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Why do citizens in autocracies believe state propaganda, even when its falsehoods are obvious? This introduction argues that existing explanations—persuasion, intimidation, and epistemic confounding—fail to account for how authoritarian media build credibility. The book advances an alternative framework: “service propaganda,” in which state-controlled media cultivate trust by serving pro-regime majorities. Authoritarian media reaffirm supporters’ identities and worldviews while meeting their informational needs, earning credibility—and making it easier to spread outright disinformation. This consumer-oriented approach is analogous to partisan media in democracies. Drawing on large-scale text analysis of Russian state television and extensive surveys, the book examines Russia under Vladimir Putin as a crucial case in comparative context. The introduction outlines the book’s contributions: reframing propaganda as a service to supporters, centering citizens’ role in co-constructing authoritarian narratives, and illuminating why independent journalism struggles to compete. It also previews implications for policymakers seeking to counteract propaganda in autocracies and beyond.
Intellectual property (IP) rights have long faced strong legitimacy criticisms. As the vaccine debates during the COVID-19 pandemic showed, IP is often seen as a problematic asset of powerful private companies and developed economies. This book addresses these criticisms by focusing on a renewed interpretation of the TRIPS – the key international treaty for IP. By combining international law analysis and political theory, this work presents the TRIPS as the structuring agreement of the international IP regime rather than treating it as a technical trade instrument. Drawing on the ideal of freedom defined as protection against domination, the book develops a legal philosophy of the TRIPS, revisiting its foundations and proposing a renewed interpretation of its key norms. This reframing highlights how the treaty can potentially provide consistency and foreseeability in a conflict-ridden global multilateral trade system where weaker trade partners are often at a disadvantage. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
Contrary to the notion of collective self-rule, in modern democratic states the set of individuals that make the rules and the set of individuals to whom rules apply cannot be one and the same. Recognizing this “non-identity thesis” has important implications for democratic theory. Among them is the need to recognize that any democratic system will involve rule over others and that democratic procedures will not be sufficient for political legitimacy.
This chapter considers how Constant offered “representative government” as an alternative to Bonaparte and his acolytes’ version of democracy. It begins by examining Constant’s critique of Bonaparte’s plebiscitary sovereignty, then explores his alternative theory of constitutional legitimacy – one inspired by Hume’s motto that all governments rest on opinion. The chapter then traces how, from 1814 onward, Constant pragmatically redeployed that theory as political regimes changed in France. After analyzing Constant’s arguments against Bonaparte’s conception of opinion formation and presenting his own theory of “the government of opinion,” the chapter’s final two sections show how reconstructing Constant’s opinion-based theory of legitimacy helps explain why, in 1830, he defended both the French conquest of Algiers and the newly founded July Monarchy.
The second chapter of Invisible Fatherland examines how the Weimar National Assembly asserted and projected its political legitimacy while addressing broader struggles over gender, class, and heritage. Drawing on a wide range of sources, from key political speeches and figures to the spatial arrangements of furniture and decorative choices, the chapter outlines the republic’s emergent symbolic order and emotional tone. In this context, the mediated presence of female delegates in the national assembly revealed the challenge of creating a more inclusive political order in a society still deeply shaped by tradition. The assembly’s negotiation of competing visions of community reflects the difficulty of establishing an open and inclusive democratic order in the aftermath of war and defeat.
The expression ‘divine right’ might sound obsolete to modern ears; indeed, it might recall images of an archaic and irrational society. In early modern Europe, things were far from it. As we shall see, divine right represented a systematically argued philosophical theory at the centre of which stood the justification for strong, earthly, power. Divine right is here understood in a specific political sense since it mainly concerns the authority of monarchs (not of bishops and not of republican governors). Such theory argued that God had given power ‘directly and immediately’ to kings, not to the people. Hence the ruler was accountable to none but God; had always to be obeyed; and held unlimited power (consequently, no form of resistance was legitimate). Divine right theory had at its core the idea, and the practice, of the individuality of kingly right, not of people’s individual rights. It expounded a subjective right, not an individual one.
There is widespread agreement that bad governance and corruption represent daunting threats to new democracies and developing countries. Nonetheless, mainstream research on system support and political legitimacy has to a large extent overlooked the crucial importance of public perceptions of procedural fairness for fostering public support and regime legitimacy. Taking its departure in the theory of procedural fairness, this article challenges the conventional wisdom of earlier research by arguing and demonstrating that public perceptions of procedural fairness and impartiality on behalf of the authorities are the most important determinants of system support in the post‐communist European Union Member States. The empirical analysis lends strong support to the fact that perceptions of fairness and the extent of corruption exercise a strong effect on public support for the performance of the political system and approval of regime principles.
