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Building on Chapter 3, one would expect that free and fair elections, as well as expansive democratic citizenship would translate to considerably different strategies and claims making in Johannesburg, South Africa. Yet, on the contrary, urban communities in Johannesburg have been engaging in housing protests using unruly tactics and populist claims that are surprisingly similar to the tradition of bread uprisings in Cairo. In this case, residents have drawn on the history of township protests developed in the fight against apartheid, as well as the legacy of Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Using archives and interviews, I trace the history of popular rights to housing developed alongside a set of insurgent practices of riots, boycotts, and land occupations. They have formed a foundation that still informs housing protests in the township today, with communities combining unruly protest with electoral and legal mobilization. More broadly, this chapter challenges assumptions about what politics in a democracy is supposed to look like.
Nicolas Cornell’s Wrongs and Rights Come Apart argues that accountability practices are rooted in wrongs, that obligations are rooted in rights, and that these are two distinct relations. Cornell’s argument convincingly pushes back against a widely held family of views in moral and legal philosophy according to which there is a necessary conceptual relation between, on the one hand, rights and obligations, and, on the other, wrongs and accountability practices. This is the Obligation-Accountability Nexus (OAN). But Cornell frames his arguments against the OAN as arguments against all ‘rights-based’ or ‘juridical’ views. This Critical Notice argues that this is a mistake. There is a coherent rights-based view that rejects the OAN but nevertheless posits a restricted juridical domain in which rights and wrongs are contingently correlated. This overlooked juridical view gives an independently attractive argument against the OAN and yields more compelling accounts of moral deliberation and moral community.
This article examines the constitutional environmental duties (CED) of legal persons (natural and artificial) in Africa. Based on a systematic analysis of the constitutions of 54 African countries, it provides empirical evidence of the substantial presence of CED of persons and sheds light on the framing of their relationship with constitutional environmental rights and the environmental duties of the state. This account of a specific category of duties of persons, from a non-Western perspective, is an important contribution to legal scholarship. It unsettles the dominant paradigm of “rights of individuals and duties of the state” by challenging the dismissal of the CED of persons as “symbolic” or “aspirational” and highlights the functional elements of these duties, which can be used to address violations of rights and / or the non-performance of duties by the state. These findings also have broader implications for constitutional, environmental and human rights law.
Wallace aims to interpret all of morality in relational terms. The paradigmatic features of his relational interpretation derive from the case of promising. I agree both that morality has a rich and interesting relational core and that promises illustrate it well. Against Wallace, however, I argue that other significant elements of morality resist assimilation to his relational interpretation. In some cases, this is because their relational character differs notably from that of promising. In other cases, important elements of morality lack a relational character altogether. Wallace’s interpretation therefore stands to be improved by sharply reducing the scope of its ambition.
The approach of equity theory and other justice-based psychological theories to intergroup relations is criticlly examined in this chapter. The discussion includes consideration of distinctions between distributive and procedural justice, rights and duties, and natural law and positive law. The equity theory proposition that the ratio of inputs and outcomes determine subjective justice is examined, with research examples of how the ratio works. Lerner’s just world theory is also discussed, with research examples. The applied implications of equity theory and just world theory are also examined, as are the relationship between these theories and other major theories of intergroup relations.
Hobbes’s introduction, in Leviathan, of a somewhat extensive liberty for subjects to disobey the sovereign, raises some difficult questions concerning the obligation of subjects to obey an all-powerful sovereign, which has traditionally been seen as central to Hobbes’s argument. In Leviathan, Hobbes strengthens the rights of subjects to such a degree that we are forced to reconsider his understanding of political obligation. The chapter argues that there is an irresolvable tension between the requirement for obedience to the sovereign and Hobbes’s conviction that each individual should be able to act freely to survive in the short term and to provide for their protection in the long term, even when that means disobeying the sovereign. An examination of what Hobbes says about the subjects’ rights in Leviathan shows that, in contrast to his earlier political works, the rights do not come to an end once the sovereign is instituted. Rather, he argues that while some rights are given up or transferred, some are inalienable and must be retained. The chapter explores the implications this has for the relationship of the individual subject to the sovereign and for Hobbes’s argument more generally.
In this chapter, we review the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders involved in developing and using AI systems, with a particular focus on our role as (competent) citizens. It is important, thus, to understand our rights and obligations in order to advance to a safer and more trustworthy AI implementation in our daily lives.
