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Collective memory of a historical event does not depend on its contemporary and historiographical significance alone. Germany’s selective memory of the Eastern Front is a case in point. It has been influenced by four developments. The problem of the prisoners of war that had remained in the Soviet Union, the ‘returnees’, and the veterans underlined the importance of the Eastern Front among the West German public. The Stalingrad myth, in particular, had a decisive influence on an image of war (in the East), according to which the Germans considered themselves first and foremost victims of that war. The critical discussion of the war and its nexus with the Holocaust after 1970 led to a turning point wherein the victims of the Germans became the focus of remembrance in West Germany. In the socialist satellite state of East Germany, the heroization of the Red Army was a characteristic feature of public war memories. Commemorations of the Eastern Front changed again in unified Germany after the Cold War – from the early years of Russia’s rapprochement to the dramatic deterioration of the German-Russian relationship.
This chapter describes German and Soviet strategies for the year 1942 and covers operations from May 1942 to March 1943. These includes the Soviet offensive towards Kharkiv, German preliminary operations such as the conquering of Sevastopol and the Kerch peninsula, but also operations on other sections of the Eastern Front like Soviet offensives against Rzhev and the German operation ‘Whirlwind’. However, the focus is on the German summer offensive and the Battle of Stalingrad. By linking these events to the operations along the eastern front as well as decisions and events outside the eastern theatre, the chapter argues that Germany’s failure in 1942 was a consequence of Allied superiority in men and material, but also of a German leadership that underestimated Soviet warfare capabilities. The German command wanted to achieve too many objectives with too few resources in too short a period of time. This failure was part of a larger turn of the tide in the war, that finally led to the Axis defeat.
The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War has often been seen by Americans as at best a temporary necessity to defeat Nazi Germany. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes how much American and Soviet attitudes changed during the war and how many people in both countries came to believe the wartime collaboration would be a foundation for postwar cooperation. While many American politicians, journalists, and historians have downplayed or even forgotten the vital Soviet role in the crushing of German armies, during the war most Americans were keenly aware of the enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet people. By the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in early 1943, mainstream media in the United States lionized not only the Red Army but even Joseph Stalin. The massive US Lend–Lease aid to the USSR was not crucial to the Soviet survival of German offensives in 1941 and 1942, as some have claimed, but it did significantly enhance the Red Army’s mobility and communications, thereby hastening the joint allied victory in Europe by May 1945.
The Nazi-Soviet War was the largest and most brutal theatre of the Second World War, fought between two of the most ruthless states ever to exist. Bringing together twenty-four of the most accomplished authors in both German and Soviet history, this Cambridge Companion provides the most authoritative, and yet highly accessible, guide to the conflict. Each chapter examines a key aspect of the war from war planning, the opposing forces and the campaigns to criminality and occupation, alliances, the home fronts and postwar legacies and myth-making. The authors demonstrate that the Nazi-Soviet war was both a conventional clash of arms in which millions of soldiers fought in titanic battles, but also a non-conventional war in which soldiers and security forces murdered countless non-combatants. It was a war of resources, industry, mobilisation, administration, and popular support, with implications that still drive European security debates today.
The Battle of Stalingrad had far-reaching effects on political policing. A string of military disasters over 1943 raised the spectre of the stab-in-the-back. The Gestapo also feared that news of German defeats would embolden a slave revolt. The economy relied on forced labour by 1943 and disruptions could seriously threaten the war effort. Faced with criticism and revolt, the Gestapo focused on the greater of two evils. But the lessons of history dictated that morale could not be ignored. The Party stepped into the breach. Local political officials gained authority to investigate criticism and warn minor offenders. The Reich Security Main Office acknowledged this new division of labour by early 1944. Barriers between Marxists and organized opposition blurred under these conditions. Torture and surveillance were cleared against any organized group. Selective enforcement continued nonetheless. The Party singled out subversive Germans with “doubtful attitudes” and warned “grumblers.” The Gestapo were free to handle offences that filtered up with greater severity and focus on keeping foreign workers under control. Selective enforcement moved deeper into German society.
This chapter covers the Soviet-German war after the December 1941 Battle of Moscow and the failure of the initial Blitzkrieg; the Red Army takes the initiative after the Battle of Stalingrad and drives the Wehrmacht back to the western borderlands of the USSR by the spring of 1944. The Soviet winter offensive in 1941-2. Stalin’s over-optimism leads to setbacks at Kharkov and in Crimea. Hitler’s spring 1942 ‘second offensive’, Operation BLUE, concentrated in southern Russia. The Battle of Stalingrad; reasons for the success of Russian counter-attack. The responsibility of Hitler and his generals. Improvements in the Red Army are critically important. Spring 1943 and Hitler’s delayed attempt at a limited offensive in Operation CITADEL. The Battle of Kursk is followed by a successful Red Army counter-offensive across Ukraine in 1943-4. Developing diplomatic relations between Russia, Britain, and America. The Communist International disbanded. The first meeting of the ‘Big Three’ leaders at Tehran in late 1943: agreements about Polish borders and the timing of the British and American cross-Channel landing.
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