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Over time, United Nations human rights treaty bodies (UNTBs) have developed an admissibility requirement that individuals’ allegations be ‘sufficiently substantiated’ or ‘not manifestly unfounded’. Explanations of these terms have varied, but States, treaty body members and scholars have equated them with a prima facie threshold. Among international tribunals, prima facie is commonly understood to require the complainant to make a plausible claim. However, review of UNTB decisions indicates that application of this requirement clashes with the accepted meaning of prima facie by: (1) often requiring the complainant to present convincing allegations; (2) taking into account – or giving greater weight to – the state’s arguments and evidence at the admissibility stage; and 3) sometimes requiring the complainant to pre-emptively overcome the state’s possible defences. This chapter seeks to identify relevant trends in order to both better understand current UNTB practice and illuminate paths to greater consistency and clarity in admissibility determinations.
Human rights violations often form part of a pattern or practice of violations, rather than being purely isolated incidents. This context is not consistently taken into account by UNTBs during individual case consideration, however. This chapter explores several ways in which awareness of human rights violations’ embeddedness in wider contexts of violations should inform UNTB practice. In particular, the chapter considers the impact, or potential impact, of patterns and practices of violations on the manner in which UNTBs receive information, and the sorts of sources they recognize in their decisions; on UNTBs approaches to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the burden of proof; on case structuring; and on findings, recommendations and follow-up procedures. The chapter ends by observing that UNTBs are not only receivers but also key disseminators of information, and suggests ways in which their findings as to the patterns and practices of violations may be more effectively disseminated.
Pushbacks are designed to prevent people on the move from accessing procedural and/or substantive legal safeguards. States thus tend to deny practising them and actively erase evidence of their occurrence. The resulting acute evidentiary challenges in any subsequent human rights litigation require adjustments to be made to the evidentiary framework. This chapter offers a four-branch matrix of what can logically happen to facts disputed in litigation. It then proceeds to critically examine how evidentiary issues have been handled in UNTB pushback case law, concluding the right findings have been made, but on a generally weak reasoning. The chapter finally stresses that the burden of proof should be shifted from complainant to state when two conditions are met: a context-proven to a high standard, such that the state can be presumed to have violated human rights; the complaint is linked to this context – with this proven prima facie. If the linkage is evidenced to a higher standard, the factual allegations must be recognised as established on the strength of the evidence –without any shift being alluded to, so as to avoid an upward slippage in the purposefully low standard of proof applied.
Ordinary language users do in fact use RIGHT and WRONG in ways that permit of degrees, as pointed out in Chapter 1, but advocates of the binary theory may question the philosophical relevance of this. Meaning tracks use, but it is not certain that the current meanings (and uses) of RIGHT and WRONG are optimal. Gradualists need to show that the gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG used by laypeople are better than their binary rivals and ought to be adopted by moral philosophers. The focus of this chapter is on what I call the argument from conflicting reasons. This argument seeks to show that gradable notions of RIGHT and WRONG enable moral theorists to articulate nuanced verdicts about moral conflicts, which cannot be expressed in binary theories. The gist of the argument is as follows: Some moral conflicts are irresolvable, and in those cases the deontic properties of acts favored and disfavored by conflicting reasons cannot be accurately captured by binary deontic verdicts.
The negative effect doctrine discussed in this chapter deals with when, if ever, a state court will stay proceedings before it and refer disputants to the arbitrators for them to decide, in the first instance, whether an arbitration agreement between the parties (i) exists, (ii) is valid, and (iii) has a scope that covers the dispute in question. An affirmative answer on each of these points would mean that the dispute’s merits must be decided in arbitration. Thus, the negative effect issue concerns whether a decision on these three jurisdiction sub-issues should be decided with finality by the court itself at the outset, or, in the first instance, by the arbitrators themselves, with possible court review on jurisdiction delayed until later.The chapter discusses the dramatically different approaches to the negative effect issue followed in several leading arbitral jurisdictions: France, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, the U.K., and Canada (Quebec).It also discusses the underlying policy issues at stake in the different national approaches to the doctrine.In conclusion the chapter offer’s the author’s view of a preferred approach to the negative effect issue.
[36.1] Statutory powers confer authority that enables a person or body to do what would otherwise be illegal or ineffective. They do so in two broad ways: by conferring discretions and imposing duties. This chapter focuses on the meanings of ‘may’, ‘shall’ and ‘must’ and on a question of characterisation that often arises in relation to them: namely, should the words be characterised as conferring a discretion or as imposing a duty, at least in certain circumstances?1
[42.1] A statutory offence may contain, expressly or by implication, a proposition as to a state of mind. At common law the state of mind that an offence contains is known as ‘mens rea’.
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