This chapter maps the background conditions that set India, Brazil, and Israel on a collision course between apex courts and elected branches. It first surveys court design and doctrinal evolution: India’s Supreme Court (PIL, basic-structure review, collegium, proportionality); Israel’s Supreme Court (abolition of standing/justiciability limits, reasonableness/proportionality, constitutional review via Basic Laws and – recently – striking down even Basic Laws); and Brazil’s Supreme Court (abstract review, expansive interpretation, and assertive criminal/prosecutorial powers). Across all three, anti-formalism, self-empowerment, and a liberal, cosmopolitan rights orientation expanded judicial reach before polarization surged. The chapter then traces polarization’s ascent alongside shifts in political hegemony: BJP dominance and Hindu nationalism in India; Likud-led, religion-inflected coalitions and anti-elite rhetoric in Israel; and Bolsonaro’s conservative, evangelical-backed populism in Brazil. Media fragmentation and social platforms amplify identity conflict, producing mass protests and, in Brazil, institutional assaults. Together, strong courts and sharp polarization generate recurrent executive–judicial clashes.

This chapter examines how polarization interacts with apex courts in Westminster systems (United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). We outline core design features – parliamentary sovereignty, common-law apex courts without separate constitutional courts, career-based selection to retirement, and traditionally professional, non-political adjudication. From the 1980s–2000s, global constitutionalism softened this model: Canada’s Charter (with an override) introduced rights-based review; the United Kingdom’s HRA 1998, New Zealand’s BORA 1990, and subnational Australian charters instituted “weak-form” of judicial review along with proportionality analysis, drawing courts into value-laden disputes and associating them with liberal cosmopolitanism. Polarization then rose unevenly – sharply in the United Kingdom (Brexit) and Canada, modestly in New Zealand, little in Australia – exposing courts to conflict. We trace UK flashpoints (Miller I/II, media/political attacks, abortive reform proposals, de-escalation); Canadian tensions under Harper (Nadon episode, rights expansion and backlash); and milder pushback in New Zealand and Australia. Overall, exposure hinges on two variables: erosion of the professional model and the degree of polarization.

The main contention of Chapter 6 is that the legal predominance of the internal market objective in this field of regulation has not been to the detriment of the protection of health. While the broad reach of the TFEU free movement provisions does mean that most Member State measures can be scrutinised by the Court of Justice for their restrictive effect on cross-border trade, the case law does not reveal a consistent hostility towards national control measures. The picture is rather one of unpredictability. In addition, the harmonisation practice of the EU legislature shows that the market functions mostly as an auxiliary to health, or, at times, fades away behind the objective of health protection. This invites a re-evaluation of the concept of the internal market in EU law.

This chapter examines the permissible limitations on the right to science under Art. 4 ICESCR, emphasising the delicate balance between protecting scientific freedom and safeguarding broader societal interests. It first situates the right within the ICESCR’s general limitations framework, distinguishing it from rights-specific limitation clauses in instruments like the ICCPR. The chapter analyses key criteria governing legitimate limitations – legality, compatibility with the nature of the rights, necessity, proportionality and promotion of general welfare in a democratic society – and clarifies their application specifically to the right to science. It further distinguishes limitations from related concepts, such as progressive realisation and retrogressive measures. Moving beyond the human rights limitations framework, the chapter critically assesses the role of scientific self-regulation, arguing that ethical norms governing research should not merely be voluntary or professional standards but rather grounded in international human rights obligations.

This chapter begins by introducing misconduct – as the enforcement of standards of conduct at international organizations – comprising a series of actions intended to dependably investigate, attribute responsibility and consequently sanction integrity breaches by international officials. Second, the legal principles of misconduct are identified, namely: (1) The facts of misconduct must be established; (2) The established facts must legally constitute misconduct; and (3) Disciplinary sanction must possess a legal basis. Third, three attendant legal duties of misconduct are considered, as follows: (1) Proof of misconduct must be compelling; (2) Alleged misconduct must afford an opportunity to respond; and (3) Misconduct may only be sanctioned proportionately. Fourth, the chapter considers obligations towards staff who allege that they have been subjected to interpersonal misconduct – notably sexual harassment and bullying – and their capability to challenge and obtain information concerning related administrative decisions. Fifth, and in conclusion, this employment law of misconduct at international organizations is restated. The standards of conduct implementing the treaty-attributed integrity and independence of the international civil service are the subject of Chapter 9, ‘Standards of Conduct’.

This chapter extends the discussion of discrimination, as well as the exceptional provisions of Article XX of GATT, and incorporates analysis of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services to describe the scope of constraint on national governments’ regulatory autonomy.

In this chapter I respond to the claim that medical assistance in dying (physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia) is justified if refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining care is. I conclude with a reflection on the importance of a norm against intentional killing to the medical profession

In this Chapter I argue, contrary to Aquinas and modern day defenders, that capital punishment is unjustified killing. Capital punishment is not required by retributivism, and Aqunas’s arguments defending the practice are unconvincing.

