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This chapter continues the exploration of knowing-that and knowing-how. It begins with a comparison of Michael Polanyi’s idea of tacit knowledge to Gilbert Ryle’s concept of knowing-how. While the previous chapter showed that knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, this chapter argues for radical anti-intellectualism, according to which the reduction can be achieved the other way round: knowing-that to knowing-how. In other words, by using a similar strategy to Timothy Williamson and Jason Stanley, knowing-that can be reduced to a linguistic ability to provide answers to questions of how something should be done. From this viewpoint, linguistic competence is seen as a skill rooted in the correct use of language, essentially a form of practical mastery – a kind of knowing-how. This line of argumentation goes further than Ryle’s initial insight. In the latter half of the chapter, Stephen Hetherington’s and John Hyman’s thinking, which is congenial with radical anti-intellectualism, is examined. The chapter concludes by showing that neopragmatism is anti-intellectualist at heart.
It is discussed in more detail how perceptions relate to propositional knowledge. In doing so, “myths” of the perceptual Given are evaluated. One myth is that a mere perception can itself justify propositions, or ground assertoric judgments, and that it can therefore be a foundational justifier. This is the Myth of the Given in Sellars and McDowell. Kant would deny that intuitions can justify propositions independently of conceptual content, be it infallibly or fallibly. After all, he makes the well-known complementarity claim about cognition “in the proper sense,” according to which intuitions without concepts are blind. However, as argued in the preceding chapters, their blindness does not entail that they do not have epistemic power in their own right.
This chapter argues that through reading, readers can acquire knowledge of three varieties: propositional knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, and know‐how. Objections against these arguments are discussed.
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