and Flabelliforma magnivora are microsporidian parasites of planctonic freshwater crustaceans Daphnia spp. We performed a phylogenetic analysis of the small subunit ribosomal DNA which revealed their positions as polyphyletic. G. intestinalis, Microsporidium sp. and O. colligata, which are horizontally transmitted gut parasites with small spores and low virulence, group with different lineages. G. intestinalis is related to 2 microsporidia infecting lepidopterans and to Vittaforma corneae, which has been described as a human pathogen. It is thought that V. corneae may have an invertebrate as its natural host. Microsporidium sp. is a relative of the genera Enterocytozoon and Nucleospora, pathogens of man and fish respectively. O. colligata is the first species found to be closely related to the genus Encephalitozoon, which is comprised of 3 species that are parasites of homeothermic vertebrates. G. vavrai and L. obtusa are sister taxa that branch close to the Amblyosporidae, the only microsporidia with known intermediate hosts. This finding supports the presumption of secondary hosts for G. vavrai and L. obtusa, as it has not been possible to maintain these species in Daphnia in the laboratory. F. magnivora roots deep at the base of the phylum microsporidia with no close relative found so far.
Secondary structure analysis of 34 internal transcribed spacer 2 (ITS-2) sequences showed that the current model for the green algae Scenedesmus and Desmodesmus is not accurate. In particular, helix I of the currently used model showed considerable deviations from our new model. The newly proposed model is supported by many two-sided compensated base pair changes and fully compensated insertions in all four helices. Phylogenetic analysis by maximum parsimony based on the new alignment confirmed the recent division of the old genus Scenedesmus into the new genera Scenedesmus and Desmodesmus. However, the analysis was not able to show phylogenetic relationships within these two genera. Hence, the ITS-2 region alone is not suitable for clarifying the phylogeny of Scenedesmus and Desmodesmus and new regions have to be found for future sequence analyses.