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When the Korean War exploded in 1950, few Americans felt a strong commitment to South Korea (ROK). By the end of the Cold War, however, the US–ROK alliance had emerged as one of the closest relationships in the American diplomatic portfolio. This essay examines the post-Korean War diplomacy between the two nations to suggest that the strong contemporary relationship is rooted in the immediate post-Korean War years, when skillful political maneuvering by ROK leaders, along with increasing cultural and economic connections between the two nations and the presence of a competing developmental model immediately across the 38th parallel, drove the two sides together despite the reluctance of American leaders.
‘The Irish Novel in Translation’ identifies the centrality of the Irish language to the nationalist ideology that underpinned the new Irish state as one of the main forces shaping the work of literary translation in Ireland in the twentieth century. A key moment here was the establishment of An Gúm in 1926, a state-funded body tasked with translating works both into and out of the Irish language. Many of the key Irish-language novelists of the period were supported by the work of An Gúm, and this placing of translation at the heart of a literary ecosystem is common for minoritised languages. Simultaneously, for Samuel Beckett, writing in French, and translating his own work, opened a way of escaping what he felt were the constraints of English. More recently, outward translation of Irish fiction into multiple world languages is understood as part of the exercise of soft power.
Central Asia would seem like a context where it would be difficult for China to establish its soft power through educational exchange due to the region’s widespread Russification. However, an opening was created for Chinese influence as Central Asian countries evolved away from the Soviet educational system, developed ties with other major powers, and established educational exchange programs. Beijing assumed that Central Asia’s Russification would fade, creating space for Chinese cultural influence commensurate with China’s economic influence. But Vladimir Putin has sought to reclaim Moscow’s great-power status within Central Asia based on the Russian language and Russkiy Mir. Putin has placed increased emphasis on Russian educational exchanges in Central Asia. Behind the crafted image of Sino-Russian cooperative joint leadership in Central Asia is a more complex reality. This chapter examines Russia and China’s differing visions for a Eurasian order that have emerged in different plans and practices for higher educational exchange in Central Asia. The languages used in Central Asian universities provide an indicator of Chinese influence relative to Russian and Western influence.
Chapter 1 grounds this study in larger policy and theoretical debates, including literature on US-China competition, China’s authoritarian diffusion, South–South communication flows, and China–Africa relations. It further introduces the analytical and conceptual framework of this study: China’s uneven image-making in Africa, which includes its ambitious image promotion mechanisms, as well as disjointed implementation and reception on the ground. The chapter also explains the methodological choices, including the focus on Ethiopia and Global China ethnographic approach.
Chapter 2 examines the positionality of Africa in China’s larger pursuit of image and recognition. Drawing on high-level official speeches, academic and policy writings, as well as on selective interviews with China–Africa experts in Beijing and Shanghai, the chapter shows China’s dualistic visions for Africa. It is at once treated as an important pathway for China’s construction of its global image as a major responsible power, but also as a sensitive context in competing for narratives with the West. China’s activities in Africa are frequently the target of Western criticisms that feed into the larger Western narrative of the “China threat.” Chinese scholars and experts, in turn, advocate for both offensive and defensive image-making in Africa – strengthening its diplomatic reach and debunking Western narratives on neocolonialism and imperialism.
Through the critical case study of Ethiopia, Maria Repnikova examines the ambitious but disjointed display of Chinese diplomatic influence in Africa. In doing so, she develops a new theoretical approach to understanding China's practice of soft power, identifying the core mechanisms as tangible enticement with material and experiential offerings, ideational promotion of values, visions, and governance practices, and censorial power over the production and dissemination of China narratives. Through in-depth field work, including interviews and focus groups, Repnikova builds a clear picture of the uneven implementation and reception of this image-making, in which Chinese messengers can improvise official agendas, and Ethiopian recipients can strategically appropriate and negotiate Chinese power. Contrary to popular claims about China replacing the West in the Global South, this innovative research reveals the successes, but also the inconsistencies and limitations of Chinese influence, as well as the ever-present shadow of the West in mediating soft-power encounters.
Since Korean cultural products and entertainers have gained global popularity – the so-called Korean Wave – many studies have regarded the Korean Wave as Korea's soft power. However, the concept of soft power remains contested in the political science literature, particularly because it is difficult to clearly distinguish it from hard power. This Element, therefore, examines whether the Korean Wave can be considered Korea's soft power within the debate surrounding the concept. The findings indicate that the Korean Wave has enhanced Korea's national image and increased trade and international interest in the country. As Korea is not a superpower, this case suggests that soft power can be real without hard power support and that the Korean Wave is Korea's soft power. Nevertheless, due to the limited evidence that the Korean Wave leads to policy changes in other countries, the term “soft power” should be used with caution.