Publicity politicians explored new media strategies. Rather than through traditional secret methods of managing the press, politicians now personally sought the limelight. A ‘will to publicity’ defined their politics: they published their political communications – seeking political legitimacy by showing the public how they handled political crises – and made political speeches that the press amplified internationally. A fiery speech that animated a local audience, however, risked upsetting a distant audience of newspaper readers the next day. Consequently, political aides intervened in speeches’ publication. Since politicians and the press considered speeches important political acts, they became crucial to exercising power in a mass mediated environment. Mediated speeches enabled politicians to connect with the people directly, bypassing parliament and bureaucracy. Developments in photography and film further enabled politicians to put their person at the centre of public attention. Sketches and cartoons of politicians had a longer history, but they could now be printed and distributed faster and on an industrial scale.
The expansion of the press in the late nineteenth century – Britain and America leading the way; Germany and other countries soon following – reinforced its self-proclaimed role as representative of the public. Politicians could no longer ignore newspapers and needed to (appear to) take into account public opinion. However, sensitivity to news related to the security of a political position: monarchs remained most shielded from public opinion and the press, followed by non-elected insiders, non-elected outsiders, elected insiders, and elected outsiders. Both journalists and politicians posited that ‘the press’ shaped the parameters of political manoeuvrability and provided politicians with the daily information needed to perform their duties. Politicians’ choice of newspapers, seen to affect their decisions, became subject to debate in newspapers themselves. Politicians were portrayed as bourgeois readers, reinforcing their participation in an imagined community of readership that developed in this period, particularly in the major urban centres. Despite the expectation to heed the voice of the people, journalists also expected politicians to stand above the clamour of the press and to lead public opinion in pursuit of national interests. In response to these contradictory expectations, politicians increasingly sought to steer the press themselves.
This chapter examines the attempts of the high Spanish officials in Chuquisaca and Buenos Aires to suppress Chuquisaca’s vibrant political sphere in the aftermath of years of open confrontation, both violent and through the courts. Royal magistrates came to believe that the city’s public life posed formidable challenges to the colonial administration. This was not necessarily due to prevailing feelings of outright opposition to Spanish rule or even because the urban lower classes had violently clashed with the military garrison. The problem lay in the unyielding refusal to submit to authority. While some grievances, such as the suppression of the tobacco monopoly or the rejection of Spanish troops, were more radical than others, such as ceremonial controversies or the endowment of chairs, the greatest threat came not from the demands themselves but from the systematic act of demanding, from the continuous collective assertion of views about governmental affairs through an interwoven array of legal and extralegal, violent and nonviolent political practices. If the legitimacy of the Spanish rule was not strictly speaking in question, the governance certainly was. Without directly challenging the colonial regime, the routines of political contestation undermined its basic operating principles.
This paper argues that (1) political community requires an agreed method of deciding disputes about the norms that will govern; (2) a decision method that includes a legislative process, strong judicial review, and a legislative override is a method with components that work at cross purposes; and (3) that such a method cannot be agreed upon responsibly. Points (1) and (2) describe Canada’s method of decision-making in which the legislative override is called the notwithstanding clause. An argument at cross purposes is incoherent and cannot responsibly be accepted, nor can someone responsibly obey a command that involves contradictory directives. By analogy of reasoning, steps that work at cross purposes in a decision-making system can weaken or erode agreement to it. In other words, the political legitimacy of that method is weakened and contributes to its illegitimacy. Optimally for democratic decision-making, eliminating strong judicial review removes this weakness.
In this chapter, I discuss in what sense and to what extent institutions have political authority. I take institutions with legitimate authority to be justified in wielding political power, where this political power is backed by the threat of coercion. Against the position that international institutions are not coercive, I claim that applying an adequate conception of coercion – which takes the concept of enforcement as paradigmatic for coercion, rather than the concept of pressure – enables us to understand some international institutions as coercive. It also lays open the assumption that a single conception of authority applied to all international institutions misconceives the diversity in aims and purposes of international institutions. Institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims and institutions that coordinate mutual advantage can both be plausibly understood as coercive, even though their authority differs in scope and in what standards they must satisfy. Finally, I discuss whether the standard of state consent is appropriate for international institutions: while it is plausible for institutions that coordinate mutual advantage, it is implausible as a standard of legitimacy for institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims – such as institutions of international criminal justice.
Building upon the analysis of the previous chapter, this final critical chapter examines theories of state creation focused upon the protection of human rights and the provision of representative government. Both approaches are examined through the lens of governmental legitimacy, and both are finally dismissed as implausible reconstructions of the relevant legal practice. In the course of this argument, significant attention is given to whether the protection of human rights and the provision of representative government are sufficient to render contemporary governments legitimate, to which a negative answer is ultimately given. In particular, neither the egalitarian credentials of representative government nor its facilitation of popular accountability are as normatively conclusive as many 'democratic statehood' theorists suggest.
