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During the Second World War, psychiatrists, psychologists, and other experts confronted unprecedented numbers of patients, including distressed servicemen, bombed civilians, unaccompanied children, returning veterans, displaced persons, and Holocaust survivors. In the first comprehensive analysis of treatment during and after the war, Elizabeth Roberts-Pedersen examines how British and American experts interpreted and responded to these diverse patient populations. Looking at both combatants and civilians together, she demonstrates that wartime psychiatry was less concerned with individual suffering than with managing mental distress at scale, revealing profound tensions in psychiatric thought over the causes of wartime mental disorder and its treatment. Perhaps most significantly, Human Salvage shows how the Second World War brought mass violence into the clinical realm, transforming psychiatric theory and practice for decades to come.
Chapter 2 reconstitutes Cuban and US history with sexuality at the center beginning in 1970s, including the sexual revolution in the US, HIV/AIDS, and the development of progressive sex ed in Cuba. It chronicles the downfall of the Soviet Union and its impact on the Cuban economy, which in turn affected the sexual economy. The meaning of homosexuality evolved in both the US and Cuba, at least in part in relation to geopolitics.
In this path-breaking history, Tobias Rupprecht offers a revisionist account of Russia's post-Soviet marketisation from the perspective of the advisors and ministers who oversaw this transformation. Based on extensive interviews with economists and research in state and private archives, he uncovers a significant minority of economic liberals from late Soviet academic and dissident circles who sought to chart a new path, believing free prices and private property were the foundations of a 'civilised country'. This provides a vital challenge to the dominant narrative that neoliberal advisors and organisations imposed harmful reforms on Russia after the collapse of Communism. Liberal reformers faced a profound dilemma – one for which Western advisors had no solution either: should they commit to democratic political activism and risk irrelevance, or align themselves with those in power and be co-opted by an authoritarian state determined to reassert its imperial strength?
Extractive activities in central Russian peatlands gradually declined in the late Soviet period, a change which reflected the reorientation of the country’s energy system toward Siberian fossil fuels as well as a shift in the cultural perceptions of peatlands, as scientists began to recognize the value of intact wetlands and a wider public expressed concerns about their loss. The Soviet collapse and subsequent economic crisis made the end of extraction an unsettling experience. Many regions were gradually cut off from the resources and services that had sustained them for several decades. Communities experienced high outmigration and social marginalization, while abandoned peat extraction sites became serious fire hazards. Tracing the decline of extraction and its legacies, this chapter demonstrates that, instead of recovery, the end of extraction brought new forms of social and environmental precarity. While peat’s role as a fuel has shrunk dramatically in the past decades, the legacies of its extraction and use are bound to remain.
This chapter recounts the final years of the USSR, from the collapse of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe in 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. It focuses particularly on Gorbachev's failed bid to create a common European space that would include the USSR. His effort to keep East Germany out of NATO was a significant part of that vision, but it was outrightly rejected by President George H.W. Bush, who feared that if Gorbachev had his way, Germany would leave NATO, undermining the alliance and, with it, the rationale for the American presence in Europe. The chapter explores the nature of the reassurances given to Gorbachev in February 1990, concluding that there was never a "deal" not to enlarge NATO, at least not as far as Gorbachev knew. Facing economic collapse and political chaos at home, the Soviet leader had to accept the terms he was given. This did not save the Soviet project. Gorbachev's vision for the future fell flat, leaving his dreams of global leadership largely unfulfilled.
As communism collapsed, disagreements emerged that endured until 2014. Russia struggled unsuccessfully to keep Ukraine in a new Moscow-led union and disagreement over the Black Sea Fleet and its base in Crimea proved unresolvable. Meanwhile, Russia and the West advanced different visions for post-Cold War Europe. Pressured by both Russia and the US, Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances. Already in 1993, the prospect that a “red–brown” coalition of communists and fascists would come to power in Moscow prompted many countries to look for ways to guard against Russian reassertion, exacerbating the security dilemma.
As communism collapsed, disagreements emerged that endured until 2014. Russia struggled unsuccessfully to keep Ukraine in a new Moscow-led union and disagreement over the Black Sea Fleet and its base in Crimea proved unresolvable. Meanwhile, Russia and the West advanced different visions for post-Cold War Europe. Pressured by both Russia and the United States, Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances. Already in 1993, the prospect that a “red-brown” coalition of communists and fascists would come to power in Moscow prompted many countries to look for ways to guard against Russian reassertion, exacerbating the security dilemma.
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