This chapter examines Meta’s Oversight Board, a pioneering experiment in governance by emulation that adapts individual rights adjudication to the private governance of social media platforms. Operational since 2020, the Board has been celebrated as a step toward greater accountability while also criticized as a superficial PR strategy. Through its structure, practices, and public perception, the Board blends public- and private-law principles, presenting itself as operationally independent and adjudicating disputes based on international human rights norms. However, its circumscribed authority raises questions about its capacity to elicit substantive structural change at Meta. The chapter situates the Oversight Board as an Emulated Guardian, designed to mimic adjudication but primarily serving as a performative tool to lend legitimacy to Meta’s content moderation. While initially dismissed as symbolic, the Board’s incremental expansion of its guardianship role highlights its dialectical potential: it is both limited by its private nature and empowered by its adjudicatory appearance. This case study progresses through six analytical steps, exploring the Board’s origins, institutional structure, decision-making processes, and practical impact, offering insights into the challenges and opportunities of regulating private power in a globalized digital environment.
The loss of community is often seen as one of the reasons for the alienating experience of modernity. Community seems to allow for a civic-minded solidarity that counteracts the legitimation crisis of democracy by returning agency to citizens. Such a demand for a communitarian correction to liberal constitutional democracy is not without dangers, even when this demand is intended to stand in the service of a more democratic life. This chapter traces the fate of this communitarian desire in a broader transatlantic field, highlighting the uncanny connections among the philosophical debate about communitarianism, the antidemocratic and authoritarian drift in American conservative political and legal thought, and central aspects of European neofascism. These connections should make us suspicious about the democratic potential often ascribed to community. The ease with which arguments for a communitarian correction of democracy can be used against democracy suggests that community lacks an intrinsically democratic and emancipatory potential.
Chapter 4 shows that while one cannot deny Swift’s use of a Tory “conspiracy thesis” in foreign policy tracts like The Conduct of the Allies, Swift relied more heavily on legitimate arguments and sources of international politics and law that have been underrated: Aristotle, Hugo Grotius, and Samuel Pufendorf. Aristotle taught a concept of foreign policy centered on constitutionalism, geography, naval power, self-defense, and public reason. Grotius and Pufendorf provided a foundation of natural and international law, as well as just war theory, that was secular yet grounded on classical learning and Christian ethics. Grotius’s underappreciated influence undermines the idea that Swift’s politics were purely Hobbesian, realist, or authoritarian. Swift had a realist and an idealist strain but “Grotian rationalism” predominated in the controversy over the Utrecht Peace. Grotius also fed Swift’s growing skepticism about the Whig concept of the balance of power.
What is the difference between a reason to do something and a duty to do it? This paper develops a relational account of duties, locating the distinction between duties and nonduty reasons in how others should react to the agent’s will: duty-contrary willing deserves distinctively diminished respect from others, when compared to the respect owed to willing contrary to nonduty reasons. It is also a “reasons-first” account, revealing a duty (and indeed a right) to be composed of a specific nexus of reasons for the agent and for others. The account has important implications for how to understand duty-creation in promising and legislation.
In an increasingly contemptuous political environment as the nation prepared to celebrate its semisquicentennial on July 4, 2026, the US Supreme Court capped its 2025–2026 term, which included profound decisions on a series of cases raising significant controversies in health law and policy. As per Figure 1 and analyses below, major topics addressed by the Court this term include: (1) the scope and limits of presidential emergency authorities; (2) state debates over LGBTQ+ rights and discrimination in parental and sports-related settings; (3) First Amendment interests juxtaposed against states’ rights to regulate medical professionals or require vaccinations; (4) expansion of Second Amendment rights to possess firearms; and (5) state-based product liability and other claims foreclosed via Congress.
Inclusion is a term used frequently, but what does it really mean? Inclusion in its simplest term is ‘the action or state of including or of being included within a group or structure’ (Oxford Dictionary). This is a fundamental right of all people, but unfortunately when diversity exists, this is not a right afforded to everyone. The Oxford Dictionary has an alternate definition which elaborates on this initial one. Inclusion is also defined as ‘the practice or policy or providing equal access to opportunities and resources for people who might otherwise be excluded or marginalized, such as those who have physical or intellectual disabilities and members of other minority groups’. As recognised in this definition, inclusion is about opportunities for all, including those with disability, developmental delay, neurodivergence, mental health difficulties, cultural diversity, variations in socio-economic status, LGBTQIA+ people, gender diversity, people experiencing trauma, unique family structures, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, just to name a few! While there are differences in what every individual needs to be included, the principles of inclusion and the foundation of everyone having the same rights, should not change.