This paper highlights scholarly neglect of political legitimacy, the idea of a state's use of power in ways acceptable to its citizens. We argue that political legitimacy affects a state's ability to formulate and implement its policies, thus affecting governance. Our paper provides the first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between political legitimacy and governance. We combine novel cross-sectional data on political legitimacy and several governance indicators from 66 countries. Our results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the legitimacy score increases the rule of law indicator by about one-third standard deviation. These results are robust across OLS, an instrumental variable method, and several other governance indicators. Moreover, our results reveal that in the presence of greater trust, political legitimacy has an enhanced impact on governance.
John Locke affirms a right to revolt against tyranny, but he denies that a minority of citizens is at liberty to exercise it unless a majority of their fellow citizens concurs in their judgment that the government is a tyranny. In a recent article, Massimo Renzo takes an equivalent position, on which a revolutionary vanguard requires the consent of the domestic majority before being permitted to revolt. Against Locke and Renzo, I argue that a minority of citizens can have a liberty to revolt, whatever the domestic majority may hold. My argument concentrates on the moral force of majority rule, which turns out to presuppose the satisfaction of a number of background conditions. When any of these conditions fails to obtain, no domestic majority can justifiably block a minority’s liberty to revolt against tyranny. For the purposes of the theory of revolution, this minority has to be large enough to have a reasonable prospect of (military) success. Without that prospect, the minority will be anyhow forbidden to revolt, on grounds familiar from just war theory. However, for the purposes of the theory of political legitimacy, prospects of success are irrelevant. All that matters are the conditions under which any citizen is released from their ordinary duty not to overthrow the government.
This chapter takes up what Harold Laski has called the most real problem in modern politics, namely, the theoretical defense of the proposition that the people should rule. It returns to the first sustained philosophical engagement with this problem, in Platos Republic, and argues that the Republic remains a vital resource for thinking through the problem of the legitimacy of popular rule. The chapter focuses on the status of knowledge – its presence and absence – with regard both to the evaluation and the execution of political rule. It maintains that the Republic, far from being the epistocratic manifesto it is often taken to be – by both the defenders and critics of the view that not the people but the knowledgeable should rule – in fact expresses profound skepticism about any attempt to claim the right to rule on the basis of superior knowledge about the political good. The chapter then explores how the Republic, so understood, may inform our thinking about the theoretical legitimacy and practical implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty.
The chapter, termed Legalized Politicization Era (2010–present), examines the role of law in securing a new political–economic equilibrium. In this era, the consequences of state capitalism, China’s economic turning point, and a legitimacy crisis in the Party-state’s rule, advanced the use of law in two directions: intensifying the presence of the regulatory state in the market on the one hand while shifting market governance powers directly to the CCP itself on the other. The chapter describes how in these developments the law has been assigned a meaningful and more explicit role in steering capital flows and structuring markets. It argues that taking notice of the two functions of law has become ever more relevant.
Rawls introduces the idea of a well-ordered liberal society in the 1996 introduction to Political Liberalism. A liberal society is well-ordered when governed by one or another reasonable liberal political conception. Rawls says: “political liberalism is to be understood as a freestanding family of reasonable liberal political conceptions.” I discuss the main features of reasonable liberal conceptions within well-ordered liberal societies, and the centrality of the criterion of reciprocity. Liberal conceptions are not reasonable if they fail to impose any formal restrictions on permissible inequalities or fail to limit the effects of wealth on democratic politics. This includes not only libertarianism but also a wide range of classical and neo-liberal positions. None of these are reasonable according to Rawls’s criterion of reciprocity, and none satisfy his liberal principle of political legitimacy, since all permit and even encourage unrestricted inequalities and individuals’ unlimited accumulation of wealth and economic powers.
Assessing authoritarian police and policing in East Asia poses conceptual challenges – which institutions count as “police,” which functions constitute “policing,” which polities are “authoritarian,” what features are “East Asian”? Patterns can be understood in terms of common issues: functions or roles police are expected to perform; internal institutional structures of the police (including centralization/decentralization); horizontal relations with other institutions; vertical relations with the regime; relations with society; and external influences (from abroad and from the past). Policing is beset by several paradoxes and much ambivalence: scope versus effectiveness of police work; laws and the rule of law as both empowering and constraining police; bolstering legitimacy for the police versus for the regime; “police reform,” which can make police more benign (from a liberal perspective) or more potent tools of oppression and control. The country-specific assessments in this volume collectively reveal a complex pattern that includes fundamental similarities and significant diversity.
Fabienne Peter (2020) recently proposed a taxonomy of accounts of the meta-normative grounds of political legitimacy. In this article, I argue that there is an important distinction left out of that taxonomy that complicates the picture. This is the distinction between attitude-independent and attitude-dependent conceptions of normative truth. Through an examination of these conceptions of normative truth (and correlate interpretations of what counts as a normative reason) I argue that what Peter calls a fact-based conception of legitimacy may collapse into a will-based conception. Further, the distinction has important implications for what Peter calls the belief-based conception. Finally, I defend the will-based conception against Peter's arbitrariness objection through an examination of ideally coherent eccentrics.