Chapter 4 examines the changes from 1992 to 2009, a period that was characterised by the end of the Cold War. The focus is on examining how the EU became a politicised actor with increasing public visibility. The study analyses the most important developments of this period chronologically, including the introduction of the euro, the Schengen Agreement, several rounds of enlargement, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both the institutional reforms and their social and political effects are considered. While considerable successes were achieved in economic integration and geographical enlargement, fundamental problems remained unresolved: incomplete institutional structures (especially in monetary and political union), growing social inequalities due to the neoliberal agenda, and a growing democratic deficit. These developments laid the foundations for the crises that were to shake the EU in the following decades. The period exemplifies the tensions between economic integration and political legitimacy, between enlargement and deepening, and between national sovereignty and supranational governance that still characterise European integration today.
Extending the concept of economic interdependence to the subnational level, this paper explores how the foreign commercial ties of non-state actors can introduce geopolitical risks to advanced democracies. We examine this phenomenon through the lens of US–China higher education partnerships. Facing budget constraints, public universities in the United States often rely on revenue from international tuition and fees. Due to trade barriers in China, American universities frequently recruit fee-paying Chinese students through joint degree programs (JDPs) established with Chinese partner institutions. These transnational partnerships create asymmetric market dependencies that the Chinese government can exploit. Using newly compiled panel data from the United States, we find that the extensive pre-existing JDP network is significantly correlated with the proliferation of Confucius Institutes (CIs) – a flagship soft power initiative of the Chinese government – on American college campuses. Preliminary evidence from other countries aligns with the patterns observed in the USA. Our findings highlight how China employs a decentralized approach to advance its soft power strategy through higher education ties.
Studies on Chinese cultural and religious engagement abroad are often framed through the lens of state-driven soft power. Drawing on the case study of the Zambia Shaolin Cultural Center (ZSSC), I challenge this state-centric interpretation, emphasizing the collaborative, relational, and fluid nature of China–Africa cultural and religious encounters. Inspired by “assemblage thinking” and based on fieldwork observation and interviews, I examine the heterogeneity, fluidity, and adaptability of Shaolin’s operations in Zambia. I argue that ZSCC should be viewed as an evolving assemblage where diverse actors and elements interact and co-create meaning through adaptation and negotiation.
Despite initial hopes that advances in information technology would spread and deepen democracy around the world, new platforms for communicating have instead provided opportunities for the weakening of democracy. Social media, website hosting, messaging apps, and related technologies provide easy and cheap ways for micro-actors such as individuals and small groups (in addition to more traditional state and non-state actors) to wield soft power for antidemocratic purposes. This chapter probes how the malign version of soft power works by attracting targets through flows of information that seduce and trick audiences with mis- and disinformation as well as with divisive and hateful messaging. Focusing on malign soft power and how it is wielded through control of information flows (content, velocity, and access) provides a framework for assessing how cyber-enabled antidemocratic efforts take form and how new actors emerge.
Do perceived foreign policy failures shape assessments of a country’s leadership in the eyes of international observers? We explore the consequences of foreign policy failures using global reactions to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some argue that a poorly executed withdrawal heightened concerns about America’s soft power and image abroad. Others believe that the negative consequences of the withdrawal were exaggerated. To adjudicate between these claims, we compile public opinion surveys across 24 countries containing over 17,000 respondents. Analyzing perceptions of US leadership before and after the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, we find that the Afghanistan withdrawal had a substantive negative impact on global perceptions of US leadership. However, we observe no corresponding evidence that the attractiveness of great powers is ‘zero-sum’: decreases in favorability towards the United States were not paralleled by increases in the perceived attractiveness of alternatives to US leadership like Russia and China.
The revival of Confucianism in China reflects an effort to infuse soft power with moral authority and signals an attempt to turn ethical credibility into political legitimacy amid strategic ambition. This study examines the reception of China’s Confucian moral diplomacy in Southeast Asia, a region shaped by diverse ethical and religious traditions. Drawing on data from the sixth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, the analysis explores how Confucian social ethics and political values affect perceptions of China’s influence at domestic, regional, and global levels, and how these relationships vary with democracy, economic ties, and territorial disputes. The results show that moral integrity, not cultural familiarity, sustains acceptance. Social ethics foster approval only when China’s actions demonstrate reciprocity and sincerity, whereas political Confucianism, rooted in hierarchy and competence, gains traction under conditions of stability and cooperation. Across contexts, Confucianism functions less as a cultural export than as a moral framework guiding how publics interpret conduct. The findings reveal a broader transformation in international politics, suggesting power now depends more on the integrity of behaviour than on the allure of culture.
