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The United Nations Operation in the Congo’s (ONUC) mandate was progressively expanded in the 1960s to include elements of international administration. In this case, like many others, a strict reading of the mandate fails to give a sense of the effective authority displayed by UN officials.The focus of this chapter will be on two specific aspects of the UN presence in the Congo in the early 1960s. First, I will focus on the role played by the UN Secretary-General in the Congo and the UN mission in general during a specific moment, generally referred to as ‘the Constitutional Crisis’. The collapse of the Congolese government enabled the UN to display assertiveness in the country, taking opportunity of this moment of exception. Second, I will analyse the Civilian Operations Programme, an unprecedented effort through which UN technicians controlled segments of the public administration of the country, which is truly interesting from the point of view of authority devoted to the UN. I argue here that the UN displayed sovereignty practices in the Congo, notably through the enterprising Hammarskjöld, who managed to position the UN in position of authority in the country, autonomising itself to a certain degree both from member states and from local Congolese elite.
This chapter features a broad spectrum of voices of the 1960s which all, if to varying degrees, used the normative framework of human rights in their growing criticisms of global inequalities: from pan-Africanists to the 1960s Popes to development economist Barbara Ward to other key figures in the UN community of ideas. Building upon new research on the global history of human rights, the chapter demonstrates that human rights were deployed to criticize global material inequality; that their protagonists were concerned with distributive justice; and that it was a long quest to defend economic and social human rights. Global inequalities, including those pertaining to racism and empire, were increasingly unjustifiable – to some extent in the very light of the growing legitimacy of human rights. It was a decade in which international economic and social human rights acquired a hitherto unparalleled legitimacy with the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The chapter sheds new light on figures such as Barbara Ward, the 1960s Popes, Ralph Bunche, and UNESCO official Malcolm Adiseshiah.
Whereas political and intellectual debates about the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights have received considerable scholarly attention, the intellectual history of international economic and social human rights in the 1950s remains an understudied topic. This chapter investigates this history, zooming in upon Ralph Bunche, Gunnar Myrdal, and Moses Moskowitz, and mapping their main arguments in favor of economic and social human rights. Within the domineering horizon of the global Cold War, they argued in favor of internationalizing economic and social human rights, even if their chances of success, admittedly, looked very slim. It was a human rights advocacy that included a criticism of material inequality. This advocacy flowed from several actors in various parts of the UN – from Bunche’s and Myrdal’s UN leadership positions preoccupied, respectively, with political conflicts and decolonization and economic development, to Moskowitz representing the Jewish minority at the UN and dedicated solely to human rights advocacy. Little noted in the scholarly literature, economic, and social human rights had some degree of salience within the burgeoning discourses on development too.
With the second Bernadotte Report of September 1947, completed by Ralph Bunche following Bernadotte’s murder by Lehi terrorists, the State Department sought to use the UN Security Council to deprive Israel of the Negev desert and full control of the port of Haifa. Members of the Senate and House, again led by Emanuel Celler, urged lifting of the arms embargo but, as exchanges with under secretary of state Robert Lovett made clear, those efforts were not successful. Czechoslovakia remained the only government that sent weapons to the new Jewish state. Without any American military assistance, Israel repelled the Arab invasions, gained control of the Negev and the Galilee in northern Israel. As a result of its military victories, and with support from the Soviet bloc states, Israel successfully resisted American and British diplomatic efforts to use the Bernadotte Report as a basis for its boundaries.
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