Working with others is at the heart of inclusive practice. In early childhood education and care, no single professional can meet the full range of strengths, needs and identities that children bring with them. Inclusion becomes possible when educators, families and external professionals think, plan and act together with shared intent. This chapter explores what it means to build strong, respectful and coordinated partnerships across a service and beyond the gate. It positions early childhood education settings as relational spaces where collaboration supports participation, wellbeing and belonging for children with disabilities, developmental differences and neurodivergence, as well as for children and families navigating complex circumstances. Drawing on Australian frameworks and research, the chapter offers practical ways educators can participate confidently in cross-sector collaboration while holding children’s rights, agency, and cultural identities at the centre.
The interaction across law, rights and nature has led to a resurgence in the significance of sacred and natural sites to nature conservation. In Africa, this turn was marked by the adoption of the Resolution on the Protection of Sacred Natural Sites and Territories by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2017. However, this resolution remains entangled in the Anglo-German heritage of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Given the expansive mandate of the African Commission under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, this article argues that the African Commission might consider formulating an Africa-focused characterization of sacred and natural sites, away from its reference to the IUCN’s definition, and in accordance with Africa’s needs within the context of the leading role of the Charter and related Africa-centred nature-specific treaties.
There is a difference between doing something that is wrong and wronging someone in particular. Texting while driving is wrong; injuring a pedestrian because you were texting while driving is a wrong against that particular pedestrian. It has been common to think that wrongs just are violations of the wronged party’s rights, but recent arguments suggest otherwise: there can also be wrongs without rights violations. Supposing these arguments are correct, what is it to wrong someone?
Inclusion is about recognising the rights of every person and ensuring that equitable opportunities exist for all. Inclusive Practice in the Early Years provides pre-service and in-service early childhood teachers and educators with theoretical guidance and practical strategies to allow all children to participate meaningfully in learning. Inclusive Practice in the Early Years focuses on the inclusion of children with disability, developmental delay and neurodivergence from birth to five years. The book also highlights the importance of recognising inclusive principles that apply to a wider range of diversity including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, refugee and migrant children, children who have experienced trauma and families experiencing disadvantage. Developed by authors with extensive experience across early childhood education, disability, community, and allied health, this text provides valuable information and strategies to support both pre-service and in-service teachers and practitioners to develop an inclusive practice.
Chapter 4 examines local concepts of right(s), dissecting the ways in which brokering and begging were viewed as charitable compensations for the lack of government protection for disabled people, but claimed by the recipients as forms of work. Aspiring to have their activities recognised as rights, they spoke a local language of entitlement that conflated the value of independent work with the ethical and political right to care, asserting obligatory rights or taxes, against the donors’ perception of gifts. The language of ‘rights’ is a space of mutual evaluation, a rich and powerful language for discussing issues of inequality, membership, personhood, welfare, and power in Kinshasa today. It is perhaps most significant as a claim for distribution than as a legal premise of entitlements. Here, the question of a rightful share becomes pertinent, as givers and receivers evoked differing views on the same transaction that expressed contradictory aspirations and values. In the absence of formal institutions to enforce informal disability privileges, people had to recognise the right to be beggars or brokers on an interpersonal level, requiring constant value tests on whether claims to assistance were legitimate. The chapter thus disrupts the classic Maussian focus on giving and production to consider the moral and political controversies associated with asking and distribution.
Simon Franz Ewers, in the pages of this journal, has recently undertaken a critique of my philosophical account of the holding of claim-rights. In this short response to Ewers, I defend that account against some significant misrepresentations or misapprehensions in Ewers’s article.
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a serious and urgent global health challenge that is often presented as a war on “superbugs.” The implicit message is that certain pathogenic microbes should be eliminated. With a focus on AMR innovation, I explain how microbes have been relegated to an abstract notion of property that may be controlled, manipulated, and owned. In this context, the treatment of microbes merely as an exploitable resource renders redundant ecological evaluation since only anthropocentric needs matter. Drawing on insights and concepts from the humanities and social sciences, I explain what ecological equity means when microbes are recognised to have moral value, creative agency, and situated knowledge. By this view, the patent system becomes inherently unfair because it neither considers nor rewards the inventive contributions of microbes. It also does not consider the ecological impact that an invention may have. Social institutions (like patent systems) that apply to AMR innovation must shift away from the human–nonhuman divide and adopt an ecological or biocentric approach to allow both human and microbial environments to flourish. I argue that the attribution of rights to microbes not only helps to realise this end but also enables conceptual cross-pollination across law, the humanities, and social sciences and steers the “greening” of legal regimes that apply to AMR innovation.