As the term ‘soft power’ in international relations (IR) has been coined by Joseph Nye a quarter of a century ago it has gained a great response and initiated numerous debates. A high quality education sector is one of the important factors that contributes to a country’s soft power. Despite that, as shown in the article, education has not been adequately covered in the existing IR literature. The article addresses this lacuna by offering an attempt to conceptualise and operationalise the educational aspect of soft power. First, with cases from the People’s Republic of China and Finland, it provides various examples of growing internationalisation of education, and analyses possible soft power gains from education. Second, the article provides a theoretical conceptualization of educational soft power, and presents three mechanisms that it can work through: as a carrier of genuine values, as a resource that countries possess, and as a tool in achieving certain goals. All three mechanisms also show how increasing internationalisation brings more direct connections between education, international relations, and foreign policy.
Do the public in a rising authoritarian power overestimate their country’s reputation, power, and influence in the world? Excessive national overconfidence has both domestic and international consequences, but it has rarely been systematically studied. Using two studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and another conducted later, I show that the Chinese public widely and systematically overestimate China’s global reputation and soft power, even during a national crisis. Critically, informing Chinese citizens of actual international public opinion of China substantially corrects these perceptions. It also moderately alters their evaluations of China, its governing system, and their expectations for the country’s role in the world. These effects from simple information interventions are not fleeting, suggesting that overconfidence can be meaningfully corrected and triumphalism mitigated. The findings have both theoretical significance and important policy implications.
Liturgies of Empire adopts a deliberately satirical, epistolary voice to examine the after-lives of Anglican imperialism as reconfigured in contemporary neocolonial activity. Some terms and turns of phrase assume an insider’s knowledge, and familiarity with socio-political definitions, the geographical regions and their specific religious registers and discourse would place the reader in a better position to appreciate the North/South epistemic critiques. Whilst the English narrator, recipient and institutional offices in the missive are entirely fictional, all events, statistics, and quotations are factual and have been verified against the sources cited. The memo casts an eye over three postcolonial Anglican dioceses as case studies to examine how the Anglican Realignment revives the spirit of empire through insistence on its monopoly of truth. It traces how conservative evangelical networks, under the banner of biblical warrant and “Global South” identity, reintensify imperial-era logics of propriety and paternalism. Attempting to supplant Canterbury’s more generous ecclesial disposition, these self-proclaimed guardians of truth are grounded in patriarchal authority, marked not by self-scrutiny but fixation on policing gender and sexuality. Theirs is an ecclesiology that cannot abide dissent, ambiguity, or difference, sanctifying conformity as faithfulness and exclusion as orthodoxy.
This chapter follows the trajectory of an early Cold War ideal of a pro-American Islam that could serve US foreign policy goals. It asks how and why Islamic mysticism generally, and Sufism specifically, came to be seen as the West-friendly “moderate Islam.” What role did transculturation and comparativism between Türkiye and Iran under America’s global hegemony play in forming this common perception?
Building on research into US government archives, Pahlavi propaganda texts, Islamist sermons, and print media from US allies, including Iran’s common comparand, Türkiye, this chapter demonstrates how State Department officials, CIA researchers, and public intellectuals used representations of Empress Farah to link beauty to modernization theory and mobilized comparative critiques of both on aesthetic grounds. Examining these depictions alongside the Empress’s own views on her appearance and political role offers new insights into the gendered limits of nation-branding and soft power.
This article contributes to the literature on religious soft power by considering how non-Muslim-majority great powers – China, Russia, and the US – use Islam as a foreign policy resource in their soft power strategies. We argue that these states have deployed Islam to present positive self-images on the international stage, at the same time as using negative-other strategies via soft disempowerment to construct competitor states as unfriendly and/or dangerous to Muslims. We conclude by arguing that the use of Islam by non-Muslim great powers is a potentially dangerous game. While instrumentalising Islam may provide immediate benefits, it also opens the possibility for critique, particularly around perceived inconsistencies between domestic religious practices of a state and its internationally promoted narratives. These tensions can invite accusations of illegitimacy and hypocrisy, especially when leveraged by competitors or transnational religious actors.
After the conquest of the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru, Spanish dominance in the Americas was maintained through a combination of “soft” and “hard” power: a mixture of armed coercion and an elaborate legal-administrative apparatus which ensured that tension rarely escalated into full-blown conflict. The sturdiness of Spain’s empire may also be attributed to other significant factors, including epidemiology (differential immunity), topography, and the avoidance of certain types of military engagement, all of which tended to intersect with or reinforce the deployment of “soft” and “hard” power. There were at least three broad threats to Spain’s dominance: external enemies, particularly rival European states covetous of the economic advantages Spain obtained from its New World dominions; unsubdued Amerindians on the fringes of Spanish settlement, who clung to their autonomy and effectively controlled vast swathes of territory through to the end of the colonial period; and an internal, heterogeneous group from all rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, from wealthy, privileged merchants to mistreated African slaves. At some point or other from 1521 until 1808, an internal challenge to Spanish dominance emerged from every sector of colonial society. Whether by design or felicitous coincidence, external and internal threats to Spanish dominance were rarely coterminous, which may help to explain the empire’s resilience and longevity.