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This chapter uses statistical analysis to investigates great power interventions and side-taking in revolutionary civil wars, focusing on the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UNSC. Utilizing a global dataset of great power military interventions from 1975 to 2015, we analyze 1,215 conflict-years across five powers, yielding 6,075 observations. Our findings support the patron–client hypothesis, showing that great powers are more likely to intervene on behalf of arms clients. Conversely, the rivalry hypothesis indicates that they are deterred from intervening in rival clients’ states but may support opposition forces if they do intervene. The rogue hypothesis holds that while interventions in revisionist states are rare, they typically favor regime change. We also evaluate alternative explanations for intervention behavior, including humanitarian concerns, ideological ties, resource interests, colonial legacies, and geographic proximity, concluding that hierarchical intervention theory offers a superior account of great power side-taking.
This chapter explores the puzzle of why great powers intervene in some revolutionary civil wars but not others, and how they choose sides. Focusing on the 2011 Arab Spring, it highlights contrasting responses of great powers to Arab Uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Introducing the hierarchical intervention theory, it argues that great powers intervene based on preexisting security hierarchies – patron–client ties like arms transfers and defense pacts. These security ties influence the choice of roles on the backstage, while frontstage action scripts are justified through intervention frames. The chapter explains how intervention decisions are framed as performances, with great powers casting themselves and others in specific roles. The theory sheds light on the selective and strategic nature of great power military interventions in regime conflicts. The theory is contrasted with alternative explanations of great power interventions, including resource competition, rivalries, ideological ties, humanitarian concerns, and leadership traits, none of which can account for the historical patterns of great power side-taking.
Why do great powers intervene militarily in revolutionary civil wars? This pivotal question in international relations is answered though a new theory of security hierarchies that emphasizes the role of clients, rivals and rogues in world politics. Employing a mixed-methods approach, integrating statistical analysis with comprehensive case studies of Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, this book demonstrates that great power interventions are significantly more constrained and predictable than previously assumed. Role theory and frame analysis further exhibit how the status of other states within a great power's security hierarchy influences interventions. The findings provide a lucid account of great power behavior, offering critical insights for scholars and policymakers interested in the international dimensions of intrastate conflicts. Clients, Rivals and Rogues shows that the strategies that underpin great power interventions and provides crucial lessons for the management of regime conflicts, one of the most common and deadly forms of political instability today.
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