To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Isaiah Berlin’s essay explores and criticises a conception of human freedom that identifies it with knowledge and, especially, with self-understanding. Even on this conception, freedom seems to require a power to change or reform one’s self – some power of self-determination through choice or decision, through will or volition. But this involvement of self-determination through the will then raises the issue of determinism. Are our choices or decisions antecedently determined? Knowledge and freedom may both be goods, but they are importantly distinct goods, and they may be in tension. Berlin’s reflections on freedom and knowledge are part of a wider project of understanding conceptions such as freedom in terms of their intellectual history and of exploring plurality within goodness and tensions between its various forms. The discussion will explore the relation between two very different forms of freedom – freedom as a form of power, a capacity to produce or prevent outcomes, and freedom as liberation, a desirable condition of fulfilment. It is freedom conceived as a power that seems threatened by determinism.
Isaiah Berlin argues that philosophy has a distinctive task, one which cannot be appropriated by the natural sciences. One of the reasons Berlin gives for holding that philosophy’s task falls outside the scope of science is that its area of reflection essentially employs normative concepts. An understanding of the human agent must, in the end, encompass an understanding, not only of meaning and intentional action but of the moral, political and aesthetic life of fully acculturated human beings. Although Berlin’s historical approach to this task was highly distinctive, his aims and his convictions concerning the relation between philosophy and science, the central place of the human agent in philosophy, and his anti-reductive, anti-positivist approach were shared with a number of his Oxford contemporaries, in particular G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. In this chapter, I look at how these three philosophers understand the nature of philosophy and the relation between philosophy and science, focusing particularly on their attitude to the topic of determinism.
Strawson famously criticized Kant’s “imaginary subject of transcendental psychology.” Using the example of Hume, this chapter develops criteria for what a philosophical method based on the empirical psychology of human beings would be like, and argues that Kant’s method is not that of empirical psychology. However, Kant develops an analysis of conditions of the possibility of knowledge, for example, in his account of the “threefold synthesis” of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, that would apply to any cognition of a manifold of data or inputs given over time, human or (anachronistically, to be sure) computer. It is not an empirical account, but it is not fanciful, either: it is an abstract account of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of the abilities required for knowledge of a temporally extended manifold. In that regard it may be considered a transcendental psychology, but is not imaginary.
This chapter was written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Sir Peter Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense in 1966. Strawson’s book contributed greatly to the revival of interest in Kant’s theoretical philosophy in Anglo-American philosophy in the 1960s and thereafter. But, the chapter argues, Strawson read Kant through a meaning-theoretical approach that led him to mischaracterize some of Kant’s most fundamental arguments and unduly restrict their results. In particular, he held that Kant’s transcendental deduction showed only that we need a concept of an objective world in order to form a concept of the self, and thus could not find in Kant an argument of the kind that is developed in this book’s Chapter 1, that all of the categories must apply to all of our experience. This chapter argues by contrast that Kant’s conception of the transcendental unity of apperception as applying to all of our possible experience and his analysis of the conditions of time-determination, or making judgments about the temporal relations among all of our experiences, are meant to show that the categories must apply to all of our experience.
Carnap’s naturalism evidently differs from Quine’s, but the precise nature of this difference has proven elusive to generations of commentators. This chapter focuses on what Quine defends as his “provincial” naturalism against a Carnapian “cosmopolitan” alternative. The problem with this contrast, however, is that Quine does not represent a pure form of what he calls a “provincial” view – he vacillates between provincial and cosmopolitan temptations. To illustrate a purely provincial view the position of Peter Strawson is held up as an opposite, provincial extreme to Carnapian cosmopolitanism, and while Quine is clearly tempted by both these extremes, the attempt to locate him on a continuum between them is complicated by his evident indecisiveness. This is further illustrated by his tergiversations about analyticity; after initially denying that there was even an explicandum worth bothering about, he later offered his own ordinary-language-based account of analyticity, without feeling any need to supply a more exact explication; there would appear to be no way to resolve the resulting stand-off with the cosmopolitan standpoint. This chapter suggests a more robust explicandum for analyticity (and cosmopolitanism more generally). We come back, in the end, to the confrontation between Carnap and Quine in Chicago in 1950, where Carnap convinced Quine that their differences did not concern any question about which there could be right or wrong, correct or incorrect; it is regretted that Quine soon lost this lesson from sight.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.