When it became clear that gender critical belief is protected in our anti-discrimination law, it was often said that, while such views were protected, manifesting or expressing them was not. This is simply not true. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects both the absolute right to hold a belief and the qualified right to manifest a belief. The manifestation of protected beliefs is also protected under Article 10, which protects the right to freedom of expression. Because these are qualified rights, it may be permissible to interfere with them where proportionate. Where discrimination or harassment arises because someone holds gender critical views, this will be unlawful. However, where the treatment complained of is a genuine response to the fact or manner of manifestation of a protected belief, the legal situation becomes more complex. In assessing the extent to which is it permissible for an employer or other duty-bearer to interfere with the fact or manner of manifestation of a protected belief, the central importance of freedom of expression must be recognised as the background context of any analysis.

This use of preferred pronouns for those with trnsgender identities is extraordinarily contentious within the context of debates on sex and gender identity. This chapter begins by exploring why pronouns are so contentious, arguing that their use is an important signifier of underlying beliefs about the relationship between sex and gender identity. From here, the chapter explores whether and under what conditions an emplouyer could interfere with the expression of employees to prohibit or compell the use of particular pronouns. It concludes that this will require a fact-sensitive analysis which begins from the understanding that the right to freedom of expression is robustly protected, especially in the context of compelled speech.

The Court of Appeal in Higgs v Farmor’s School has provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between anti-discrimination and human rights standards in the workplace where employees manifest protected beliefs. Unfortunately, this analysis suffers from a central flaw by presuming that if manifestation of belief is protected under direct discrimination, it will always be unlawful for an employer to interfere. It is this presumption which prompted the Court of Appeal to defend the introduction of a justification test into what was previously a factual analysis of causation, by deeming less favourable treatment in response to ‘objectionable’ manifestations to have not been ‘because of’ the protected belief itself. This chapter argues that such an approach is unnecessary because it responds to a problem which does not exist. It is simply incorrect to presume that protection from direct discrimination necessarily implies that any interference with the manifestation of a protected belief is directly discriminatory. The ordinary application of the Equality Act is already coextensive with the protections afforded under the European Convention on Human Rights. Any interpretation needed under s.3 of the Human Rights Act is needed within the sphere of indirect discrimination, not direct discrimination.

This chapter begins with the foundations and the history of international humanitarian law before discussing the scope of its application and the law governing the conduct of hostilities, namely the means and methods of warfare. The final sections discuss the law governing the protection of persons during armed conflict and the implementation and enforcement of international humanitarian law. In introducing international humanitarian law, this chapter focuses on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.

This chapter describes the law governing transgender girls’ participation in girls’ sports. It compares the interpretations of Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination by the Obama and Biden administrations on the one hand and the Trump administration on the other. It explores the state laws regarding transgender girls’ inclusion or exclusion that have arisen against the backdrop of Title IX ambiguity. Finally, the chapter examines what courts have said about what Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause require with regard to transgender girls’ inclusion in or exclusion from girls’ sports.

By 1200, clerks might face homicide charges before royal and church courts. Both jurisdictions recognised similar homicide charges: intentional killing; complicity; self-defence; and accidental death. It has long been argued that English common law was separate from continental Roman and canon law. But this chapter shows that common law and canon law display striking similarities in theory and practice when dealing with homicide charges. This was arguably not a matter of coincidence or ‘common sense’ (Hurnard) but a result of canon law influence on common law; both formed a common legal culture, at least regarding homicide. The only outlier was judicial homicide, a charge only applied to clergy before church jurisdiction and concerning involvement in secular law penalties of death and mutilation. This exception aside, the chapter systematically compares canon and common law theory and practice on each homicide charge. For legal practice, it draws on both royal and church court records and papal penitentiary petitions to exonerate clergy from homicide, which are remarkably similar in their argumentation and narratives to common law jury recommendations for royal pardons for homicide.

Thomas More was the first to question the application of the death penalty to a particular offence. Theft had long been classified as a capital crime in the penal codes and practices of Britain and elsewhere. In More’s Utopia, a range of arguments is marshalled against the execution of thieves, echoed by later progressive thinkers. More’s critique brings to bear a whole armoury of arguments, including proportionality, deterrence, the public good, the law of God, and the causal relationship between poverty and petty crime. His argumentation was picked up by radical thinkers in Britain in the seventeenth century and gave impetus to a movement to formulate and promote alternative punishments for trivial offences. The principal candidates were hard labour and exile, the latter involving, in Britain, transportation to America and later Australia. Transportation had obvious disadvantages, and in any case it began to be asked, ‘How can the criminal be made maximally economically useful to the mother country?’ The contribution of Sir William Petty in the first decade of the Restoration (1760s) was crucial in this, and the idea finally finds articulation in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.